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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the impact of Fyodor Dostoevsky and Friedrich Nietzsche on
the development of Albert Camus’ political philosophy. The innovation of the present
study is in the attempt to offer a substantive examination of Camus’ dialogue with
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. To the extent that connections between these writers have
been discussed, it has been in the general context of modern thought or it has focused on
overlapping literary themes. This project emphasizes the political dimensions of these
connections. In addition to re-interpreting Camus’ political thought, the aim is to clarify
Camus’ struggle with transcendence and to bring renewed attention to his unique
understanding of the relationship between nihilism, ideology, and political violence in the
twentieth century. I focus on Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky for three
reasons. First, these are the thinkers with whom Camus is most engaged. Indeed the
problems and themes of Camus’ work are largely defined by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche;
a full account of this dialogue will therefore enhance our understanding of Camus while
also reinforcing the enduring importance of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Second, it allows
me to recast Camus’ political philosophy as both a synthesis of and a response to
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s projects. Finally, I believe this approach allows for a reassessment of Camus’ broader political significance, which I contend has been
undervalued in the literature. Ultimately, I argue that Camus remains among the most
important moral and political voices of the twentieth century. Although limited, his
philosophy of revolt offers a humane portrait of justice and articulates a meaningful
alternative to the extremes of ideological politics.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“In the spectacle of death, in the endurance of intolerable pain, and in the
irrevocableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an overpowering awe, a feeling
of the vastness, the depth, the inexhaustible mystery of existence, in which, as by some
strange marriage of pain, the sufferer is bound to the world by bonds of sorrow. In these
moments of insight, we lost all eagerness of temporary desire, all struggling and striving
for petty ends, all care for the little trivial things that, to a superficial view, make up the
common life of day by day; we see, surrounding the narrow raft illumined by the
flickering light of human comradeship, the dark ocean on whose rolling waves we toss
for a brief hour; from the great night without, a chill blast breaks in upon our refuge; all
the loneliness of humanity amid hostile forces is concentrated upon the individual soul,
which must struggle alone, with what of courage it can command, against the whole
weight of a universe that cares nothing for its hopes and fears.” – Bertrand Russell
More than fifty years after his death, Camus remains a critical voice for political
justice and human rights. Writing in the midst of World War II, Camus engaged the
problem of nihilism with urgency and moral clarity. As an artist, Camus felt obliged to
confront injustice and to tell the truth about its origins. Through his journalism, fiction,
and philosophical essays, he sought ways to confront a world without meaning while
avoiding the ideological extremes of the twentieth century. Given his task and historical
moment, it is not surprising that Camus continues to receive attention from scholars and
the public.
Camus’ early notoriety was largely the result of his journalism. Unable to join the
military because of his tuberculosis, he moved to Paris in 1940 to write for the French
newspaper the Paris-Soir. With the help of his long-time friend Pascal Pia, Camus was
introduced to Gaston Gallimard, whose family operated publishing houses in France at
the time. This connection would lead to the publication of Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus
and The Stranger. Although he hoped to publish these works in conjunction with
Caligula, the Nazi occupation of Paris forced him to return to his native Algeria. Having
1

fled France, Camus sent his manuscripts to Pia, who forwarded them to Andre Malraux.
Although he had reservations about Caligula and The Myth of Sisyphus, Malraux was
impressed by The Stranger. Malraux sent the manuscript to Gallimard and recommended
immediate publication. In June of 1942, Gallimard published The Stranger. After a few
months and several revisions, The Myth of Sisyphus was also published. Although
Camus’ first works did not initially garner widespread acclaim, among the French elites
they were embraced with unusual enthusiasm.1 In 1942, then, Camus’ literary life was
permanently altered.
Later that year, as Allied forces landed on the North African coast, Camus
became separated from his wife Francine, who arrived in Oran shortly before the
occupation. In Paris and unable to return to Oran, Camus began working with Gallimard
as a literary reviewer. He quickly emerged as a key figure in the French Resistance
movement. Around this time he helped to establish the underground newspaper Combat,
which was arguably the most significant publication during the Nazi occupation. As an
editor and writer, Camus captured the public’s attention, eventually becoming one of the
leading voices of the movement.
Camus’ experiences at Combat were critical to his development as an artist and
political thinker. Having risked his life as a member of the resistance, giving shelter to
colleagues and working with various underground groups, Camus became increasingly
aware of his responsibilities as an artist. Nihilism was no longer an abstraction; it was a
political reality that demanded action. As his influence increased in post-war France,
Camus’ resistance activities also expanded. His struggles against Nazism in particular
1

Herbert Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (New York: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1979), p. 255.
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sharpened his understanding of the threat of violence and ideological terror. Henceforth
his writing assumed an increasingly moral hue. Even in the aftermath of the Allied
victory, Camus continued to defend human dignity, both in France and abroad. The spirit
of revolution persisted in Europe after the defeat of Nazism, and Camus perceived a
lingering nihilism at the root of it. Against this nihilism Camus and his colleagues at
Combat advocated a new kind of political morality. Herbert Lottman described this
attitude in the following terms:
The moral bias of Camus's Combat, or more accurately the Combat of
Camus, Pia, Altschuler, Paute-Gimone, Ollivier, and their colleagues, was
the newspaper's single distinguishing feature, making concrete the vague
and often unexpressed hopes of the younger generation. . . . It guaranteed
that there would not be a moral vacuum during the scramble for power
that was taking place the first few months of liberated Paris. Camus and
Combat were a new morality or they were nothing.2
Lottman’s observation here is important because it reflects Camus’ post-war view of his
role as a thinker and a political actor. The moral urgency of Camus’ subsequent writings,
therefore, is unsurprising.
Camus’ next major work, The Plague, was published in 1946. The book was a
tremendous success. Exploring exile and rebellion in an explicitly absurd context, The
Plague was a uniquely relevant work in Europe’s post-war climate. It was also the first
work of fiction in which Camus tried to articulate his philosophy of revolt. For that
reason, it helped to cement Camus’ reputation as one of the most important moral
thinkers of his generation. Following The Plague, Camus emerged as an international
figure, giving talks throughout Europe and the United States.
In the post-war years, however, the ideological rift between the United States and
Russia defined international politics. The Allied victory gave rise to a new world order,
2
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with capitalism and communism dominating political life. An opponent of both
ideologies, Camus’ moderation become a source of increasing tension. On the one hand,
Camus rejected the economic injustices of capitalism, which he believed perpetuated a
system of force and domination. On the other hand, Camus was unable to accept the
totalizing claims of communism, which justified violence on pseudo-historical grounds.
In the leftist climate of post-war France, however, Camus’ moderate stance was
vehemently condemned. This culminated when Camus released his most significant
political work The Rebel. Published in 1951, The Rebel articulated Camus’ theory of
revolt as well as his critique of ideology, particularly socialism and Marxism. Following
its release, leading intellectuals like Andre Breton and Jean-Paul Sartre publicly criticized
the work, dismissing it has vague and incoherent. Breton, for instance, called Camus’
moderate notion of revolt a meaningless “artifice . . . a case of keeping the word and
eliminating the thing itself.”3 Although Camus was wounded by the backlash, he
continued to denounce ideologues on both the left and right. But his refusal to choose
sides damaged his reputation among French intellectuals and the public. Furthermore,
Camus’ nuanced position concerning France’s occupation of Algeria (to which I return
later) only reinforced the view that Camus’ moralism was politically naïve.
Although he remained firm in his convictions, Camus suffered immensely from
the criticisms of his work, many of which were deeply personal. There was an extended
period, in fact, in which Camus questioned his vocation as a writer.4 Unable to create,
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Andre Breton, “The Second Surrealist Manifesto,” in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans.
Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1969),
p. 178.
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Camus’ notebooks during this period reflect his frustration. Particularly in the first few
years after The Rebel, Camus continually references his writer’s block, suggesting at one
4

Camus failed to produce a major work of fiction for roughly five years. In 1956, Camus
published his final novel The Fall, and in the following year he released a collection of
short stories entitled Exile and the Kingdom. In 1957, moreover, Camus was awarded the
Nobel Prize for Literature at the age of forty-three. Tragically, just as Camus seemed
ready to begin the next phase of his literary career, he died in a car accident in 1960.
Despite his early death, Camus produced a number of influential works, and his
thought continues to stimulate debate in the academic literature. In the political science
scholarship, there is considerable doubt as to Camus’ importance as a political thinker.
Focusing mostly on his essay The Rebel, critics like Michael Harrington claim that
Camus “could find nothing more than a romantic syndicalism to counterpose against his
own corrosive skepticism.”5 But critiques such as this tend to view Camus’ thought
through too narrow a prism and, consequently, undervalue his importance as a political
thinker. While it is true that Camus was not a systematic theorist, it is a mistake to
assume he had nothing significant or concrete to say about political life. Camus analyzed
politics not as a social scientist or a philosopher but as an artist and existentialist; and he
sought understanding of human reality through psychological analysis and experience.
For Camus, this was best done through art and fiction. The difficulties involved in
classifying Camus have been addressed well by Germaine Bree:
Philosophical and ethical systems, as such, did not interest him, and he
himself on several occasions stated that he was not a philosopher . . . [But]
if we think of a writer whose essential effort is directed toward elucidating

point that he may have exhausted his creative potential (Notebooks 1951-1959, pp. 11112).
5
Michael Harrington, The Accidental Century (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965),
p. 169.
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his own experiences through an effort of his intelligence as a philosopher,
then Camus most certainly is a philosopher.”6
It is true that Camus was primarily a fiction writer, but this did not prevent him from
exploring serious political problems; on the contrary, it enabled him to examine them on
a variety of levels and to articulate them in a multiplicity of ways. John Cruickshank has
argued persuasively, in fact, that Camus’ use of fiction should be understood in the larger
historical context. In the wake of World War II, Cruickshank notes, “The general move
in philosophy was to move away from abstractions and general theories and grapple with
concreteness and particulars. Novels are a perfect vehicle for just such a move.”7 To
account for his thought, therefore, we must give equal attention to all of his writings,
particularly the fiction, where his philosophical themes and political ideas are most
developed. To this end, I examine the development of Camus’ thought in his political
and philosophical writings as well as his novels and plays.
Before continuing, it is essential to explain why Dostoevsky and Nietzsche are of
such importance to Camus’ thought. First, these are the thinkers with whom Camus is
most engaged. Indeed the problems and themes of Camus’ work are largely defined by
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche; an account of this dialogue is therefore critical to a larger
understanding of Camus. Second, analyzing Camus’ thought from this perspective helps
to elucidate the ways in which Camus responds to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. Camus
regards these thinkers as prophets of modernity; his works seek to clarify this fact.
Although Camus engages them in different ways and for different reasons, he is almost
always responding to them in one way or another. Finally, I believe this approach allows
6

Germaine Bree, Camus, Revised Edition, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.,
1964), p. 9.
7
John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 63.
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for a re-assessment of Camus’ broader political significance, which I argue has been
undervalued.
The Appeal of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky
Nietzsche was a figure of enduring interest to Camus. Indeed one of Camus’ first
published essays is a laudatory analysis of Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy. 8 Among the
many reasons for Camus’ attraction to Nietzsche was Nietzsche’s peculiar place in the
history of philosophy. Neither an academic philosopher nor a conventional writer,
Nietzsche spent the bulk of his productive life in solitude, critiquing his age and culture
from afar. Nietzsche thus appealed both to Camus’ artistic and critical disposition. More
importantly, Nietzsche was a lucid thinker who directly engaged the nihilism of his time
– given his historical moment, Camus likely found this aspect of Nietzsche admirable.
While Camus would later concede that Nietzsche was partly responsibility for this crisis,
he nonetheless recognized the urgency of Nietzsche’s admonitions.
As a thinker, then, Nietzsche was deeply engaged with the problem of nihilism.
Unable to dismiss it, Camus writes, “Nietzsche accepts the entire burden of nihilism.”9
Nietzsche’s philosophical courage was a kind of model for Camus. In his notebooks, for
example, Camus writes
It is said that Nietzsche, after breaking with Lou, entered into a final
solitude, walked at night in the mountains that dominate the Gulf of Genoa
and lit immense fires there that he watched smolder. I’ve often thought of
these fires and their gleam has danced behind my entire intellectual life.
So even though I’ve sometimes been unjust toward certain thoughts and

8

The article, entitled “Essay on Music,” was published in June 1932 in the Algerian
review Sud. Camus wrote this during his first year of college, during which he was
introduced to Nietzsche by his mentor and professor, Jean Grenier.
9
Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p.
67.
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certain men whom I’ve met in this century, it is because I’ve unwillingly
put them in front of these fires and they were promptly reduced to ashes.10
Camus’ admiration for Nietzsche is apparent, as is his tendency to judge himself and
others by Nietzschean standards. Camus’ writing room, moreover, as Herbert Lottman
notes, was “decorated with portraits of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.”11 It is important to
emphasize these details at the outset, as they speak to Nietzsche’s lasting influence on
Camus.
As an intellectual influence, Dostoevsky was equally important to Camus. Indeed
among Camus’ literary models, Thomas Epstein has claimed that “Dostoevsky was the
most important case, the inspiration, idol, and obstacle needed by Camus in order to
define himself.”12 With Dostoevsky, however, there are some biographical parallels that
help to explain Camus’ fascination. To begin, Camus and Dostoevsky experienced
comparable intellectual evolutions. Both, for instance, were initially drawn to socialist
ideologies. In 1849, in fact, Dostoevsky was arrested and exiled in Siberia for conspiring
with members of the Petrashevsky Circle, a literary group of progressive intellectuals.
Dostoevsky’s memories of this period would later serve as the basis for his political novel
The Possessed. Camus similarly joined (albeit reluctantly and not for long) the
Communist Party during his college years in Algeria.13 Shortly after joining, however,
both Camus and Dostoevsky rejected the doctrinal inflexibility of these movements.

10

Albert Camus, Notebooks 1951-1959, trans. Ryan Bloom (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
2008), p. 89.
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Complexity of Albert Camus’ Writings (New York: Palgrave, 2012), p. 146.
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There is also an aporetic quality to Camus and Dostoevsky’s thought that warrants
discussion. Neither thinker was able to resolve the contradictions in their life and works.
Dostoevsky, for instance, as Camus points out in The Myth of Sisyphus, understood the
absurd problem, yet posited a solution wholly inconsistent with it.14 Dostoevsky thus
acknowledges the absence of meaning in human history, but persists in his faith. Camus’
thought is also antagonistic. His philosophy of revolt rejects foundationalism, for
example, while preserving a sense of foundations. Camus also denies the existence of
God, but insists that he is not an atheist.15 Much of Camus’ later thought also revolves
around a contradiction: affirming limits and values in a world in which limits and values
are not given; as the chapter on revolt will demonstrate, this affirmation of contradiction
was the guiding theme of Camus’ political thought.
The persistence of contradictions in Camus and Dostoevsky’s writings is related
to a more fundamental commonality. Dostoevsky was plagued by doubt his entire life.16
Indeed the most powerful arguments in Dostoevsky’s novels are often those with which
he disagrees. The clearest example of this is Ivan’s atheistic pronouncements in The
Brothers Karamazov. Camus shared Dostoevsky’s self-questioning nature. Born a
French Algerian, Camus struggled to reconcile his European and Mediterranean
identities. Camus’ cultural ambivalence is reflected in his writings. His dissertation and
14

Camus writes that Dostoevsky undergoes a “complete metaphysical u-turn” (The Myth
of Sisyphus, p. 111) when he posits God and belief in immortality as the only solution to
the absurd. Camus also questions the veracity of Dostoevsky’s religious conviction. “It
is hard to believe,” he writes, “that a novel [The Brothers Karamazov] sufficed to
transform into joyful certainty the suffering of a lifetime.”
15
In a response to a question about the religious tone of one of his plays, for instance,
Camus is quoted by his biographer Todd as saying “It’s true that I don’t believe in God,
but that doesn’t mean I’m an atheist” (Albert Camus: A Life, p. 356).
16
Dostoevsky was quite candid about the extent of his self-doubt. Indeed he referred to
himself as a “child of disbelief and doubt” (Correspondence of Dostoevsky, I, p. 157).
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first formal philosophical work, for example, tries to integrate Greek and Christian
thought. And while Dostoevsky’s Christianity existed in perpetual tension with doubt,
Camus’ secular humanism was shrouded in Christian symbolisms.17 In any event, the
abundance of aporias in Camus and Dostoevsky is an important point of convergence.
On the one hand, it reflects their resistance to absolutism. But it also explains their
preference for art and fiction. Formal philosophy demands order and coherence. Camus
and Dostoevsky wanted their art to reflect reality, which is tensional and uncertain.
Hence their art and ideas attempt to express this uncertainty. Understanding this is
essential to any effort to make sense of Camus and Dostoevsky’s thought.
Camus’ Dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky
For most of his adult life Camus was directly engaged with the works of
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. This was partly the result of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s use
of art as a medium for the exploration of social problems. But it was also because Camus
shared their thematic interests and political concerns. In his notebooks, novels, plays,
political journalism, and essays, Camus takes up specific motifs he first encountered in
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. The cardinal themes of Camus’ thought, for instance, are
absurdity and revolt, and the terms of these problems are defined by Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky; indeed the resulting tension between them eventually crowns Camus’
political thought.18 To illustrate this as well as the larger significance of Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky to Camus’ art and political philosophy, this study follows Camus’ attempts to
17

There is a considerable literature on Camus’ tenuous relationship to Christianity, as
well as his use of Christian imagery. As I will deal in greater detail with this in the
following chapters, it suffices here to note that Camus’ thought is never entirely divorced
from the Christian vision to which it is often opposed.
18
This will be examined in detail in chapter five, where Camus’ philosophy of revolt is
analyzed.
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develop and respond to their ideas. Particular attention is paid to direct references to
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in Camus’ notebooks and non-fiction, as these will help to
corroborate more general claims concerning Camus’ fictional works. Although
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s influence on Camus has received sporadic attention in the
literature, the significance of this dialogue has not been fully elucidated. Consequently,
the nature and motivating concerns of Camus’ thought (as well as its political import) are
not entirely understood.
To help frame Camus’ dialogue Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, three conceptual
periods of Camus’ writing are delineated. The first is Camus’ sensualist period, which
begins with Camus’ college years in the early 1930s and extends roughly until the 1940s.
This cycle of works is largely apolitical. Camus’ inquiries are chiefly metaphysical,
focusing on the role of aesthetics and meaning in human life. Camus’ encounter with
Nietzsche begins in the sensual period, as questions of affirmation and purposelessness
are explored in a variety of contexts. The second period, which emerges around 1942, is
concerned with the metaphysics of absurdity. Here Camus is interested in man’s relation
to the world and in deducing the moral and epistemological consequences of absurdity
for human life. Accordingly, his analyses are more existential than political, more
solipsistic than social. During this period, Camus continues to engage Nietzsche, but his
dialogue with Dostoevsky begins to take shape as well, particularly when Camus
develops a psychology of the absurd. Camus’ third and final period coincides with the
publication of his novel The Plague in 1947. Here Camus develops a positive philosophy
of revolt and, not surprisingly, his interaction with Dostoevsky becomes paramount.
Camus tries to map the lessons of the absurd onto the social-ethical sphere, and his
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dialogue with both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche begins to crystallize. Henceforth, Camus’
thought reflects his postwar concerns and we discover what Thomas Hanna aptly calls a
“positive attack on the ethical-political problems of the twentieth century.”19 Throughout
his revolt period, moreover, Camus formulates an ethos that is uniquely his own. For this
reason, this period will be instrumental to establishing the final significance of Nietzsche
and Dostoevsky to Camus’ thought.
In terms of his broader dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, Camus’
transition from absurdity to revolt is particularly significant. For the first time, Camus
appears to reject Nietzsche on ethical grounds. Camus’ desire to affirm life on absurdist
terms is weighed against his desire to impose limits on action. As Camus wrestles with
this dilemma, his engagement with Dostoevsky increases. More precisely, absurdity and
political action are seen as problematic in a world without transcendence. It is thus in
these works that Camus responds most directly to Dostoevsky’s essential claim: that
without God and belief in immortality life becomes not only impossible to love but
“something unnatural, an unbearable nonsense.”20
Ultimately, Camus’ thought will be understood in terms of its engagement with
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Nietzsche shapes Camus’ conception of modern nihilism. As
his notebook entries suggest, Nietzsche becomes the catalyst for Camus’ understanding
of nihilism as a crisis of culture; he challenges Camus to identify the proper attitude one
ought to adopt towards an absurd world. Nietzsche’s psychology also informs much of
Camus’ absurdist thought in The Myth of Sisyphus. Dostoevsky awakens Camus to two
19

Thomas Hanna, The Thought and Art of Camus (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery
Company, 1958), p. 85.
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Quoted in Ray Davison’s The Challenge of Dostoevsky (Exeter, UK: University of
Exeter Press, 1997), p. 44.
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existential realities. First, Dostoevsky’s Christianity profoundly alters Camus’ beliefs
concerning the social utility of unifying ideas (such as the Christ-ideal). While Camus
does not accept Dostoevsky’s Christianity, he is clearly affected by Dostoevsky’s
understanding of the sources of order in society. Hence Camus’ dialogue with
Dostoevsky intensifies during the absurd and revolt periods; in works such as The
Plague, The Fall, and The Rebel, this is most apparent.21 Dostoevsky also awakens
Camus to the connections between individual crime and collective revolution. Indeed in
his notebooks Camus sums up Dostoevsky’s argument as follows: “Dostoevsky’s Thesis:
The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the society to revolution.”22 This
Dostoevskyian insight anchors Camus’ analysis of historical rebellion, and is central to
his broader conception of revolt.
To sum up, the approach of this study is to identify the substantive foundations of
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in Camus’ non-fiction and to examine
the ways in which Camus engages these thinkers in his fictional works. I argue that
Nietzsche’s thought is more significant in Camus’ early works while Dostoevsky’s is
more important in Camus’ later writings. In both cases, however, the influence is more
of a dialogue, in which and through which Camus grapples with various conceptions of
absurdity and rebellion.
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Previous Literature
Much of the scholarship on Camus, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky has ignored the
philosophical implications of their dialogue and instead focused on overlapping literary
themes. Given the significance of these thinkers to Camus’ thought, this dearth in the
literature is surprising. However, several studies are exceptional in this respect. Fred
Willhoite’s Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus’ Contribution to Political Thought, for
example, briefly examines the substantive importance of Nietzsche to Camus. As the
title implies, Willhoite is primarily interested in Camus’ importance as a political
philosopher. Sensitive to what he calls Camus’ “existential method,” Willhoite begins by
acknowledging Camus’ deliberate avoidance of systematic thinking.23 On his account,
which this work adopts, Camus’ overarching concern was to confront nihilism and to reestablish “norms for human conduct in the political realm.”24 Willhoite’s contribution to
Camus scholarship is critically important mostly because of its emphasis on experience.
In particular, he elucidates Camus’ attempts to move beyond the “inadequate choices of
positivism and idealism,” neither of which captures the essence of lived experience for
Camus.25 Building on this insight, I try to explain Camus’ “existential method” by
considering it in the light of his engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.
In terms of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche, Willhoite argues persuasively that
Nietzsche’s creative nihilism was central to Camus’ philosophical development. As I
argue in subsequent chapters, Willhoite’s claims are borne out in Camus’ absurd and
revolt periods, where the creation and affirmation of values are seen as absurd
23

Fred Willhoite, Beyond Nihilism (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
1968), p. viii.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid, p. 11.
14

imperatives. Despite its many insights on the Camus-Nietzsche dynamic, however,
Willhoite’s analysis is limited in that it does not adequately address the reasons for
Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche. For instance, Willhoite explores the Nietzschean
roots of Camus’ early momentist works, but there is little discussion of Camus ’humanist
alternative to Nietzsche or of Camus’ attempts to develop a political philosophy within an
explicitly Nietzschean framework.
While several scholars have examined Nietzsche and Camus’ foundational
inquiries, David Owen’s Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity is among the few to
comparatively analyze them. Owen is particularly insightful in his analysis of
Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics, which he rightly identifies as a precursor to
Camus’ absurdist thought.26 However, Owen’s study does not examine Camus’ critical
engagement with Nietzsche’s ideas, particularly Nietzsche’s ubermensch doctrine. This
project examines Camus’ critique of Nietzsche and explains why Camus ultimately
remains faithful to Nietzsche’s fundamental vision. Perhaps most importantly, I explore
Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche against the backdrop of Dostoevsky’s thought. In
addition to clarifying Camus’ political resistance to Nietzsche, this will also help to
crystallize the importance of Dostoevsky to Camus’ mature philosophy of revolt.
One of the more recent studies of Camus’ political thought is Jeffrey Isaac’s
Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion. Emphasizing Camus’ rejection of traditional
grounds for action, Isaac ably distinguishes Camus as uniquely “antifoundational”
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thinker.27 This aspect of Camus’ thought is an enduring concern of this work. Unlike
Isaac, however, I try to account for Camus’ antifoundationalism by understanding it
primarily as a reaction to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Camus’ broader interest in “the
pathos of modernity,” Isaac also notes, was in part due to the influence of Nietzsche,
whose writings seemed to prophesize twentieth-century politics.28 The pathos to which
Isaac refers corresponds to the modern experience of exile, the dominant theme of
Camus’ absurdist writings. Isaac identifies an important parallel between Camus and
Nietzsche, which points to the enduring influence of Nietzsche during Camus’ revolt
period:
“Like Nietzsche, Arendt and Camus view the condition of modernity as
one of homelessness and estrangement in which men, having dethroned
God, hopelessly and dangerously seek through their own efforts the
certainty and solidity that only a God can provide. Like Heidegger, they
see modern subjectivity as engendering an unbridled, Promethean will to
power.29
The persistent search for certainty and meaning, as Isaac notes here, was central to
Camus’ view of the modern condition. Indeed when Camus criticizes ideologies in The
Rebel, these are seen as the animating impulses of all modern historicist movements.
Isaac is thus right to emphasize the Nietzschean origins of this insight.
Isaac also makes a critical observation concerning Camus’ complicated departure
from Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s account of nihilism, Isaac contends, was deeply influential
to the young Camus. Given his historical moment, Camus could not help but accept
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity. However, as Isaac notes, Camus could not embrace
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Nietzsche’s response to nihilism, which precluded a ground for solidarity or limits.30 In
the analysis of Camus’ philosophy of revolt, I build on Isaac’s limited analysis by
showing how Camus’ antifoundationalism tries to go beyond Nietzsche’s amoral
individualism. Additionally, I try to better elucidate the positive characteristics of
Camus’ antifoundationalism, which become clearer when contrasted with Nietzsche’s
creative nihilism and Dostoevsky’s conception of active love.
Isaac’s study is also instructive in its emphasis on Camus’ commitment to action.
Isaac sees Arendt and Camus as unique among the postmoderns because of their desire to
engage politics in a more concrete way. Unlike contemporary theorists such as Derrida
or Adorno, Isaac contends, Camus and Arendt recognized the urgency of the moment and
“sought to get to the bottom of the civilizational crisis of the twentieth century.”31 This
meant avoiding the pitfalls of doctrinaire thinking (particularly Marxism) and “helping to
reconstitute political thought in a nihilistic age.”32 The modern civilizational crisis was
anticipated and explained with remarkable clarity in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche
and Dostoevsky; it is therefore not surprising that Camus remained in constant dialogue
with these thinkers. Isaac notes the influence of Nietzsche on Camus in general terms,
but he does not discuss Dostoevsky at all. A fuller account of this dialogue will both
advance our understanding of Camus and reinforce the enduring importance of Nietzsche
and Dostoevsky.
Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky has also generated a fair amount of
scholarly interest. Particular focus has been given to Dostoevsky’s psychological account
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of metaphysical revolt. Hanna’s The Thought and Art of Camus is notable in this regard.
Indeed Hanna comments extensively on Camus’ ideas concerning Ivan Karamazov’s
place in the history of metaphysical revolt.33 By explaining the appeal of Ivan’s peculiar
humanism to Camus, Hanna lays the groundwork for much of this study, which claims
that Camus imbues Ivan’s revolt with an explicitly positive content. Unlike Hanna,
however, I include key Dostoevsky texts such as The Possessed in a broader discussion
of Camus’ experiential alternative to Dostoevsky’s foundationalism. By drawing on
additional Camus texts such as The First Man (which was unpublished at the time of
Hanna’s study), I also develop a more comprehensive account of Camus’ dialogue with
Dostoevsky.
Although it is somewhat dated, Maurice Friedman’s Problematic Rebel remains
among the most penetrating studies of rebellion and modern literature. While Friedman
is not directly concerned with the relationship between Camus and Dostoevsky, he does
identify some key points of contrast. In particular, Friedman’s discussion of The Plague
points to what I consider a vital distinction between Camus and Dostoevsky. Referring to
the protagonist Rieux, for instance, Friedman writes: “Camus portrays a number of
genuinely different images of man, to each of which he lends validity, yet he commits
himself in The Plague to one image above all others – that of the dialogical rebel Dr.
Rieux.34 The notion of the dialogical rebel is especially significant. As Friedman
observes, it emphasizes Camus’ momentist concern with dialogue, solidarity and
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suffering, as well as his “commitment to the concrete demands of the hour.”35 By
developing Camus’ notion of dialogical rebellion, Friedman accounts for the ethical
importance of Dostoevsky to Camus while contextualizing the dispute between Camus
and Dostoevsky concerning transcendence and experience. In the chapter on revolt, I
extend Friedman’s analysis by contrasting Rieux’s revolt with Ivan and Father Zossima
from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. This will help to distinguish Camus’
experiential humanism from Dostoevsky’s religious mysticism.
Friedman’s study is also noteworthy for its insight into Camus’ uniqueness as a
political thinker. Like Willhoite and Bree, Friedman emphasizes Camus’ interest in the
social implications of man’s ontological and epistemological situation. Recognizing the
limits of reason, Friedman asserts, Camus sought a more authentic politics in the realm of
human experience. Although Friedman does not explore this aspect of Camus’ thought
as exhaustively as Willhoite, he nonetheless treats Camus as an artist seeking to recover a
moral ground beyond the confines of transcendent religion and positivist science.36 In his
discussion of dialogical rebellion in particular, Friedman skillfully connects Camus’
political morality to his existential account of the human condition. This part of
Friedman’s will be discussed at length when I examine the Dostoevskyian roots of
Camusian revolt.
More recently, Mark Orme has explored the significance of Dostoevsky’s Ivan
Karamazov to Camus’ experiential humanism. In The Development of Albert Camus’s
Concern for Social and Political Justice, he suggests that Camus discovered in Ivan
35
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Karamazov a more concrete ground for action. Ivan’s moral outrage combined with his
refusal “of the divine,” Orme writes, marked an essential moment in the history of
rebellion for Camus.37 Although Ivan falls into negation as a result of his revolt, the
moral impulse behind it was an affirmation of human solidarity. Emphasizing this
moment, Orme points to the increasing importance of suffering and solidarity to Camus’
political thought. While it never went beyond the realm of abstraction, Ivan’s
identification with human suffering represented one the animating impulses of Camusian
revolt. In several works, notably The Plague, Camus suffuses his fictional rebels with
this sentiment, and in other texts such as The Rebel Camus identifies Ivan’s
humanitarianism as a starting point for a more authentic mode of revolt. In any case, by
examining Camus’ enduring interest in Ivan, Orme offers important insights into Camus’
fascination with one of Dostoevsky’s most enigmatic characters.
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the Camus-Dostoevsky relationship is
Ray Davison’s Camus: The Challenge of Dostoevsky. Focusing on the importance of
Dostoevsky’s fiction to Camus, Davison provides an excellent overview of Camus’
literary dialogue with Dostoevsky. In the context of this study, Davison’s analysis of
Dostoevsky’s absurd fiction is particularly instructive. Indeed Davison offers a richly
detailed account of Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky’s literary characters. “The
world of Dostoevsky’s rebels,” he writes, “is well tuned . . . to the aspirations of the
young Camus. They, like himself, want to live according to the dictates of logic and
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absurdity. They wish to deny nothing and to face the truth of existence.”38 Here Davison
elucidates the fundamental appeal of Dostoevsky’s fiction to Camus. By exposing the
individual’s inner confrontation with absurdity, Dostoevsky defines the absurd problem
for Camus. Davison is thus most insightful when discussing Camus’ fascination with
specific Dostoevsky characters. For this reason, I draw extensively on his text when
discussing Camus’ interaction with Dostoevsky’s absurd psychology. If there is a
difference, it is that I view the Camus-Dostoevsky dialogue through a distinctly political
prism. Dostoevsky’s psychology is critical, to be sure, but the central task is to explain
how Camus deals with the political implications of Dostoevsky’s thought.
Although he does not develop the connection, Davison does discuss Camus’
political interest in Dostoevsky’s absurdism. However, as Davison is concerned mostly
with Dostoevsky’s problematization of the absurd, he does not adequately address
Camus’ humanist extension of Dostoevsky’s absurdism. For instance, Davison points to
Ivan Karamazov’s “everything is permitted” as the essential theme of Camus’ absurd and
revolt writings. It is certainly true that Ivan (as well as Nietzsche) help to define the
problem of nihilism for Camus, but equally important is Camus’ response to Ivan. Ivan’s
“everything is permitted” was merely a point of departure for Camus. In his notebooks,
for example, Camus writes:
The truly free person is the one who accepting death as it is, accepts
simultaneously the consequences – namely the overturning of all
traditional notions of values in life. Ivan Karamazov’s ‘Everything is
Permitted’ is the only expression of coherent freedom. But it is imperative
to get to the bottom of the statement.39
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Here Camus’ desire to move beyond Ivan is clear. As with Nietzsche, Camus regards
Ivan’s diagnosis of nihilism as an injunction to create and affirm new values. To accept
Ivan’s negation as final, moreover, is to sanction crime and fail to see the creative
potential of rebellion. Camus speaks directly this in a 1946 Combat article:
Terror can be legitimized only if one adopts the principle that the end
justifies the means. And this principle can be embraced only if the efficacy
of an action is taken to be an absolute end, as in nihilist ideologies
(everything is permitted, success is what counts) or philosophies that take
history as absolute.40
Wresting a moral imperative from Ivan’s “everything is permitted” is thus a central aim
of Camus’ political thought. Davison recognizes Camusian revolt as a response to
“Ivan’s dilemma,” but he does not resolve the question of whether revolt works as a
political solution to this dilemma.41
Beyond his engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, Camus’ political thought
has received considerable scholarly attention. As mentioned, the works of Thomas
Hanna, Germaine Bree, Jeffrey Isaac, and Fred Willhoite are notable examples. Before
continuing, however, mention must also be made of David Sprintzen’s Camus: A Critical
Examination. Sprintzen insists that despite his fame, “few have adequately appreciated
Camus’ cultural significance.”42 For Sprintzen, this has to do with a failure to understand
the nature of Camus’ project. After diagnosing “those interior forces seemingly
propelling us toward destruction,” he argues, Camus sought to instantiate a different way
of thinking, what Sprintzen calls a “cultural rebirth.”43 Sprintzen’s analysis is insightful
40
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mostly because of its focus on Camus’ concern with foundations. Recognizing that
“metaphysical problems plague the modern world as never before,” Camus was always in
search of a new ground, one that did not point beyond.44 Aware of this, Sprintzen
evaluates Camus’ thought in terms of its possibilities for more authentic politics, not as a
system or blueprint for action.
Like Friedman, Sprintzen understands Camus’ emphasis on “dialogue and
community” as essential to his political pragmatism. Indeed Sprintzen makes a strong
case (which I corroborate in subsequent chapters) that Camus’ political thought
privileged experience as the only means of affirming limits and avoiding ideological
abstractions. This was the impetus, Sprintzen claims, for “Camus’ exploration of the
preconditions for the creation of dialogic communities.45 While Sprintzen is not alone in
pointing this out, he is unique in describing Camus’ dialogical rebellion as an attempt to
wrest “us out of the metaphysical isolation to which the experience of the absurd bears
witness.”46 This is a crucial point as it draws an important connection between absurdity
and revolt. One of the few imperatives to emerge from Camus’ absurd analysis, for
example, is acceptance of ambiguity. As Sprintzen notes, Camus emphasizes experiential
sharing as a way of encouraging mutual respect and undercutting “any claim of a right to
suppress the views and oppress the person of the Other.”47 To engage others in this way
is to accept, on mutual terms, the impossibility of absolute truth and the necessity of a
politics wherein no perspective is privileged over another. The absurd, in other words,
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negates absolutist claims and revolt aspires to build a dialogic community in which
values can be affirmed on relative terms.
Although Sprintzen is later critical of Camus’ efforts to establish a new
experiential ground for politics, his insights into Camus’ metaphysical and ontological
projects are an important contribution to Camus scholarship. In the final chapter on
revolt, I respond to Sprintzen’s critique of Camus, which resembles those of Sartre and
other Marxist-oriented contemporaries of Camus. In brief, Sprintzen contends that
Camus fails to account for concrete historical processes. Failing to see man as trapped
“within an engulfing history,” Camus falsely assumes he can transcend his historicaltechnical existence. By misunderstanding man’s relation to the world, Sprintzen
concludes, Camus’ theory of revolt fails to go “beyond the tragic-tension-dualism that
counterposes nature against history.”48 Worse still, it exaggerates man’s capacity (via
revolt) to practically transform his world. While Sprintzen’s critique is not altogether
wrong, this study suggests that it is based on a flawed conception of Camus’
philosophical anthropology. As chapter three argues, Camus’ ontology implies that
human beings can order their existence and orientation to others through symbols and a
commitment to concrete action.
While Sprintzen seems to understand Camus’ concern for foundations, he does
not adequately address Camus’ central political aim: imposing limits on action. It is
untrue, for instance, that Camus neglects man’s historical situation or even the material
origins of revolution; on the contrary, he concedes that “if rebellion exists, it is because
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falsehood, injustice, and violence are part of the rebel’s condition.”49 Camus, moreover,
does not assume the rebel can escape or transcend this condition. Instead the question
was always how to avoid the temptation to use history “to legitimize murder.”50 From
Camus’ perspective, the tragedy of twentieth century ideology was its urge to serve
history by hastening its climax. Against this destructive attitude Camus taught a new
political morality, one tethered to experience and accepting of limits. Sprintzen and other
commentators fail to fully explore Camus’ efforts in this respect. This work aims to fill
this void, and to show how instrumental Nietzsche and Dostoevsky were to the evolution
of Camus’ thought.
To accomplish this task, several questions must be addressed. In the following
chapter, I examine Camus’ sensualist literature, which begins in the early 1930s and ends
around 1940. Although this is the most apolitical of Camus’ conceptual periods, it is
critical to establishing the initial importance of Nietzsche to Camus. The primary claim
here is that Camus’ early absurdist orientation was shaped in large part by Nietzsche.
While Camus’ mature political thought diverges in crucial ways from this period, the core
insights he borrows from Nietzsche remain fundamental to his subsequent writings.
In chapter three, Camus’ absurdist writings are explored. Here Camus’ early
thought is challenged as a result of his engagement with Dostoevsky’s absurd literature.
As Camus considers the social implications of absurdity, he confronts more directly the
links between individual and political disorder. Such themes as solipsism, selfaffirmation, and estrangement are all problematized within a distinctly Dostoevskyian
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framework. During this period, Camus struggles to reconcile his early affirmative
response to absurdism with the inner nihilism of Dostoevsky’s characters.
Chapter four explores the political implications of Camus’ absurdist inquiries.
Here Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky reaches its climax. Camus draws
an explicit connection between absurdity and the apotheosis of reason; and political
ideologies are seen as extensions of man’s essentially religious pursuit of totality. The
core claim is that Camus’ epistemological skepticism and metaphysical account of
totalitarian ideologies are deeply informed by Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.
The fifth chapter addresses Camus’ revolt period. Here the central theme is
Camus’ attempt to ground a political morality in a world defined by absurdity. In this
period, Camus’ chief concerns are values and limits. He accepts Nietzsche’s relativism,
but Dostoevsky’s emphasis on transcendence and foundations continues to loom large.
As a result, Camus formulates a philosophy of revolt that affirms moral limits while
avoiding the problem of metaphysical essentialism. The chapter makes two broad claims.
First, that Camus replaces transcendent foundations with an experiential ground, which
takes the agonism of revolt as a tensional source of order. Second, that Camus’
philosophy of revolt can be seen as an amalgamation of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s
thought.
In the final chapter, I sum up Camus’ philosophical dialogue with Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky and comment briefly on the political import of Camus’ project. I also ask
what is unique and enduring about Camus’ thought? What, if anything, can Camus’ plea
to moderation and dialogue teach us today? Does Camus resolve the problem of
foundationalism? What are the practical implications of revolt? And finally, how does
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an examination of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky add to our
understanding of all three?
The works of Camus that are given considerable attention in this study include the
following: the two philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel; the
collections of essays on general topics, Lyrical and Critical Essays and Resistance,
Rebellion, and Death; the novels A Happy Death, The Stranger, The Plague, The Fall,
and The First Man; the collection of short stories, Exile and the Kingdom. Finally, as
mentioned, all of Camus’ published notebooks are consulted for additional insight into
his thought and intentions
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CHAPTER TWO
CAMUS’ SENSUALIST LITERATURE
Camus’ sensualist writings are concerned primarily with metaphysical and
aesthetic questions. The ethical and political problems that pervade his later texts are not
yet visible. During this period, Camus is engaged almost exclusively with Nietzsche, and
the central motif of his work is the problem of happiness in a world without apparent
meaning. This chapter begins with a brief examination of Camus’ early non-fiction,
paying particular attention to the Nietzschean roots of Camus’ early anti-foundationalism.
I then discuss Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche’s metaphysics and aestheticism in such
fictional works as A Happy Death and Caligula. I argue that several Nietzschean
concepts (acceptance and creative affirmation in particular) guide much of Camus’ early
thought.
In light of the significance of Nietzsche’s aestheticism to Camus, it will help to
first summarize Nietzsche’s thesis in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche’s task is to
associate the decline of tragedy with the rise of Socrates and his disciple Euripides. He
argues that Euripides’ mania for logic reduced tragedy to a kind of contrived intellectual
exercise. Before Euripides, tragedy was life-affirming, the “truly metaphysical activity of
man.”1 Tragedy also spoke to the anguish and nobility of human living. It denied the
comforts of reason, Nietzsche writes, and said yes “to life even in its strangest and
hardest problems.”2 For Nietzsche, then, pre-Euripidean tragedy embraced the
contradictions of life without attempting to resolve them on stage. Under the sway of
Socrates, however, tragedy was altered; it became reasonable. Worse still, Euripides
1
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upsets the balance between Apollo and Dionysus, the two Greek gods of art. Set in
opposition to one another, Apollo represents beauty, individuation and reason. Dionysus
stands for the community or tribe; it symbolizes the bursting of boundaries and the loss of
self. The antagonism of these deities gives birth to tragic art, according to Nietzsche.
Under the sway of Socrates, however, this tension was lost and virtue was redefined as
knowledge.3 Following this turn, it became the business of philosophers and artists alike
to know and to explain rather than to create and to affirm. Henceforth tragedy required
not only that the “virtuous hero must be a dialectician” but that there also “be a
necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality.”4 This
is this sense in which Nietzsche believes Socratism destroyed tragic art.
As Joseph McBride has noted, Nietzsche is concerned with this movement in
tragic art because it paved the way for the modern apotheosis of reason, or what
Nietzsche often called the will to truth. Nietzsche, he writes, believed “this decline . . .
begun with advent of Socratic philosophy and . . . culminated in Christianity.”5 In his
early writings, Camus appears to adopt Nietzsche’s attitude concerning the relationship
between Socrates, tragedy, and reason. The first indication of this can be seen in 1932,
when Camus published his first essay.6 Entitled “Nietzsche and Music,” the article
examines Nietzsche’s aesthetic and tragic philosophy. The essay is mostly a restatement
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of the central arguments in The Birth of Tragedy.7 The impact of Nietzsche’s work,
however, can be seen as late as 1955. That year Camus was asked to speak about the
future of tragedy. In his remarks, Camus reveals his continued fidelity to Nietzsche. Of
Euripides, for instance, Camus says: he “upset the tragic balance by concentrating on the
individual and on psychology. He is thus a forerunner of individualistic drama, that is to
say, of the decadence of tragedy.”8 Camus then depicts Descartes as the philosophical
equivalent of Euripides. Specifically, Camus argues that Descartes reduced man’s
relationship to experience by encouraging a shift from passionate ritual to “individual
reason.”9 To emphasize his resistance to reason, Camus insists that a renaissance in
tragic art is possible only because
The world that the eighteenth-century individual thought he could conquer
and transform by reason and science has in fact taken shape, but it’s a
monstrous one. Rational and excessive at one and the same time, it is the
world of history. But at this degree of hubris, history has put on the mask
of destiny. Man doubts whether he can conquer history; all he can do is
struggle within it.10
These parallels are worth noting as they suggest that Camus developed his aestheticism
against the backdrop of Nietzsche. They also suggest that Camus’ epistemological
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skepticism, which is not apparent until later, was shaped early on by Nietzsche’s critique
of reason.11
This aspect of the Camus-Nietzsche relationship has received considerable
attention in the literature. Germaine Bree, for instance, mentions this in her study of
Camus:
Camus draws on his conception of the fundamental nature of tragedy from
the Greeks, but within the Nietzschean perspective: tragedy is born of the
conflict between two equally strong, equally valid antagonistic forces,
man’s passionate assertion of his freedom and will to live, and the
irreducible natural order to which he must first submit. Since there can be
no real final reconciliation between these forces, man inevitably goes
down to his doom. But tragedy contains a revelation: in the tragic
universe man, the victim of a fate incomprehensible to him in rational
terms, becomes through his struggle with death and suffering the
conscious participant in a higher order of greatness which surpasses him.
The hour of death in which tragedy culminates is, therefore, for hero and
audience alike, the hour of truth. Camus is quite familiar with the ApolloDionysus opposition.”12
Bree offers an important insight here, but it remains undeveloped. Of the few studies that
do pursue this facet of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche, two in particular stand out. The
first is James Arnold’s analysis of Camus’ play Caligula. Arnold’s work is notable for its
exposition of the evolution of the Caligula manuscript, which Camus began in 1938 and
presented on stage in 1944. Concerning Caligula Arnold makes two general claims.
First, that Camus attempted to work out an aesthetic of modern tragedy and “that this
aesthetic derives directly from Nietzsche.”13 Second, that the changes Camus made to
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the manuscript reflect his growing concern with absurdity.14 Arnold’s study focuses on
the dramatic structure of Caligula; much of it is therefore beyond the scope of the present
inquiry. However, Arnold’s findings support two claims I intend to develop over the
course of this project. The first is that Camus originally found in Nietzsche a justification
for his early sensualism. Indeed, Arnold writes that Camus discovers in Nietzsche “a
confirmation of his own tendency toward a pagan mysticism.”15 Although Arnold
discusses this in the context of Camus’ tragic aesthetic, it nevertheless speaks to
Nietzsche’s influence on Camus’ early Mediterranean disposition. By convincing Camus
of the limits of reason and Western metaphysics more generally, Nietzsche stimulates
Camus’ sensualist inclinations. Arnold’s analysis also supports my larger claim that
Camus begins to diverge from Nietzsche as he pivots to his absurdist period. The
thematic shift in Caligula, which Arnold rightly associates with the era’s political
turmoil, signals an important transition in Camus’ intellectual life. As noted, the specter
of nihilism redirected Camus’ attention away from narrow existential concerns and
towards the political realities of the mid-twentieth century. Arnold’s study, if only
obliquely, identifies the reasons for this shift.
The second notable study is George Sefler’s comparative analysis of Nietzsche
and Camus’ aesthetical theories. Sefler’s inquiry focuses mostly on the relationship
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between art and revolt.16 However, Sefler also touches upon Nietzsche’s early
importance to Camus: “Both culturally and academically, Camus matured in a world
tinged with Nietzschean hues.”17 Sefler’s conclusion is important, as it is consistent with
the claim herein that from 1932 onwards Camus is defining his philosophical world in
Nietzschean terms. As for Camus’ aesthetics, Sefler writes: “Life is without structure,
without design. In art, it is given somewhat of a design, a style . . . this is Camus’
aesthetical theory.”18 Apart from its obvious indebtedness to Nietzsche, Camus’
aesthetics points to Nietzsche’s broader significance. For one, as Sefler concludes,
Camus clearly “built upon a Nietzschean foundation, altering, modifying, and rejecting
elements of his thought.”19 Though Sefler is referring to Camus’ aesthetical theory, his
conclusion applies equally to Camus’ absurd and rebellious thought. That is to say, the
notion that life is without structure or design informs all of Camus’ philosophical
investigations. In both The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, for example, this
Nietzschean premise is presupposed – and Nietzsche is often referenced. Sefler explains
the minor dissimilarities between Camus and Nietzsche’s aesthetics by pointing to the
context in which they were developed: “Unlike Camus who develops his philosophy of
art primarily in a context of social thought, Nietzsche propounds his in an essay of,
among other themes, classical Greek culture.”20 To Sefler’s account I would add the
following: the social context out of which Camus’ aesthetics emerged is also the context
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out of which his moral and political thought emerged; therefore, to the extent that it
explains Camus’ and Nietzsche’s diverging aesthetical theories, it also explains the
incongruity among their moral and political philosophies. That Camus never abandons
his Nietzschean premises, despite drawing different conclusions, suggests two things: that
Camus was determined to ground his thought within a Nietzschean framework and that
Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche was more politically than philosophically motivated.
There is yet another 1932 essay in which Camus appears to engage Nietzsche
directly. In “The Philosophy of the Century,” Camus critically examines the prominent
French philosopher Henri Bergson. A proponent of experience and intuition, Bergson
appealed to Camus for similar reasons as Nietzsche. Camus, in fact, describes Bergson’s
philosophy as a “defense of direct knowledge, of intuition . . . It pleaded the case for the
immediate givens of our awareness. It also cautioned against the dangers of analysis; that
is to say, against reason and the intelligence.”21 The exuberance with which Camus
writes of Bergson is difficult to overstate. “There is nothing more attractive than this
idea: to set the intelligence aside as dangerous, to base a whole system of immediate
knowledge and raw sensation . . . The philosophy was awaited and ought, in fact, to have
been able to play the role of religion in our century.”22 The Bergson piece is notable for
three reasons. First, it illuminates Camus’ early anti-foundationalism, which is not antireason so much as opposed to a certain species of rationalism. At any rate, though
undeveloped, Camus’ absurdism can already be seen in this refusal to rationalize the
world. Second, because Camus invokes Nietzsche in his dismissal of Bergson, it
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suggests that Nietzsche helped to define the parameters of Camus’ philosophical
worldview.23 Third, it helps to clarify Camus’ enduring interest in Nietzsche’s radical
skepticism.
Camus’ early engagement with Nietzsche points to a final parallel in terms of
their larger projects. Nietzsche constantly celebrates the affirmative character of tragic
art. In Ecce Homo, his final work, Nietzsche restates this conviction: “The highest art in
the saying of yea to life, tragedy, will be born again when mankind has knowledge of the
hardest, but most necessary of wars, behind it, without, however, suffering from that
knowledge.”24 Here Nietzsche equates affirmation with acceptance.25 When Nietzsche
condemns idealism and its various manifestations, moreover, it is really the consequences
of these phenomena that he opposes. By design they deny the sources of anguish –
untruth, impermanence, irrationality, purposelessness. However, to console they must
conceal their illusory origins.26 For Nietzsche, this accounts for many of late modernity’s
metaphysical conflicts. The importance of these insights to Camus’ absurdism will be the
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subject of subsequent chapters. Here I want to suggest that Nietzsche’s emphasis on
affirmation or acceptance influenced Camus long before his absurdist period.
The connections between Nietzsche’s aestheticism and Camus’ sensualism
become mores explicit in Camus’ 1935 dissertation on Christian metaphysics. Here
Camus rejects Gnosticism on both aesthetic and sensualist grounds. In his defense of
Plotinus, for instance, Camus echoes Nietzsche’s praise of the pre-Socratics in The Birth
of Tragedy.27 As for Gnosticism, Camus regards it as life-denying and sides instead with
Plotinus, whose “artist’s point of view” he admired.28 Here again Camus’ remarks are
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s claims in The Birth of Tragedy.29 In any case, I note Camus’
refutation of Gnosticism because it reveals the increasingly Nietzschean prism through
which Camus interprets the world. Already suspicious of reason, Camus views the world
largely in aesthetic terms; indeed, his critique of the Gnostics is rooted in his conviction
that Gnosticism is itself an aesthetic (and negative) judgment of the world. Such a view
is consistent with (and indeed identical to) many of Nietzsche’s objections to
Christianity.30
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In 1937, just two years after completing his dissertation, Camus gave a lecture at
the Communist Party Cultural Center in Algiers in which he defended Mediterranean
culture. The lecture is noteworthy for two reasons. First, in praising Mediterranean
culture, Camus criticizes Christianity in Nietzschean terms. Originally, Camus argues,
Christianity was otherworldly, “a moving but hermetic teaching, primarily Judaic in
character.”31 However, once Christianity entered the Mediterranean, it was naturalized.
It was “Francis of Assisi, a Mediterranean, who turned Christianity from a religion of
inner torment into a hymn to nature and naïve joy.”32 Camus’ depiction of Christianity as
life-denying is mirrored in Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, which we know Camus was
reading at the time.33 In the section “Morality as Anti-Nature,” for example, Nietzsche
condemns early Christianity for its “hostility to life” and its “extirpation of sensuality.” 34
Camus’ critique of Christianity’s “inner torment” is also prefigured in Nietzsche’s
account of Christian “revengefulness.”35 The second noteworthy aspect of the lecture is
Camus’ remarks on the Greeks and Romans. Camus begins by condemning the Roman
obsession with “puerile abstraction and reasoning,” which he says is too neglectful of
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experience.36 The Greeks, on the other hand, were more appreciative of nature and the
sensual life. “What we take from Mediterranean culture,” therefore, “is not the taste for
reasoning and abstraction but the life – the streams, the cypresses, the bouquets of color.
It is Aeschylus, not Euripides, the Doric Apollos, not the copies in the Vatican.”37
Camus also laments the decadence of post-Euripidean Greece, just as Nietzsche does in
The Birth of Tragedy.38 In any case, Camus’ defense of Greek philosophy closely
resembles Nietzsche’s. And while the parallels are by no means conclusive, they do
suggest that Nietzsche informed Camus’ early sensualist disposition.
Between 1937 and 1938, Camus wrote a series of essays that were published
separately under the titles “The Wrong Side and the Right Side” (1937) and “Nuptials”
(1938). These works are dominated by sensualist and momentist themes. As Philip
Thody writes in the preface to Lyrical and Critical Essays, Camus is
exploring within the context of his own experience, the ideas of the
absurdity of the world, the inevitability of death, and the importance of the
physical life . . . The Camus that emerges from these pages is, on an
intellectual level, the young pagan rejecting Christianity, and the
Mediterranean sensualist already preparing that criticism of Northern
metaphysics which informs The Rebel.39
Thody’s emphasis on the early signs of Camus’ absurdist thought as well as his critique
of metaphysics is especially important in this context. Already Camus is attuned to the
absurd and its implications for human life. Nietzsche is a critical catalyst for Camus in
36
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this respect. Indeed, Camus was deeply troubled by the nihilistic implications of
Nietzsche’s thought. “The ambitions of a Lucien de Rubempre or a Julien Sorel often
disconcert me in their naiveté and their modesty,” Camus writes in the introduction to
“The Wrong Side and the Right Side,” but “Nietzsche’s . . . overwhelm me, precisely
because of his failure.”40 Here Camus seems to be referring to Nietzsche’s inability to
wrest meaning (beyond individual self-affirmation) out of his deconstruction of
metaphysics.
In “The Wrong Side and the Right Side,” Camus takes up a number of
Nietzschean motifs, including beauty, creative affirmation, and worldliness. In the
opening essay, for example, Camus condemns idealists for their denial of life. Man’s
“kingdom is of this world,” he declares.41 Throughout this collection, Camus uses
Nietzschean language to explore affirmative responses to absurdity. As Thody
suggested, Camus urges acceptance of life’s contradictions without illusion or false hope.
As I argue below, this is a distinctly Nietzschean injunction.
Camus’ early notebooks also suggest that he was constantly grappling with
Nietzsche. There is a particular entry in which Camus cites the following passage from
Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols: “Nietzsche: It is to the most spiritual souls, assuming
them to be the most courageous, that it is given to live out the most painful tragedies. But
it is for this reason that they honor life, because it is to them that it shows its greatest
hostility.”42 That Camus was writing about the tragic nature of existence at the same time
that he was reading Nietzsche is hardly surprising. But what Camus is most influenced
40
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by is Nietzsche’s affirmative ethos. “The great courage,” Camus wrote in 1937, “is still
to gaze as squarely at the light as at death.”43 Although there are critical differences
between Camus and Nietzsche at this point, the momentism of Camus’ early thought is
closely related to his embrace of Nietzsche. Indeed one of the earliest imperatives Camus
draws from Nietzsche is that the lack of transcendent purpose means one ought to be
more attentive to present experience.
Nietzsche’s influence persists in “Nuptials,” Camus’ second collection of essays.
One of Camus’ most astute biographers, Germaine Bree, has argued that the four essays
of Nuptials “constitute a simple but sumptuously orchestrated spiritual credo: there is no
after-life; each man’s life is an end in itself with no significance in terms of a personal
God; we die and our kingdom is of this earth.”44 Bree’s interpretation of “Nuptials” is
more than justified, and the credo she identifies is equally applicable to Nietzsche’s texts.
But more importantly, the themes of “Nuptials” reflect Camus’ continued dialogue with
Nietzsche. For example, the first essay, “Nuptials at Tipasa,” is replete with Nietzschean
affirmations of life and nature.45 The same is true of “Wind at Djemila,” where Camus’
momentism is equally clear: “If I obstinately refuse all the later on’s of this world, it is
because I have no desire to give up my present wealth.”46 In the final essay, “Summer in
Algiers,” there is also a Nietzschean emphasis on beauty and the body, which can be seen
in Camus’ admiration of Algerian life:
43
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Intelligence does not occupy the same place here that it does in Italy . . .
This race is indifferent to the mind. It worships and admires the body . . .
These people, wholly engaged in the present, live with neither myths nor
consolation. Investing all their assets on this earth, they are left
defenseless against death. The gifts of physical beauty have been heaped
upon them. And, also the strange greediness that always goes along with
wealth that has no future. Everything people do in Algiers reveals a
distaste for stability and a lack of regard for the future.47
There are numerous textual parallels in these essays, but those cited above suffice to
establish the general tone of Camus’ early non-fiction.
Camus’ Early Fiction
In his first novel, A Happy Death, Camus engages Nietzsche through the
exploration of two key notions: acceptance and affirmation. Nietzsche’s conception of
affirmation and acceptance are best expressed through his doctrines of eternal recurrence
and amor fati, both of which are at the core of Nietzsche’s affirmative ethos. This section
begins, therefore, with a brief explication of these doctrines. This will help to connect the
life-affirming sensualism of Camus’ fiction to its roots in Nietzsche’s metaphysics.
There are sporadic references to eternal recurrence throughout Nietzsche’s texts.
The doctrine first appears in The Gay Science (1882), where Nietzsche introduces it in
the form of a parable and a question:
What, if some day or night, a demon were to steal after you into your
loneliest loneliness and say to you” “This life as you now live it and have
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every
thought and sign and everything unutterably small or great in your life will
have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence . . . Would
you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse them demon
who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment
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when you have answered him: ‘You are a god and never have I heard
anything more divine.48
That Nietzsche introduces his theory of the eternal recurrence in this way is instructive.
It speaks to his intent, which is to offer eternal return as a test of one’s relation to life.
How one responds to the demon’s message, Nietzsche implies, will reveal to what extent
one has affirmed one’s own existence.49
Of the texts in which Nietzsche writes of eternal recurrence, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra is the most important. Indeed, Nietzsche later considered eternal return “the
fundamental idea of the work.”50 This is evident in the text as well, as Zarathustra is said
to be the definitive teacher of this doctrine.51 Concerning the meaning of the eternal
return, Zarathustra says:
Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we
ourselves too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of
times, and all things with us. You teach that there is a great year of
becoming, a monster of a great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn
over again and again so that it may run down and run out again; and all
these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is smallest; and we
ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is
smallest.52
Zarathustra’s description of eternal recurrence is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s account in
The Gay Science. In both texts eternal return functions as a test of one’s love of life.
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There is also an implied cosmology according to which all things recur; however, this is
intended to underscore the absence of a higher meaning or goal – it urges acceptance of
life as it is, as pure becoming. For this reason, Nietzsche’s cosmology should be seen as
secondarily important. This point has been made by Alexander Nehamas, who similarly
argued that the philosophical “use Nietzsche makes of the eternal recurrence does not
require that this highly doubtful cosmology be true or even coherent.”53 Nehamas also
maintains that Nietzsche’s cosmological claims have in fact obscured the most important
aspects of eternal recurrence, “which is the psychological consequences he draws from
the recurrence.”54 By psychological consequences Nehamas means the behavioral
imperative of Nietzsche’s doctrine. Nietzsche is describing (in The Gay Science and
Thus Spoke Zarathustra) the “attitude one must have toward oneself in order to react with
joy and not despair to the possibility that the demon raises.”55 Following Nehamas, I
regard this as the central aim of the eternal return.
Additional support for this interpretation can be found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
In the section “On the Vision and the Riddle,” Zarathustra likens eternal recurrence to a
vision that recalls the demon’s message in The Gay Science. Indeed, Zarathustra repeats
the demon’s question to a dwarf he encounters in the wilderness:
Behold . . . this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane
leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk
have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have
happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has
been there before – what do you think, dwarf, of this moment?56
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To this Zarathustra adds what the demon only implied: “Courage . . . is the best slayer –
courage which attacks: which slays even death itself, for it says, Was that life? Well then!
Once More!”57 Courage, then, is the willingness to face life (and death) without
shrinking from it. Whoever responds affirmatively (and creatively) to the demon’s
message is courageous in precisely this sense.58 In his final text, Ecce Homo (1888),
Nietzsche confirms his intent:
The psychological problem presented by the type Zarathustra is, how can
he, who in an unprecedented manner says no, and acts no, in regard to all
that which has been affirmed hitherto, remain nevertheless a yea-saying
spirit? How can he who has the hardest and most terrible grasp of reality,
and who has thought the most abysmal thoughts, nevertheless avoid
conceiving these things as objections to existence, or even objections to
the eternal recurrence of existence?59
Nietzsche’s meaning is clear: one can either see in eternal recurrence an imperative to act
and create or one can deny it on account of its implications for one’s own life. For
Nietzsche, however, only the former can be both happy and honest; for the latter,
happiness demands delusion and resignation.
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence has been subject to myriad interpretations in the
literature. Among the most influential is Walter Kaufmann’s. For Kaufmann, eternal
recurrence is the culmination of Nietzsche’s affirmative (and momentist) philosophy. As
a doctrine, eternal recurrence is a product of Nietzsche’s “supra-historical point of
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view.”60 It was Nietzsche’s attempt to eternalize the moment and to describe the proper
affective response to becoming.61 In a world of becoming, the moment is everything;
there is no beginning or beyond: there is only the present. In this way, Kaufmann regards
eternal recurrence as a manifestation of Nietzsche’s opposition to teleological notions of
progress or salvation.62 To support this claim Kaufmann points to a revealing passage in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
Pain too is a joy . . . Have you ever said yes to a single joy? O my friends,
then you said Yes too to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared,
enamored; if you ever wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, You
please me, happiness! Abide, moment! Then you wanted all back. All
anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored – oh, then you loved
the world. Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too,
you say: go, but return! For all joy wants – eternity.63
In this passage Nietzsche’s message of acceptance (this-worldliness) is apparent; it
includes the embrace of suffering and joy, both of which are indispensable to life and
growth.64 In the end, then, eternal recurrence is more than a divinization of the moment;
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it is, as Kaufmann observes, “the most extreme repudiation of any deprecation of the
moment, the finite, and the individual – the antithesis of any faith in infinite progress.”65
Mostly concurring with Kaufmann, Arthur Danto has argued that eternal
recurrence both denies telos and “entails the meaninglessness of things.”66 Like
Kaufmann, Danto claims that Nietzsche’s intent was to posit eternal repetition as an
imperative to will meaning and impose form. This is also the sense in which Danto
imagines eternal recurrence as a momentist imperative: “It does not matter that we pass
away and return and pass away again. What counts is what we eternally do . . . and the
meaning we give to our lives.”67 The interpretation set forth here is entirely consistent
with Danto’s momentist reading of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence.
More recently, Maudemarie Clark has interpreted Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence
as a “practical doctrine,” designed to help human beings “become the kind of person who
. . . would consider the demon’s message divine.”68 Following Solomon (1993) and other
commentators, Clark considers eternal recurrence a “device for articulating Nietzsche’s
ideal of the life-affirming person.”69 For Clark, eternal recurrence is directed at two ends,
both of which concern overcoming. The first involves acceptance of life as an end unto
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itself. Eternal recurrence, in other words, means one must be willing “to engage in the
same activities again and again, even if one had no hope of the goal being finally
achieved.”70 The second end at which eternal recurrence aims is the overcoming of
“moral condemnation.”71 Here Clark refers to the importance of conquering resentment,
envy, and other forms of moral judgment.72 For the present inquiry, it is important to
stress Clark’s focus on acceptance and affirmation as key aspects of Nietzsche’s eternal
recurrence doctrine. Much of the debate in the literature orbits around Nietzsche’s
recurrence cosmology; however, this is largely unrelated to Camus’ interaction with
Nietzsche. Here it suffices to note the scholarly agreement regarding the life-affirming
implications of eternal recurrence, as this is what most influenced Camus’ early fiction.
Before turning to Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati, it is worth noting that the joint
themes of eternal recurrence and affirmation appear on at least three occasions in
Dostoevsky’s novels as well. First, in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky introduces
the concept when the devil tells Ivan that “our present earth may have been repeated a
billion times” and “that the same sequence may have been repeated endlessly and exactly
the same way to every detail.”73
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Second, in The Idiot, Prince Muishkin expresses the idea while recounting a memory of
an execution:
The repugnance to what must ensure almost immediately, and the
uncertainty, were dreadful . . . but worst of all was the idea, ‘What should
I do if I were not to die now? What if I were to return to life again? What
an eternity of days, and all mine! How I should grudge and count up
every minute of it, so as to waste not a single instance!’ He said that this
thought weighed so upon him and became such a terrible burden upon his
brain that he could not bear it.74
Lastly, in The Possessed, Kirilov experiences a brief vision of eternity, which he
describes to Shatov as follows:
There are seconds – they come five or six at a time – when you suddenly
feel the presence of eternal harmony in all its fullness. It is nothing
earthly. I don’t mean that it is heavenly, but a man in his earthly
semblance can’t endure it…It is as though you suddenly apprehended all
nature.75
The question of whether and to what extent Dostoevsky influenced Nietzsche in this
respect is beyond the present inquiry. The focus here is on Nietzsche, as he was the first
to formally develop these doctrines. However, that these themes appear also in
Dostoevsky only adds to the thrust of my larger claim concerning the influence of both
writers on Camus’ intellectual development.
Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor fati (love of fate) is inextricably linked to eternal
recurrence. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes amor fati thus: “My formula for
greatness in man,” he writes, “is amor fati: the fact that a man wishes nothing to be
different, either in front of him or behind, or for all eternity.”76 Previously, eternal
recurrence was understood as an experiential test resulting from one’s awareness of the
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repetition of things. Amor fati is best understood as the attitude that corresponds to this
experience; or, as Maudemarie Clark suggests, amor fati “the attitude of one who affirms
eternal recurrence.”77 Amor fati is therefore a love of necessity, of the fact that, as
Nietzsche writes in The Twilight of the Idols, one’s existence is bound to “the fatality of
all that which has been and will be.”78 With amor fati, Nietzsche also points to the
interrelatedness of things. To love fate is to realize that one’s existence is the product of
all that has happened, and that nothing in that chain of events is dispensable; Nietzsche
considers this the highest affirmation of life possible. Kaufmann’s account of amor fati
captures the importance of interconnectedness well:
The projection of one’s feeling toward oneself upon a cosmic scale may
seem to hinge on a metaphysical premise, but it can be defended
empirically. That I am here, now, doing this – that depends on an aweinspiring series of antecedent events, on millions of seemingly accidental
moves and decisions, both by myself and many others whose moves and
decisions in turn depended on yet other people. And our very existence,
our being as we are, required that our parents had to choose each other, not
anyone else, and beget us at the precise moment when we were actually
begotten; and the same consideration applies to their parents, and to all our
ancestors, going back indefinitely. Thus any affirmation of the present
moment points far beyond the present.79
Understood in this way, it is apparent why Nietzsche thought amor fati such a lifeaffirming attitude. Additionally, Kaufmann’s explanation helps to clarify the connections
between amor fati, eternal recurrence, and Nietzsche’s momentism. These connections
are emphasized here because together they inform so much of Camus’ early writings. As
I argue in the following section, this is particularly true of Camus’ novel A Happy Death.
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A Happy Death
Although unpublished until 1971, A Happy Death was written between 1936 and
1938. The story revolves around the life of a French Algerian clerk named Patrice. Like
Camus’ second novel, The Stranger, the narrative is divided into two parts, both of which
explore the link between happiness and death. Camus’ aim in A Happy Death is
foreshadowed in the first part when Patrice experiences an epiphany of sorts: “If had the
time, I would only have to let myself go. Everything else that would happen to me would
be like rain on a stone. The stone cools off and that’s fine. Another day, the sun bakes it.
I’ve always thought that’s exactly what happiness would be.”80 This passage typifies the
affirmative character of A Happy Death; it also points to the increasingly Nietzschean
hue of the text. As noted, sensualism, momentism, affirmation, and acceptance are
interconnected in Nietzsche’s writings. In A Happy Death, Camus incorporates these
themes into a vision of worldly happiness. Here Nietzsche’s influence can be seen in the
language Camus uses to characterize Patrice’s evolution. Considered alongside the
concurrent (and previously examined) references to Nietzsche in Camus’ early notebooks
and essays, this supports my contention that Nietzsche was a significant influence on the
text.
The two parts of A Happy Death are respectively titled “A Natural Death” and
“Conscious Death.” Both parts concern the pursuit of happiness, but it is not until the
end, as Patrice nears death, that happiness is won. In the first part, Patrice’s life is mired
in routine; his job is tedious; his relationships are superficial; and his life bereft of
meaning. Initially, Patrice looks to nature for a model of happiness. His hope, as
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Germaine Bree notes, is “to achieve the impersonality of natural objects.”81 Increasingly,
however, Patrice adopts a momentist orientation. He seeks divinity in the most banal of
encounters. If Patrice “gave the usher too big a tip,” Camus writes, “it was because he
did not know how else to pay for his joy, and because he worshipped, by making this
everyday gesture, a divinity.”82 But this strategy is short-lived, as Patrice is continually
undermined by his consciousness of death. At this point sensualism emerges as a
dominant theme.
As the title implies, the second part of A Happy Death explores consciousness of
death as both an impediment and a means to happiness. In the first part, Patrice is unable
to will happiness, and so falls into a state of ennui. The story pivots when Patrice
indifferently befriends Zagreus, a disabled neighbor. In a series of conversations,
Zagreus enjoins Patrice to embrace the sensual life. “With a body like yours,” Zagreus
says, “your one duty is to live and be happy.”83 Zagreus convinces Patrice to think less
and to immerse himself in experience instead.84 Henceforth Patrice strives to live by this
edict and, indeed, is annoyed when others speak of “ideas” as essential to happiness.85
As the story shifts from the first to the second part, acceptance emerges as a
dominant theme, and sensualism becomes the posture of one resigned to fate.
Unsurprisingly, then, Nietzsche’s influence is most apparent in the second half of the
novel. For example, Patrice declares:
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I know what kind of life I’d have. I wouldn’t make an experiment out of
my life: I would be the experiment of my life. Yes, I know what passion
would fill me with all its power. Before, I was too young. I got in the
way. Now I know that acting and loving and suffering is living, of course,
but it’s living only insofar as you can be transparent and accept your
fate.86
Patrice’s emphasis on accepting fate seems to be an implicit allusion to Nietzsche.87
However, it is not simply acceptance that Patrice urges, but acceptance of life “even in its
thanklessness and filth.”88 Nietzsche, as we have seen, similarly exalted hardship and
suffering. Perhaps the clearest indication of Nietzsche’s influence can be seen near the
end of the text, as he converses with his daughter, Catherine. The conversation
converges on the problem of happiness, and Catherine asks her father whether he is
happy. Unable to answer, Patrice says
What matters to me is a certain quality of happiness. I can only find it in a
certain struggle with its opposite – a stubborn and violent struggle. Am I
happy? Catherine! You know the famous formula – ‘If I had my live to
live over again’ – well, I would live it over again just the way it has been.
Of course you can’t know what that means.89
Here the reference to Nietzsche is transparent. For one, Patrice’s response restates the
demon’s proposition in The Gay Science. But even more suggestive are the words
“famous formula.” To what is Patrice (Camus) alluding if not Nietzsche’s eternal
recurrence doctrine? Moreover, in his final remarks, Patrice serenely affirms and
accepts the world with a Nietzschean declaration of contentment:
From his bed, Mersault received that impact, that offering, and he opened
his eyes on the huge, curved, glistening sea irradiated with the smiles of
his gods. Suddenly he realized he was sitting on his bed, and that
Lucienne’s face was very close to his. Slowly . . . there rose inside him a
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stone which approached his throat. He breathed faster and faster, higher
and higher. He looked at Lucienne. He smiled without wincing, and this
smile too came from inside himself. He threw himself back on the bed,
and felt the slow ascent within him. He looked at Lucienne’s swollen lips
and, behind her, the smile of the earth. He looked at them with the same
eyes, the same desire. “In a minute, in a second,” he thought. The ascent
stopped. And stone among the stones, he returned in the joy of his heart to
the truth of the motionless world.90
Here Patrice’s sensualist orientation to the world is clearly infused with a Nietzschean
affirmation and acceptance of the earth.
Lastly, Nietzsche’s influence is also evident in Camus’ thematic treatment of
forgetfulness.91 In A Happy Death, forgetfulness is a means to momentist living as well
as an essential part of happiness.92 “All the misery and cruelty of our civilization, “
Camus writes, “can be measured by this one stupid axiom: happy nations have no
history.”93 As for Patrice, he does not so much accept suffering as learn to willfully
forget it. Part of happiness, he declares, is recognizing in oneself “that power to forget
which only children have, and geniuses, and the innocent.”94 Forgetfulness is a recurring
theme in Nietzsche’s writings. In the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality,
Nietzsche writes
Forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial believe; rather, it is
an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of suppression, and is
responsible for the fact that whatever we experience, learn, or take into
90
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ourselves enters just as little into our consciousness . . . To temporarily
close the doors and windows of consciousness; to remain undisturbed by
the noise and struggle with which our underworld of subservient organs
works for and against each other; a little stillness, a little tabula rasa of
consciousness so that there is again space for new things . . . that is the use
of this active forgetfulness.95
On Nietzsche’s account, forgetting quiets the pangs of consciousness so that one is
continually open to the present. In his essay on “The Use and Abuse of History,”
Nietzsche praises forgetfulness by way of his distinction between historical and suprahistorical men.96 Historical men are oriented to the world such that
Their vision of the past turns them towards the future, encourages them to
persevere with life, and kindles the hope that justice will yet come and
happiness is behind the mountain they are climbing. They believe that the
meaning of existence will be become ever clearer in the course of its
evolution, they only look backward at the process to understand the
present and stimulate their longing for the future.97
Nietzsche sees the historical sense as a false disposition in which one’s absorption in the
past and the future obscures the present. For the supra-historical man, however, “the
world is complete and fulfils its aim in every single moment.”98 Ultimately, Nietzsche
commends the supra-historical attitude for its indifference to time and, more importantly,
for its mastery of the “art of forgetting.”99 This Nietzschean attitude permeates Camus’ A
Happy Death. In addition to the more general sensualist motif, this text highlights the
early influence of Nietzsche on Camus’ art and thought.
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The Stranger
Although The Stranger (1942) is generally considered an absurd work, I include it
here for three reasons.100 First, A Happy Death is a precursor to The Stranger; for this
reason, they ought to be examined jointly. Second, The Stranger, perhaps more than A
Happy Death, bears the stamp of Camus’ early sensualism. Third, as Thomas Hanna
reports, “The Stranger reflects a state of mind which was still exploring the ideas we see
germinating in his [Camus’] early essays, Nuptials.”101 Additionally, although it is
undeniably an absurd text, The Stranger does not reflect Camus’ mature absurdist
thought. Hanna has touched on the reasons for this:
We can say with certainty that the hero of The Stranger [Mersault] is not
exemplary of or explained by the principles later sketched out by Camus
in The Myth of Sisyphus . . . The fact that Mersault lives with the
indifference of an absurd hero but lacks the consciousness and revolt of
the absurd hero, shows us that the philosophical clarity of The Myth of
Sisyphus is not yet here present.102
Hanna’s claim finds considerable support in the text. The protagonist (Mersault) of The
Stranger is closer to Patrice than to any other Camus character. Mersault, for example,
is not conscious of the absurd; he merely acts as though life is absurd; that is to say,
instinctively. In this way, he is an absurd character, but he is not yet an absurd hero.
For these reasons, The Stranger is thematically similar to A Happy Death.
Like A Happy Death, The Stranger explores happiness in an absurd context; its
foremost themes are sensualism and momentism. The central character of the story,
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Mersault, is among Camus’ more mysterious figures. He is an absurd man, but he also
embodies innocence and a fidelity to a certain kind of life. In a 1954 letter to a radio
and television producer who was adapting The Stranger, Camus explains Mersault thus:
“He simply exists, like the wind or a stone in the sun . . . If you interpret the book in this
light, you will find in it a paean to sincerity and an at once ironic and tragic eulogy to
worldly pleasure.”103 For Camus, then, Mersault is a model of sensualist living. As he
does in A Happy Death, Camus uses The Stranger to contrast sensualism (and
happiness) with reflection.104 Indeed, Mersault is happy precisely in proportion to his
immersion in immediate experience. Several commentators, notably Robert Solomon,
have noticed the anti-reflective themes in The Stranger. For Solomon, The Stranger is
principally a “book of phenomenology.”105 Mersault, he argues, illustrates the pitfalls
of reflection: “to be aware of all the complexities of life is already to foreclose its
simple, unreflective joys.”106 Solomon’s interpretation of Mersault is more than
justified in the text. Mersault is happiest when he is most attuned to physical existence.
The sun, the sand, the sea, all of these he feels intensely. Mersault, in other words, is
completely unburdened by consciousness. His momentist disposition is thus the source
of his strength.
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Even as Mersault awaits his execution and the Chaplain talks of the afterlife, he
insists:
I don’t know why, but something inside me snapped. I started yelling at
the top of my lungs, and I insulted him and told him not to waste his
prayers on me. I grabbed him by the collar of his cassock. I was pouring
out on him everything that was in my heart, cries of anger and cries of joy.
He seemed so certain about everything, didn’t he? And yet none of his
certainties was worth one hair of a woman’s head. He wasn’t even sure he
was alive, because he was living like a dead man.107
Facing death, Mersault remains utterly indifferent to God or to thoughts of annihilation;
instead, he can think only of sensual experiences (and memories). He reacts violently to
the Chaplain because he is overwhelmed by his desire to live again. To Mersault, the
Chaplain’s obliviousness to experience is revolting. Mersault simply cannot understand
the posture of the otherworldly man. His final outburst [“none of his certainties was
worth one hair of a woman’s head”] is an affirmation of Camus’ early momentism.
Thematically, The Stranger is similar to A Happy Death in its embrace of
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and amor fati doctrines. For example, just before his
death Mersault proclaims
For the first time in a long time I thought about Maman. I felt as if I
understood why at the end of her life she had taken a fiancé, why she had
played at beginning again. Even there, in that homes where lives were
fading out, evening was a kind of wistful respite. So close to death,
Maman must have felt free then and ready to live it all again. Nobody,
nobody had the right to cry over her. And I felt ready to live it all again
too. As if that blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the
first time, in that night alive with sings and stars, I opened myself to the
gentle indifference of the world.108
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Nearing death, as Solomon observes, Mersault finds peace in the thought “of an afterlife
as a life merely repeated.”109 Mersault is also relieved by the realization that his is a
common fate:
I had lived my life one way and I could just as well have lived it another.
I had done this and I hadn’t done that. I hadn’t done this thing but I had
done another. And so? It was as if I had waited all this time for this
moment and for the first light of this dawn to be vindicated. Nothing,
nothing mattered, and I knew why. So did he [the Chaplain] . . . What did
other people’s deaths or a mother’s love matter to me; what did his God or
the lives people choose or the fate they think they elect matter to me when
we’re all elected by the same fate.110
In both A Happy Death and The Stranger, joy begins with acceptance. If Patrice and
Mersault die happy deaths, it is because they accept death as part of life. Indeed, as
Germaine Bree points out, “life and death appear as one.”111 These absurd figures come
to terms with death the moment they recognize it as inescapable and as an imperative to
live. Camus inherited this bit of wisdom from Nietzsche. This is suggested in a March
1942 notebook entry in which Camus writes: “The Eternal Return is easier to understand
if it is imagined as a repetition of great moments – as if everything tended to reproduce or
echo the climactic moments of humanity.”112
It will help to recapitulate what I have so far argued. Concerning Camus’ early
fiction, I have made two broad (and related) claims: first, that it is deeply informed by
Nietzsche’s ideas regarding acceptance and affirmation of life; second, that Nietzsche’s
affirmative ethos can be seen in Camus’ embrace of sensualism and momentism. In
support of these claims I have presented textual evidence as well as direct references to
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Nietzsche by Camus. We have seen the sensualism in Camus’ early fictional works, A
Happy Death and The Stranger. However, it appears most forcefully and dramatically in
his play, Caligula. Caligula is among Camus’ most fascinating works. As mentioned,
the text was revised over the course of several years and therefore reflects a thematic shift
in Camus’ writings. Because Caligula is a transitional work between Camus’ sensualist
and absurd periods, it illuminates some of the reasons for his increasing interest in
absurdity. While Camus does not abandon his sensualism in Caligula, he does reveal its
limitations.
Caligula
Camus began work on Caligula around the same time he wrote A Happy Death.
Caligula is the story of an emperor driven mad by the loss of his sister. As the play
begins, Caligula is announced missing. We learn that he has gone “walking” for three
days after hearing of his sister’s death. Upon his return, Caligula is unrecognizable; but
he appears to have discovered a truth, which is that “Men die, and they are not happy.”113
With this declaration it becomes clear that Caligula has discovered the absurd by way of
his sister’s death. From this point forward Caligula institutes his reign of terror and the
tragicomedy slowly unfolds. Caligula’s calculated reaction to absurdity is to emulate it;
specifically, he strives to mirror the world’s indifference. “The world has no
importance,” he says, and “I shall teach men the truth of this world, which is that it has
none.”114 Caligula’s decree signals his intent to expose the ultimate equivalence of
everything, especially of human values. Much of his actions, therefore, aim to undermine
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the foundations of social life.115 For the present inquiry, however, it is essential to focus
on the characters surrounding Caligula, as they most reflect Camus’ sensualist
aspirations.
One of the more interesting aspects of Caligula is the tension it creates between
absurdity and the sensual life. Following his sister’s death, Caligula is consumed by the
absurd, and his only desire is to disabuse others of their metaphysical illusions.
Caligula’s designs, however, brings him into conflict with the other characters, each of
whom, as Avi Sagi has justly observed, “share Caligula’s basic human experience, but
draw different conclusions from it.”116 Caesonia, Caligula’s mistress, is a sensualist in
the strictest sense. She implores Caligula to “stop thinking” and to love in spite of the
world’s cruelty: “You can’t prevent the sky from being the sky, or a fresh young face
from aging, or a man’s heart from growing cold.”117 Caesonia, as Sprintzen argues,
“speaks for the body and for love . . . She is of the moment, the immediate.”118 Caesonia
is fully aware of the absurd, however. She knows “that life’s a sad business” and that
“there’s good and bad, high and low, justice and injustice.” Her plea to Caligula is to
realize “these will never change.”119 Scipio is the romantic, for whom Caligula maintains
a distant affection. Scipio embodies the poetical disposition; his love of life and nature is
invigorated through his passions. He urges Caligula to find solace in art and nature,
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which “has cured wounds more serious” than Caligula’s.120 The union of aestheticism
and sensualism in Scipio speaks to the essential indivisibility of these two doctrines.
Indeed, in all of his sensualist writings, Camus treats sensualism as an outgrowth of
aestheticism; it is the posture of the artist. In any case, Scipio is ultimately overwhelmed
by Caligula’s absurd logic, and he retreats into the background for much of the play. The
third and final character is Cherea. Cherea is Caligula’s confidant and foe, and often he
seems to be the voice through which Camus speaks. Cherea is a humanist who
emphasizes the importance of acting without the support of a normative system. His only
desire is to live humanely; as such, he is indifferent to the metaphysical problems posed
by Caligula. When pressed by Caligula to explain his indifference, Cherea explains:
What I want is to live, and to be happy. Neither, to my mind, is possible if
one pushes the absurd to its logical conclusions . . . True, there are
moments when, to feel free of them, I desire the death of those I love, or I
hanker after women from whom the ties of family or friendship debar me.
Were logic everything, I’d kill or fornicate on such occasions. But I
consider that these passing fancies have no great importance. If everyone
set to gratifying them, the world would be impossible to live in, and
happiness, too, would go by the board.121
Convinced that Caligula has made life impossible, Cherea joins with others in a plot to
assassinate him. His actions are motivated by a sense of solidarity with others. Cherea
accepts that life is meaningless, but he believes in human dignity. If he is driven to
extremism, it is because Caligula has forced his hand. “I’ll be no party to your logic,” he
tells Caligula, “I’ve a very different notion of my duties as a man. And I know that the
majority of your subjects share my view. You outrage their deepest feelings.”122
Although he is not expressly sensualist, Cherea does reflect Camus’ emphasis on
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experience. Thus he is not concerned with ideas or metaphysical problems; he merely
defends the human order, without which happiness is impossible. Sagi’s account of
Cherea sums up his disposition quite well:
Cherea’s answer is that the criterion rests on practical reasoning, prompted
by the need to protect life and attain happiness. No supreme idea, no
values rooted in the transcendental are necessary to justify normative
preferences; life and its needs direct our choices. Against alienated,
absurd rationality, Cherea offers a concrete human existence that
embodies wants and needs.123
In terms of Camus’ larger philosophical development, Caligula is significant for
two reasons. First, the work is situated between Camus’ sensualist and absurd periods,
which makes it an ideal transitional text. Second, it is the first work in which Camus
problematizes the absurd in political terms. Again, Camus does not negate his
sensualism in Caligula; instead he points to the political implications of absurdity. In
Caligula’s case, the absurd is carried to its logical conclusion and nihilism, which is the
political manifestation of absurdity, overwhelms the social order. The problem,
therefore, is not so much sensualism but the existential threat posed by absurdity. The
sensual life, however desirable, cannot flourish apart from a meaningful human
community. And absurdity, particularly in Camus’ time, imperiled the very foundations
of that community. Consequently, beginning with Caligula, Camus’ sensualism is
subsumed (not replaced) by his absurdist thought.
Conclusion
Before turning to Camus’ absurdist writings, it is important to sum up Camus’
dialogue with Nietzsche in these early works. To begin, Camus’ sensualist writings are
apolitical. As his essays suggest, Camus’ concerns are metaphysical and aesthetic.
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Given Nietzsche’s radical aestheticism, it is unsurprising that Nietzsche figures so
prominently in these texts. Perhaps more than any other modern thinker, Nietzsche
stressed the importance of creative engagement and of concrete action in the world. This
likely appealed to Camus, who discovered in Nietzsche a justification for his own
sensualist orientation.
Camus’ sensualist literature appears to grapple with two fundamentally
Nietzschean problems: how to accept life without illusions and how to affirm meaning in
a world in which meaning is not given. Camus engages Nietzsche’s doctrines of eternal
recurrence and amor fati because these are the doctrines in which Nietzsche offers
solutions to these problems. In A Happy Death and The Stranger, Camus explores the
possibilities for meaning and happiness in an implicitly absurd context.124 In both texts,
Nietzsche’s doctrines provide Camus with an affirmative vision and with a means of
eternalizing the moment, and Nietzsche’s ideas are expressed in the language of Camus’
sensualism. In Caligula, however, Camus’ engagement with Nietzsche seems to shift.
Previously, Camus does little in terms of developing Nietzsche’s ideas; he simply
incorporates (and affirms) them in his own writings. Caligula is the first instance in
which Camus implicitly problematizes Nietzsche’s ideas. This is apparent in the
character Scipio, whom I mentioned briefly above. Scipio’s silence before Caligula’s
absurd logic foreshadows Camus’ philosophy of revolt, which he would begin to develop
shortly after Caligula. While Camus does not maintain that an absurd existence and a
sensual life are incompatible, or that sensualism demands community, he does point to
the necessity of collective revolt against the forces of absurdity. As seen above, Caligula
124
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is absurdity incarnate. Similarly, Scipio represents the aesthetic-sensualist life. That
Scipio is overwhelmed by Caligula and that order is preserved by an act of revolt
symbolizes the limitations (and dangers) of a sensualist mode of existence.
In the following chapter, these claims will be developed in greater detail. I argue
that Camus’ transition to absurdity is prompted not by a rejection of sensualism but by an
increasing awareness of the inadequacy of an individualist response to absurdity. What
emerges is thus a sense of the limits of sensualism. This becomes clear when Camus
examines the problem of collective values in an absurd world. Here, perhaps for the first
time, Camus directly engages Dostoevsky. Absurdity, negation, and political disorder are
linked in crucial ways, and Camus’ account of consciousness and the factors that drive
individuals to despair and crime begin to crystallize.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ABSURD PSYCHE
“Work, worry, toil and trouble are indeed the lot of almost all men their whole life long.
And yet if every desire were satisfied as soon as it arose how would men occupy their
lives, how would they pass the time? Imagine this race transported to a Utopia where
everything grows of its own accord and turkeys fly around ready-roasted, where lovers
find one another without any delay and keep one another without any difficulty: in such a
place some men would die of boredom or hang themselves, some would fight and kill one
another, and thus they would create for themselves more suffering than nature inflicts on
them as it is” – Arthur Schopenhauer
The individual’s confrontation with absurdity was a consistent theme in Camus’
early writings. However, there is a shift in tone and emphasis in Camus’ absurdist
literature. Owing in part to his engagement with Dostoevsky, Camus becomes
increasingly interested in consciousness and the psychological implications of absurdity.
This is evident in Camus’ absurdist literature, where psychic turmoil is examined in a
social context. In this chapter, I locate key Dostoevskyian motifs in Camus’ three
absurdist works: Caligula, The Stranger, and The Misunderstanding. The aim is to show
how Camus wrestles with Dostoevsky’s critical link between individual crime and
political disorder. In each of these texts, Camus engages Dostoevsky on a variety of
problems, including negation, crime, solipsism, and self-consciousness.
In the final section, Camus’ The Fall and Dostoevsky’s The Possessed and Notes
From Underground are comparatively analyzed. These works examine the plight of the
conscious absurd man in similar ways, and the interaction with both Dostoevsky and
Nietzsche is apparent. The Fall is important because it represents a clear departure from
Camus’ previous works. Consciousness becomes a source of individuation and internal
division. The prereflective brand of consciousness personified by Mersault of The
Stranger gives way to a new, debilitating reflection. In The Fall, moreover, Camus
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associates certain psychopathologies with social alienation and political nihilism. And
the connections Camus makes between these neuroses are based largely on Dostoevsky
and Nietzsche’s insights into freedom, resentment, guilt, and alienation. I begin,
however, with a brief comparative analysis of Camus and Dostoevsky’s view of the
individual’s confrontation with the absurd. This will provide some needed context for the
ensuing discussion of Caligula and The Stranger.
Camus’ substantive engagement with Dostoevsky first emerges in Camus’ The
Myth of Sisyphus. Here Camus struggles to reconcile the individual’s desire for meaning
with the absurd.

In this text (as well as the notes that accompany it), Camus engages

Dostoevsky’s psychology directly. Of particular importance is Dostoevsky’s link
between nihilism, consciousness, and suffering. For Dostoevsky, consciousness was a
concomitant of suffering. His most reflective characters are continually tortured by their
own intellects.1 A typical example of this is Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who
declares at one point that “to think too much is a disease, a real, actual disease.”2 In the
opening pages of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus echoes this sentiment: “Undermined . . . a
more exact word cannot be imagined. Beginning to think is beginning to be
undermined.”3 In the broader context of Camus’ thought, this is a crucial point. In
Camus’ early works, the absurd is an ontological situation. In The Myth of Sisyphus,
Camus is dealing not with the feeling of absurdity but the consequences of
conceptualizing it. At this point, awareness is such that thought begins to “undermine”
1
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the thinker. Much like Nietzsche, Camus associates consciousness with a tragic break
between the individual mind and the world.4 Hence Camus insists that consciousness of
futility is the source of Sisyphus’ suffering. “If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero
is conscious.”5 The nature of this suffering was expressed most vividly in Dostoevsky’s
novels. “Probably no one so much as Dostoevsky,” Camus writes, “has managed to give
the absurd world such familiar and tormenting charms.”6
As intimated below, Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky’s psychology can also
be seen in Camus’ tendency to link solipsism and estrangement. Unlike his Marxist
contemporaries, who linked estrangement to capitalist rule, Camus understood
estrangement in terms of spiritual uprootedness.7 It was thus not a matter of simply
replacing capitalism with communism for Camus. Like Dostoevsky, Camus’ estranged
characters suffer from a loss of meaning, a sense of isolation from the world and from
others. For Dostoevsky, this is the result of being deprived of a “higher idea” of life.
Camus’ view of estrangement is essentially the same as Dostoevsky’s, although it is
expressed in the language of Camus’ absurdism. It was largely because of this overlap,
as Lev Braun has suggested, that Camus thought Dostoevsky’s literature a more universal
articulation of the absurd problem.8
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Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky in The Myth of Sisyphus orbits around yet
another absurd problem: suicide. The central question in this text is whether an absurd
life is worth living at all. “There is but one truly philosophical problem,” Camus writes,
“and that is suicide.”9 Camus’ discussion of suicide is deeply informed by Dostoevsky.
Indeed Camus says explicitly that with Dostoevsky suicide becomes “an absurd theme.”10
If life cannot be justified on its own terms, then the value of life as such is undermined.
Suicide was an abiding concern for Dostoevsky as well, and it is why he thought belief in
the immortality of the soul indispensable. “Without the conviction of one’s immortality
on Earth,” Dostoevsky wrote, “the links between man and earth slacken, become more
fragile, decay, and the loss of the sense of life’s higher meaning . . . inevitably leads to
suicide.”11
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus challenges Dostoevsky’s claim that absurdity
leads inexorably to suicide. Indeed Camus’ engagement with the problem of suicide in
this text revolves around Kirilov, a character from Dostoevsky’s The Possessed who kills
himself in response to his absurd condition. Thomas Epstein has recently argued that
Camus’ analysis of Kirilov is best seen as a response to Dostoevsky. “Unlike the Kirilov
that Dostoevsky gives us,” Epstein writes, “Camus’ absurd man does not want to become
God . . . he wants to become a man, a man, who thus must not kill himself . . . He will be
lucid and happy, like Sisyphus.”12 Epstein’s point here is correct. Camus does in fact
appear to argue against Dostoevsky’s logic in The Myth of Sisyphus. At the same time,
9
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however, Camus continues to struggle with Dostoevsky’s assertion that suffering and
suicide follow from the absence of meaning. Consider, for instance, the following two
passages from Dostoevsky and Camus in which the logic of suicide is described in
remarkably similar terms. First, Dostoevsky:
I condemn this nature which with such impudent lack of concern brought
me into the world in order to suffer – I condemn it to be destroyed with
me. But since I cannot destroy nature, I shall therefore destroy myself
expressly to show my disgust at having to endure a tyranny which cannot
be ascribed to anyone.13
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus similarly writes:
Living, naturally, is never easy. You continue making the gestured
commanded by existence for many reasons, the first of which is habit.
Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the
ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of any profound reason for
living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of
suffering.14
I note these parallels in order to show the degree to which Camus develops his absurd
arguments in contrast to Dostoevsky. By raising meaning and suffering as fundamental
questions, Dostoevsky helps to define the absurd problem for Camus. Even as late as
1949, Camus continues to reflect on Dostoevsky’s thematic treatment of suicide in his
notebooks: “One must love life before loving its meaning, Dostoevsky says. Yes, and
when the love of life disappears, no meaning consoles us for it.”15
As an author of psychological realism, then, Dostoevsky was able to propound the
absurd problem in all of its complexity. It was this psychological dimension of
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Dostoevsky’s literature that most influenced Camus’ conception of the absurd psyche.16
In Camus’ sensualist writings, much like Dostoevsky’s novels, reflection is regarded as
an impediment to happiness. During his absurdist phase, however, there is a shift in
Camus’ attitude. The absurd is now the defining characteristic of modern life. Thus
when Camus describes thinking as “beginning to be undermined,” it is to say that
consciousness of absurdity is an ineludible problem; it must be accepted without appeal
or avoided through self-delusion. The fundamental question for Camus, then, is how to
live meaningfully with absurdity.
To answer this question, Camus probed Dostoevsky’s most tortured characters.
There was something about Dostoevsky’s heroes and their habit of questioning
“themselves as to the meaning of life” that made them uniquely modern (and instructive)
for Camus.17 For Dostoevsky, human beings suffer immensely in a world deprived of
transcendence. In many of his novels, the felt absence of meaning poisons life and saps
the individual’s will. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky expresses this powerfully
through the Grand Inquisitor: “For the mystery of human life is not only in living, but in
knowing why one lives. Without a clear idea of what to live for man will not consent to
live and will rather destroy himself than remain on the earth.”18 Contrary to the early
Camus, then, Dostoevsky discovered little metaphysical consolation in nature. Instead it
was faith, active love, and a belief in the immortality of the soul that sustained the
16
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individual’s happiness and established a common bond between men. Dostoevsky
suggests, moreover, that such sublime ideas ought to be accepted on existential rather
than empirical grounds. In this sense, Dostoevsky was uninterested in truth as
traditionally conceived. Certain “ideas” were justified by their effects on the believer, by
their capacity to promote internal harmony and social order.19
In any case, at this point it appears that Camus and Dostoevsky disagree about
what human beings require for happiness. Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky becomes
more complicated, however, when Camus begins to reflect on the relationship between
absurdity and nihilism. For example, in a late notebook entry, Camus summed up
Dostoevsky’s thesis as follows: “The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the
society to revolution.”20 This became a guiding theme of Camus’ political thought. In
Camus, though, absurdity succeeds nihilism as the source of internal malaise. But the
factors leading individuals to crime are the same: egoism, self-assertion, hyperconsciousness, a compulsion for logic, and a failure to acknowledge the other. This can
be seen in the protagonists of Camus’ three absurdist works of fiction. In these texts
Camus examines sources of modern alienation, and Dostoevsky’s insights inform much
of his work.
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The Stranger and Caligula
In his notebooks, Camus wrote that “The Stranger described the nakedness of
man facing the absurd.”21 The innocence of Mersault, the hero of The Stranger, is a
reflection of this nakedness. But Mersault does not so much face the absurd as give
himself over to it. As mentioned, it is not until the end that Mersault confronts absurdity
in the form of his own mortality. For much of the text, he exists moment to moment,
with no awareness of others or of time itself. Mersault’s solipsism is important for two
reasons. First, it is among the earliest indications of a burgeoning theme in Camus’
absurdist writings. With Mersault Camus points to the consequences of an overly narrow
response to absurdity. If Mersault revolts against absurdity, he does so only as an
individual. Consequently, the absurd never assumes a social meaning and Mersault is
unable to act with or on behalf of others. Second, Mersault’s egoism points to an
important thematic overlap with Dostoevsky. On Dostoevsky’s view, self-transcendence
was essential both to individual wellbeing and to social harmony. Dostoevsky explores
this in many of his novels, particularly The Brothers Karamazov and The Possessed. In
The Brothers Karamazov, the absence of self-transcendence blinds Ivan’s ethical
intuition and leads inexorably to the death of his father. There is a similar logic at work
in The Stranger. Although Ivan and Mersault differ in significant ways, they share a
limited lucidity that acknowledges the absurd but fails to connect experientially with
others.
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The pivotal event in The Stranger is Mersault’s murder of an Arab man on the
beach. Though it is not clear at first why Mersault pulls the trigger, Camus offers a clue
in his description:
It occurred to me that all I had to do was turn around and that would be the
end of it. But the whole beach, throbbing in the sun, was pressing on my
back . . . The Arab didn’t move . . . Maybe it was the shadows on his face,
but it looked like he was laughing. I waited. The sun was starting to burn
my cheeks, and I could feel drops of sweat gathering in my eyebrows.
The sun was the same as it had been the day I’d buried Maman, and like
then, my forehead especially was hurting me, all the vein in it throbbing
under the skin. It was this burning, which I couldn’t stand anymore, that
made me move forward. I knew that it was stupid, that I wouldn’t get the
sun off me by stepping forward. But I took a step, one step, forward. And
this time, without getting up, the Arab drew his knife and held it up to me
in the sun. The light shot off the steel and it was like a long flashing blade
cutting at my forehead . . . My whole being tensed and I squeezed my
hand around the revolver. The trigger gave; I felt the smooth underside of
the butt; and there, in that noise, sharp and deafening at the same time, is
where it all started. I shook off the sweat and the sun. I knew that I had
shattered the harmony of the day.22
The first thing to notice here is the absence of motive. Mersault’s behavior is instinctive.
If his actions are dictated by anything, it is external elements – the sun, the sweat on his
brow, the bright light. Indeed his only explanation is that it was “because of the sun.”
Mersault’s failure appears to be a lack of attention. He is overwhelmed by physical
sensations. David Sprintzen has emphasized the significance of this failure. Mersault, he
claims, enters “into complicity with the forces of destruction” because he fails “to
maintain the necessary human distance from the forces of nature.”23 Sprintzen’s main
contention, however, is that Mersault’s immersion in experience blinds him to the
intersubjective reality in which he exists. As a result Mersault reinforces absurdity by
22
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unwittingly killing a man. Sprintzen’s interpretation is persuasive, and it underscores my
larger claim concerning the inadequacy of individual responses to (or revolts against)
absurdity. Ultimately, Mersault is guilty of paying attention to the wrong things. He is
attuned to his private sensations but completely indifferent to the experiences of others.
A similar theme re-emerges in the final draft of Caligula.24 Previously I noted the
destruction wrought by Caligula’s individual revolt.25 Here I emphasize a parallel
between The Stranger and Caligula concerning absurd awareness and individual crime.
To begin with The Stranger, there is a revealing remark by Mersault just moments before
he kills the Arab man:
The sun glinted off Raymond’s gun as he handed it to me. But we just
stood there motionless, as if everything had closed in around us. We
stared at each other without blinking, and everything came to a stop there
between the sea, the sand, and the sun, and the double silence of the flute
and the water. It was then that I realized that you could either shoot or not
shoot . . . and it would come to absolutely the same thing.26
In this passage Mersault appears suddenly aware of the equivalency of things: “I realized
that you could either shoot or not shoot . . . and it would come to absolutely the same
thing.” With the exception of the closing scene, this is the only moment in which
Mersault is fully conscious of the absurd. Thomas Hanna points to this passage for
similar reasons: “At this moment Mersault is more deeply aware than ever of the
meaninglessness and indeterminacy of human life.”27 Hanna’s interpretation is correct,
but here I want to stress the implications of Mersault’s absurd epiphany. Mersault’s
realization that everything comes to “absolutely the same thing” is preceded by an
24
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awareness of the world’s indifference. Here, in embryo, is the value problem posed by
absurdity; that is, Mersault has moved directly from absurdity (meaninglessness) to an
equivalency of values and actions. If everything amounts to the same thing, it matters
little whether Mersault shoots the man or walks away. That Mersault pulls the trigger
moments after his epiphany, however, only confirms its nihilistic implications.
In Caligula the value problem becomes explicit. Consciousness is heightened and
the logic of absurdity is carried to its extreme.28 Much like Ivan Karamazov, Caligula
experiences what Roger Quilliot has aptly called a “crisis of the intellect.”29 This is
dramatized in an exchange between Caligula and his confidant Cherea. With implacable
logic, Caligula reasons from absurdity to nihilism. He then asks Cherea if he “believes in
some higher principle?” Cherea accepts Caligula’s nihilistic logic, but insists that “some
actions are . . . more praiseworthy than others.” Predictably, Caligula dismisses Cherea’s
claim, maintaining instead “that all are on an equal footing.”30 Most relevant here is
Caligula’s uncompromising logic. Despite his desire for meaning, Caligula is trapped in
a kind of absurd logic, as a result of which he is driven to destruction. “Who can
condemn me in this world,” he laments, “where there is no judge, where nobody is
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innocent . . . where nothing lasts?”31 Thus we know that Caligula’s nihilism follows
directly from his absurd awareness.32
Caligula and The Stranger are united by a common theme of the individual’s
confrontation with absurdity. Additionally, both Mersault and Caligula deduce the
equivalency of things from the perceived indifference of nature. Without a community of
revolt or a sense of solidarity, they fall into crime and despair. Caligula is more extreme,
but this is attributable to his logical disposition and to his power. In the case of Mersault,
the absurd is either ignored or left unresolved. Caligula, on the other hand, is too
conscious to live with (or accept) absurdity; instead, he externalizes its inhumanity in
order to liberate himself, and by doing so he plunges the human community further into
chaos.33 In their own way, however, the actions of Mersault and Caligula mirror the
absurd. If there is a difference, it is that Caligula does so intentionally and with obvious
indifference.
In The Brothers Karamazov, we also find the motif of crime and absurdity.
Indeed, like Mersault, Ivan Karamazov unwittingly involves himself in an act of murder.
Although Ivan does not commit murder, his absurd logic (which mirrors Caligula’s)
facilitates the crime. Since we know Camus was reading The Brothers Karamazov at the
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same time he was writing The Stranger and Caligula, a brief comparative analysis seems
justified.34 As noted previously, Mersault’s mistake is to act as though the world were
absurd without realizing it. Ivan errs in the opposite way; he acknowledges absurdity but
the humanist impulse which emerges from his absurd awareness remains abstract; he
never moves from theory to praxis. Part of the reason for this is Ivan’s intellectual
intransigence. But it is also because he pays insufficient attention to those in whose name
he revolts. Ivan is determined to resolve the absurd in intellectual terms, just as Caligula
is, and when he is unable to do so he abandons his original rebellious impulse.
Ivan can be seen as an intellectual precursor to Mersault and Caligula insofar as
he anticipates their logic and actions. However, Ivan’s engagement with absurdity is
strictly theoretical. He perceives the meaninglessness of things and deduces that
“everything is permitted,” but makes no effort to live out this edict; Caligula, as we have
already seen, does the opposite. Caligula and Ivan are therefore united only by their
attachment to logic. Ivan’s relation to Mersault is more concrete, however. Despite their
divergent dispositions and their complete lack of malice, both Ivan and Mersault become
embroiled in murder. In the case of Ivan, the victim is his own father, who is killed by
Smerdyakov, a follower of Ivan and a servant in the Karamazov house. Ivan learns of his
father’s death in the following exchange with Smerdyakov:
Can you really not have known till now?” Smerdyakov asked once more.
“No, I did not know. I kept thinking of Dmitri. Brother, brother! Ach!”
He suddenly clutched his head in both hands. “Listen. Did you kill him
alone? With my brother’s help or without?”
“It was only with you, with your help, I killed him, and Dmitri
Fyodorovitch is quite innocent.”
“All right, all right. Talk about me later. Why do I keep on trembling? I
can’t speak properly.”
34
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“You were bold enough then. You said ‘everything was lawful,’ and how
frightened you are now,” Smerdyakov muttered in surprise.
“Was I so eager then, was I?” Ivan snarled again.
“To be sure you were, and by your consent you silently sanctioned my
doing it . . . and I am not the real murderer, though I did kill him. You are
the rightful murderer.35
It is striking how similar Ivan’s predicament is to Mersault’s. Ivan is both innocent and
guilty. He does not commit murder, but he tacitly consents to it. Ivan no more desired
the death of his father than Mersault sought to kill that Arab stranger, and yet both are
somehow responsible. Ivan’s nihilism, his “everything is permitted,” is the impetus for
the crime. Smerdyakov is a wayward spirit who has rejected God but still thirsts for
transcendent guidance.36 Without God, Smerdyakov finds a justification for his base
impulses in the ideas and logic of Ivan. As Robert Louis Jackson suggests in his study of
The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan’s “moral nature will not permit him openly to sanction the
death of his father, but his ideas are picked up by his disciple Smerdyakov, who
implements them with a ruthless logic.”37 At any rate, the point here is not that these
episodes are analogous; rather, it is that they are guided by similar themes. Caligula,
Mersault, and Ivan cause suffering because they either pay attention to the wrong things
or they accept moral license as a logical consequence of a Godless world. Whether it is
Mersault’s reflexive response to absurdity or Ivan and Caligula’s self-conscious
obsession with its implications, each takes his behavioral cues from an absurd world.
Because there is no consciousness of revolt and no recognition of the need to create
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rather than justify values, these men are unable to reject (or resist) the absurd as a rule of
action.
The Misunderstanding
There is a continuation of these themes in Camus’ final absurdist work, The
Misunderstanding. Written in 1944, The Misunderstanding is the story of a son, Jan, who
returns home after twenty years to reunite with his widowed mother and sister. Jan hopes
to share his wealth with his family, who run a small inn out of their home. When Jan
arrives, however, he is not recognized. Inexplicably, he decides to conceal his identity
and pose as a regular customer. He requests a room and vows to objectively observe his
family “from the outside.” He is convinced that this will give him a “better notion of
what makes them happy.”38 By all accounts, Jan is sincere in his desire to move his
family from the country to his seaside home. The tragedy unfolds as we learn that Jan’s
sister, Martha, has long dreamed of leaving Europe to live “beside the sea.”39 In fact,
Martha is so fixated on her goal that she immediately plots to rob and murder their new
houseguest. The misunderstanding is thus apparent: Jan and his family share the same
goal, but their inability to communicate puts them at cross-purposes. And it is not until
Martha and her mother have already killed Jan that they discover his true identity.
There are several ways to interpret The Misunderstanding. Thomas Hanna reads
the play as a meditation on individual revolt. Thus his analysis centers on Martha. On
Hanna’s view, Martha consents to crime because she revolts angrily against the absurd.
“The wretchedness of her present condition warrants any action which can give her the

38
39

Caligula and three other Plays, pp. 83-84.
Ibid, p. 79.
79

irreplaceable experience of the sun and sea.”40 Hanna’s interpretation is just; however,
Martha’s revolt also fails because of her solipsism. The only suffering against which she
revolts is her own:
There is no love for me, so let her [the mother] die . . . all I wish is to be
left in peace with my anger, my very rightful anger. I have no intention of
rolling my eyes heavenward or pleading forgiveness before I die . . . I hate
this narrow world in which we are reduced to gazing up at God . . . I am
suffering from the injustice done me . . . and I shall leave this world
without being reconciled.41
Martha cannot see beyond her own pain and longings. Hence she has only two aims: “to
get what I desire” and to “sweep away every obstacle on my path.”42 Martha makes no
distinction between people and things. This is why she kills with such ease. Irina Kirk
has come closest to this interpretation, arguing that Martha is “blind to mankind” and that
her actions suggest “that pagan love for the earth must include a concern for one’s
brother – for mankind – since man is bound both to this earth and to the other human
beings on it.”43
More recently, Jeffrey Isaac has argued that Camus uses The Misunderstanding to
emphasize the need for “mutual comprehension and dialogue.” 44 This is undeniably part
of Camus’ intent. As Camus notes later in The Rebel, “Every ambiguity, every
misunderstanding, leads to death; clear language and simple words are the only
salvation.45” But The Misunderstanding also concerns the individual’s failure to think
40
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intersubjectively. Like Patrice in A Happy Death, Martha pursues happiness in isolation.
She has no concept of the other. Thus she goes to her death alone and without the
conciliations of love and communion. In this sense, her fate speaks to the impossibility
of happiness in a world in which isolated I’s narrowly fulfill their desires.46 Martha is
blind to Jan’s intentions because her attention never extends beyond her wish to escape.
Jan is seen only as a means to that end. This is evident when Jan and Martha are alone in
Jan’s room. As Jan tries repeatedly to engage Martha in dialogue, even hinting at one
point that they are related, Martha insists “that we should keep our distance.”47 Martha
willfully avoids Jan in order to depersonalize him; for “it’s easier,” as the mother finally
admits, “to kill what one doesn’t know.”48 Hanna has captured the symbolic significance
of Martha and her mother: “Camus presents them not as ideal examples of how to live in
an absurd universe; he offers them as dramatic examples of two persons clearly aware of
such a universe, who suffer from it, struggle against it and are finally defeated by it.”49
If Martha’s mistake is her inability to transcend self-interest, Jan’s failure consists
in refusing to speak plainly.50 Because of his subterfuge, Jan facilitates Martha’s crime
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against him. Thomas Merton has suggested that Jan is Camus’ caricature of modern man.
Jan’s desire to be “reasonable” and to “study his family objectively,” Merton argues, are
symptoms of an overly confident “scientific mind.”51 There are good grounds for
Merton’s claims. But Jan’s error is more elemental. Despite his good intentions, Jan
remains hopelessly self-involved. For instance, he conceals his identity initially out of a
rather shallow disappointment. He “expected a welcome like the prodigal son’s.”52
When instead he is received as a stranger, his reflex is to distance himself from the
situation; it is only then that he attempts to intellectualize things. Jan’s failure is
highlighted by his wife, Maria, who implores him to be forthcoming. “There are
situations,” she says, “in which the normal way of acting is obviously the best. If one
wants to be recognized, one starts by telling one’s name. Otherwise . . . one simply
muddles everything.”53 But Jan’s excessive self-awareness prevents him from doing this.
Even when moved by the noblest of intentions, he is undermined by internal confusion.
From Mersault’s narrow sensualism to Caligula’s absurd obsession to Martha’s
egoism, Camus consistently links the individualist instinct to crime and the destruction of
alterity. Even Jan, a sympathetic figure, brings about his own ruin as his selfinvolvement severs his connection to the concrete. Like Caligula and Martha, he is
unable to pay attention to what is in front of him – namely other people. All of these
characters, then, are united by an inability to transcend or surpass absurdity, and as a
result they are alienated from others and the world. Further, with the exception of Jan,
characters engages in a monologue rather than a dialogue. Consequently, they fail to
communicate with one another.
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they all commit or consent to crime. I have tried to show that their failures are rooted in
their solipsistic orientations as well as their expression of self-will at the expense of
others. However, there is another individual (and related) response to absurdity that is
equally problematic: indifference. Indifference and inertia are recurring themes in
Dostoevsky, and they are central to his absurd psychology. Camus grappled constantly
with this aspect of Dostoevsky. To illustrate this, I turn to one of Camus’ later works,
The Fall. Here Camus tries to capture the essence of the modern, alienated soul. In
doing so, Camus incorporates themes from several of Dostoevsky’s works, including The
Possessed, Notes From Underground, The Adolescent, and The Idiot.
The Fall
The Fall is arguably Camus’ most Dostoevskyian text, and the importance of
Dostoevsky’s absurd psychology to Camus cannot be grasped apart from it. Published in
1956, The Fall is a confessional narrative and an absurd character study. Through the
protagonist, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, Camus raises a host of moral and religious
questions. Chief among these are guilt, innocence, meaning, judgment, exile, and the
motivations and justifications for action. More importantly, as Thomas Hanna observes,
“The Fall reveals Camus as a psychologist. For the first time he deals directly and
seriously with the psychological make-up of men.”54 Following Hanna, this section
focuses on Camus as psychologist. There are numerous parallels between Clamence and
Dostoevsky’s nihilistic protagonists. Here I identify these parallels and associate them
with more general Dostoevskyian motifs in The Fall. The aim is to show how Camus’
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engagement with Dostoevsky influenced Camus’ view of the relationship between
absurdity and estrangement.
The Possessed is Dostoevsky’s most political novel. Based loosely on historical
events, the book concerns a group of revolutionaries who plot a series of attacks against
the government.55 It is difficult to overstate Camus’ admiration for this work. In
addition to adapting it for the theatre, Camus placed The Possessed “among the four or
five supreme works” in all of literature.56 Camus’ principal interest was Stavrogin, the
anti-hero of The Possessed.57 Stavrogin’s personality is defined by negation and
indifference.58 In The Possessed, he functions as a provocateur, driving much of the
story’s chaos. The narrative quickly unfolds when Stavrogin encounters Verkhovensky,
the leader of the revolutionary group. Unlike Stavrogin, Verkhovensky’s nihilism is
insidiously active; it results not in paralysis or indifference but in blind submission to the
libido dominandi. Enamored by his strength, Verkhovensky solicits Stavrogin’s
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membership in the group. Stavrogin obliges, but he remains utterly indifferent to
Verkhovensky’s political schemes.
Stavrogin is a passive nihilist. He values nothing and so cannot will himself to
meaningful action. Hence much of his behavior defies description.59 Stavrogin leads, as
Camus observes in The Myth of Sisyphus, an empty and “ironic life.”60 But the key to
understanding Stavrogin lies in his inability to transcend negation. In a letter before
committing suicide, Stavrogin explains his failure:
I’ve tried my strength everywhere. You advised me to do this that I might
learn to know myself . . . But to what to apply my strength, that is what
I’ve never seen, and do not see now in spite of your praises . . . I am still
capable, as I always was, of desiring to do something good, and of feeling
pleasure from it; at the same time I desire evil and feel pleasure from that
too. But both feelings are always too petty, and are never very strong . . .
One may argue about everything endlessly, but from me nothing has come
but negation, with no greatness of soul, no force . . . Everything has
always been petty and spiritless.61
The source of Stavrogin’s anguish is his conscience, which strives for tranquility and
purpose but lacks the spiritual capacity to attain either. Stavrogin’s significance to
Camus has been noted by several commentators. In one of the few comprehensive
studies of Camus and Dostoevsky, Ray Davison claims that Stavrogin’s influence on The
Fall is apparent in Clamence’s ironic disaffection.62 Davison touches on an important
parallel here. Stavrogin can be seen as a model for Clamence in several ways. For one,
59
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Stavrogin arouses admiration in those around him. This is partly because of his
individual strengths, but it is also, as Felix Rysten notes, because Stavrogin “lives on
solitary heights.”63 His solitude and indifference are seen as signs of greatness. In the
first part of The Fall, Clamence similarly lives aloft. “My profession,” he admits,
“satisfied most happily that vocation for summits.”64 Although Clamence, unlike
Stavrogin, consciously elevates himself above others in order to be “seen and hailed by
the largest number,” his solitude is nonetheless an essential part of his character. Second,
both Stavrogin and Clamence are esteemed by bourgeois intellectuals. In The Possessed,
it is the young socialists who are most drawn to Stavrogin; in The Fall, it is the Parisian
bourgeoisie who are impressed by Clamence’s perceived virtues. In both works,
however, this reflects the vacuousness of their contemporaries as well as the absence of
guiding norms. Lastly, Stavrogin and Clamence embody the disorder of their day.65
Dostoevsky suggests this in an 1869 notebook entry. “Everything is within the character
of Stavrogin,” he writes, “A depraved aristocrat and nothing more. Nothing but
disorder.”66 It is not clear to what extent Camus was familiar with Dostoevsky’s
notebooks, but we know Camus interpreted Stavrogin more or less in this way.67
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Furthermore, Clamence appears to fulfill the same role in The Fall. In an interview cited
by his biographer Herbert Lottman, for instance, Camus said of Clamence:
The mirror into which he looks will finally be held out to others. Where
does the confession begin, where the accusation? Is the man who speaks
in this book putting himself on trial, or his era? Is he a particular case, or
the man of the day? There is, in any case, a sole truth in this studied play
of mirror: pain and what it promises.68
In their dysfunction and disaffection, Stavrogin and Clamence bear the crosses of their
cultures. As Camus writes in his notebooks, the name Stavrogin is derived from the
Greek word for “cross,” stauros.69 The problem, though, as Father Tihon says to
Stavrogin during the latter’s semi-confession, is that “It is difficult for a man to take up
his cross when he does not believe in the cross of Christ.”70 Like Stavrogin, Clamence
cannot love or repent because there is no one to whom he can appeal or from whom he
can seek forgiveness.
Stavrogin’s despair also dramatizes the link between metaphysical angst and
nihilism. In The Possessed and The Fall, this is explored through the theme of sexual
promiscuity.71 In the case of Stavrogin, sex is a diversionary activity rather than a source
of pleasure or an affirmation of love.72 “I’ve tried the depths of debauchery, and wasted
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my strength over it.”73 Stavrogin frequents brothels, misleads women, and inexplicably
marries a disabled girl for whom he feels nothing. These pointless acts are done either
out of a spirit of irony or in an effort to relieve boredom.74 Such is the fate, Dostoevsky
suggests, of an incoherent personality. In The Fall, Camus imbues Clamence with a
similar disposition. Throughout the text, Clamence seeks solace in sex and debauchery.
“Alcohol and women provided me,” he admits, “the only solace of which I was
worthy.”75 For Clamence as well as Stavrogin, depravity is “a substitute for love.”76 I
emphasize Clamence and Stavrogin’s licentiousness because it is a symptom of their
internal disorder. Their world is emptied of meaning as a result of their hyper-active
consciousness. Unable to fill this void, they grow increasingly estranged from the world
and others. Their inability to love must, therefore, be seen as a consequence of their
inability to transcend their own subjectivity.
The alienation experienced by Clamence is also analogous to Stavrogin.
Clamence cannot love because of his debauchery and isolation. To ease his suffering, he
indulges his excesses, which “decrease vitality, hence suffering . . . It is but a long
sleep.”77 The excesses are thus a means to diminish consciousness. For Stavrogin,
however, nothing, including excess, sufficed. He commits suicide instead. What I want
to emphasize here is the theme of the isolated consciousness. Neither Clamence nor
Stavrogin are able to connect meaningfully with others. Their inner turmoil leaves them
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broken and restless, and their individual strengths prove useless without a sense of
purpose or community. Ultimately they divorce themselves from a world to which they
no longer feel connected. Stavrogin takes his own life and Clamence retreats to the
bourgeois hell of Amsterdam. In both cases, the path from self-estrangement to social
isolation is straightforward.
Along with the motif of estrangement, Dostoevsky and Camus also stress the
importance of transcendence and roots; in Dostoevsky’s universe in particular, characters
typically suffer from the absence of both.78 This is especially true of Stavrogin. “I have
no ties in Russia,” he laments, “everything is as alien to me there as everywhere.”79
Seeking stability, Stavrogin travels abroad, but he is unable to find fulfillment. He enjoys
all the trappings of modern life: wealth, travel, education, culture, etc. Yet he has no
sense of self and no community with which he can identify. Like Mersault of The
Stranger, Stavrogin is an outsider wherever he goes. “I’m an outsider,” he says to his
wife, “not your husband, nor your father, nor your betrothed.”80 As his doubt increases,
Stavrogin sinks deeper into isolation and his social ties are completely severed.81 In this
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way, he personifies the rootless individualism of modern man.82 Stavrogin is among the
clearest incarnations of Dostoevsky’s view of the link between reason (intelligence) and
individualism. This is suggested in Maria Banerjee’s account of Stavrogin: “reason
decoupled from faith and individualism without self-transcendence are linked together by
the fatal flaw of egocentrism.”83 Stavrogin is an unmoored ego in precisely this sense
and for precisely these reasons.84
Clamence’s descent into negation is similarly linked to rootlessness in The Fall.
Ray Davison has recently pointed to this thematic parallel. “Camus appears in The Fall,”
he writes, “to embrace the despair and tormented rootlessness of Dostoevsky’s hapless
atheists.”85 Though Davison is speaking in general terms here, his claim is correct and is
especially clear when comparatively analyzing Clamence and Stavrogin. Clamence, for
example, begins as a successful Parisian lawyer, just as Stavrogin is introduced as an
esteemed figure in St. Petersburg. However, after experiencing a moral failure,
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Clamence’s self-image deteriorates. His account of the humiliating event is worth
quoting in full:
It was an hour past midnight, a fine rain was falling, a drizzle rather . . .
I had just left a mistress . . . I was enjoying that walk, a little numbed, my
body calmed and irrigated by a flow of blood gentle as the failing rain. On
the bridge I passed behind a figure leaning over the railing and seeming to
stare at the river. On closer view, I made out a slim young woman dressed
in black . . . I had already gone some fifty yards when I heard the sound . .
. of a body striking the water. I stopped short, but without turning around.
Almost at once I heard a cry, repeated several times, which was going
downstream; then it suddenly ceased . . . I wanted to run and yet didn’t
stir. I was trembling, I believe from cold and shock. I told myself that I
had to be quick and I felt an irresistible weakness steal over me. I have
forgotten what I thought then. Too late, too far . . . or something of the
sort. I was still listening as I stood motionless. Then, slowly under the
rain, I went away. I informed no one.86
Clamence is permanently altered as a result of his inaction on the bridge that night.
Indeed, as Avi Sagi suggests, Clamence “discovers that he is no more than an actor.”87
Realizing that something false about his character was exposed, he flees Paris, wanders
about Europe, and ends finally in the slums of Amsterdam. Increasingly, he becomes
disconnected and overly self-conscious. And be begins, almost pathologically, to subject
everything and everyone to relentless scrutiny. I note Clamence’s moral failure because
Stavrogin experiences a similar fall from grace, the effects of which he describes in his
final confession:
Toward evening I felt afraid again, but this time the fear was
incomparably more intense. The main thing was that I was afraid and that
I was so conscious of being afraid. Oh, I know of nothing more absurd
and more abominable! I had never experienced fear before . . . but this
one time in my life I was afraid, and in fact, I literally trembled. The
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intense consciousness of it was a profound humiliation. If I could, I would
have killed myself, but I felt myself unworthy of death.88
Here Stavrogin is referencing his failure to stop a young girl, whom he had just raped,
from hanging herself. Like Clamence, Stavrogin’s sense of self is shattered in this scene.
As Felix Rysten notes, Stavrogin is “faced with the absurd in his recognition of the
discrepancy between his actual self and the way he has conceived himself to be.”89 In
both works, these are pivotal events; they trigger an internal confrontation as a result of
which neither character can escape the feeling of guilt and estrangement. Alone and
deprived equally of transcendence and communion, Clamence and Stavrogin withdraw
from life. If there is a discernible difference between them, it is that Clamence hides
behind a veneer of strained, self-glorifying cynicism, whereas Stavrogin is more
bewildered and apathetic. But they both suffer from a sickness of spirit. And their
inability to construct meaning in experience results finally in exile and despair. Worse
still, because they mirror and magnify the disorder in which they live, they drag everyone
they encounter into negation and crime.
Estrangement and negation are explored from a slightly different angle in
Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground. Here Dostoevsky uses his protagonist to
examine the despair of the typical bourgeois Russian, and the result is a more
illuminating look at the inner life of an estranged and ordinary man. Because the hero of
Notes From Underground is intended to indict an entire era, there are several parallels
between this text and Camus’ The Fall.90 The next section discusses these parallels and
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argues that Notes From Underground was vital to Camus’ conception of the modern
absurd psyche.
Estrangement in The Fall and Notes From Underground
Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground is a first- person confessional narrative in
the vein of Camus’ The Fall. Like The Fall, Notes From Underground is also a polemic
directed at the dominant philosophical movement of its time.91 In addition to noting
various structural similarities, this section emphasizes three points of thematic overlap.
First, Camus and Dostoevsky both explore the plight of the conscious absurd man, whose
search for identity within a community is continually undermined by internal disorder.
Second, I examine the theme of estrangement and its relation to egoism, freedom, and
resentment. Here I also draw on Nietzsche’s concept of bad conscience to help clarify
the psychological conditions of Clamence and the Underground Man. Lastly, I explore
the problem of guilt and innocence without absolute standards. The concern here is to
demonstrate how Camus’ understanding of the modern psyche and condition overlaps
with Dostoevsky’s.
It is important to begin by situating these works in their proper political and
cultural context. Both The Fall and Notes From Underground are veiled attacks on the
bourgeois virtues of modernity. In Notes From Underground, Dostoevsky links the
neuroses and self-division of contemporary Russians to the corrupting influence of
Western rationalism. The state of the Underground Man’s soul speaks to the
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consequences of abandoning traditional virtues and beliefs. In an authorial note on the
first page of the text, Dostoevsky explains his intentions in Notes From Underground:
The author of these Notes, and the Notes themselves, are both, of course,
imaginary. All the same, if we take into consideration the conditions that
have shaped our society, people like the writer not only may, but must,
exist in that society. I have tried to present to the public in a more striking
form than is usual a character belonging to the very recent past, a
representative figure from a generation still surviving.92
As noted, Camus similarly uses Clamence to caricature modernity. Like the
Underground Man, Clamence has fully internalized the zeitgeist.93 Referring to this in a
1959 interview, Camus remarked that “My hero is indeed discouraged, and this is why, as
a good modern nihilist, he exalts servitude.”94 There are nonetheless some important
differences between Clamence and the Underground Man. For one, the Underground
Man’s critique is implicit in his fate; that is, he fails insofar as he embodies the virtues of
contemporary culture.95 He has also lived underground his entire life.96 Clamence, on
the other hand, lived happily in society for years. His exile begins with his inaction on
the bridge. Once his self-image collapses, however, he is reduced to a state of ironic
detachment in which he parodies the virtues he once affirmed. Further, by admitting his
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own guilt, he pronounces judgment on all.97 As Clamence proclaims, he is “an empty
prophet for shabby times, Elijah without a messiah.”98 At any rate, despite their
differences, both of these anti-heroes are captives of the same absurd psyche.99 They try
to live alone and without illusions but are unable to do so.
Before examining the theme of estrangement, it is essential to stress the
problematic nature of consciousness in these works. In Notes From Underground,
consciousness is a disease. “I tell you solemnly,” the Underground Man proclaims, “that
I have many times tried to become an insect. But I was not equal even to that. I swear,
gentlemen, that to be too conscious is an illness.”100 Consciousness as pathos is also a
key motif in The Fall. Thomas Merton describes this well in his brief but insightful study
of The Fall:
Clamence is a bourgeois man whose conscience has died of self-analysis
and whose frustrated reasoning has become a kind of moral eczema . . .
His confession cures nothing and finds relief only in passing on the
contagion to another. The plague, which in the novel of that name was
physical, is here revealed as a moral sickness unto death, an utter despair
which can do anything but live with itself and accept life without analysis
– a plague of self-examination which turns narcissism into self-hate.101
The “plague of self-examination,” as Merton describes it, infects both Clamence and the
Underground Man; it is the source of their suffering and their isolation.102 Indeed the
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Underground Man’s consciousness leads inexorably to inertia. To combat this, he turns
to books and “ideas.” “I was always alone,” he says, “I did a lot reading. I wanted to
stifle all that was smoldering inside me with external impressions and reading was for me
the only possible source of external impressions.”103 Reading thus becomes a substitute
for experience and human contact. In The Fall, Clamence repeatedly scorns this modern
tendency. Europeans are derided for their indifference to experience and their
preoccupation with “ideas.”104 In both texts, then, there is an implicit connection
between consciousness and inertia.105 But there is also a link between consciousness and
social atomism. As Irina Kirk notes, The Fall and Notes From Underground ask whether
in the absence of “traditional remedies for the human condition there does not exist an
existential answer to each man’s isolation.”106 The answers proffered by Camus and
Dostoevsky are difficult to discern. Here I point to thematic parallels and suggest that
Camus appropriated many of Dostoevsky’s insights into the causes and consequences of
modern estrangement.
In The Fall, Clamence’s isolation increases in proportion to his self-awareness.
The more he questions and doubts, the more divided his personality becomes. At the
core of Clamence’s disarray is a perverse need for contradiction.107 Clamence knows

that isolation is a byproduct of his fidelity to a noble “idea.” But this is merely a post-hoc justification. In
truth, he is estranged from others because he lives inside himself.
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what he ought to do but can no longer do it. In this way, Clamence resembles Ivan
Karamazov, who, as the devil observes, wants to “perform an act of heroic virtue” but is
tormented by his disbelief “in virtue.”108 Clamence’s conscience, as Germaine Bree has
observed, is reduced “to an endless, formless, chaotic parade of inner consciousness.”109
There are several reasons for Clamence’s confusion. For one, he has rejected the virtues
and traditions that bind him to others, and can no longer practice them in good faith. But
his embeddedness in a community means that his identity, his sense of worth, depends
upon the judgments of others. This is why his exile follows from the disintegration of his
self-image. His self-image was preserved so long as it corresponded to his public image.
Having failed to act on the bridge, Clamence is confronted by two facts. First, he realizes
that his self-esteem was a product of his perceived social standing, and that his virtues
were merely for self-elevation. “When I was concerned with others,” he concedes, “I
was so out of pure condescension, in utter freedom, and all the credit went to me: my
self-esteem would go up a degree.”110 In effect, as Sagi also observes, Clamence
discovers that “he lives constantly vis-à-vis others.”111 Second, and more importantly, he
recognizes that his freedom was illusory. As Kirk points out, before the incident on the
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bridge, Clamence “exercised his will within the framework of what is considered virtuous
by conventional standards.”112 However, when given a chance to be authentically
virtuous, to save another human being, he shrinks. Consequently, he discovers that he
was only playing the role of the virtuous man and, moreover, that his happiness and
freedom were “not free from social opinion.”113 Clamence sinks under the weight of
these realizations. Thomas Hanna’s account of the significance of this is worth quoting
at length:
Clamence was undistinguished from his habitual virtues until that crucial
moment when the plaints of a drowning woman inserted itself between
Clamence and his virtue. In that instant Clamence chose himself and not
his virtue, he suddenly acted as a completely free individual, and, in this
very act, took upon himself the enormous, inescapable responsibility for
his act. He was no longer safe or unconscious, he was in trouble. His
virtue could not justify his action; he alone had to be its justification.
From this point onward, Clamence moved toward consciousness and the
agony of decision.114
Following his failure on the bridge, then, Clamence is thrust into a state of genuine
freedom, which obliges him to take responsibility for his choices and actions. But his
neutrality on the bridge exposed his inability to accept this responsibility. As a result
Clamence is overwhelmed by a sense of guilt.
Clamence’s estrangement is hastened by this sense of guilt because it occurs in an
absurd context in which, as John Cruikshank notes, “there is no available standard of
innocence.”115 “We cannot assert the innocence of anyone,” says Clamence, but “we can
state with certainty the guilt of all.”116 Because there is no God, no ultimate redemption,
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Clamence is condemned to live in perpetual self-judgment, which he tries to escape by
confessing his guilt and implicating the rest of mankind. This alienates him from the
community of men to which he properly belongs, as his interactions with others are
driven by this desire to provoke a sense of guilt.117 Henceforth Clamence is consumed by
an inner need to justify his moral failure, and “the fear of self-judgment,” as Kirk writes,
sets him on a “course of self-deceit.”118
Like The Fall, estrangement is the foremost theme of Notes From
Underground.119 Here our main concern is the relationship between resentment and
estrangement, which Camus and Dostoevsky depict in similar ways. As seen already,
Clamence’s need to discharge his guilt guides much of his behavior. But he is also
animated by a spirit of resentment. Indeed, as several commentators have suggested,
Clamence is a model of Nietzschean bad conscience.120 Walter Kaufmann, for instance,
argues that “Camus’ last novel, The Fall . . . is a veritable case history of the will to
power of the weak, who, as a last resort, derive a sense of superiority from their

117

This was a common theme of Dostoevsky’s novels as well. In The Idiot, for example,
the nihilist, Natasia, is continually unable to connect with others because she projects her
sense of guilt on to everyone she encounters. Prince Muishkin explains this tendency
thus: “Try to realize that in the perpetual admission of guilt she probably finds some
dreadful unnatural satisfaction – as though she were revenging herself upon someone”
(424).
118
Dostoevskij and Camus, p. 78.
119
Indeed, Albert Levi (1959) has argued that the very notion of estrangement “burst
upon the modern world with Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground” (Philosophy and
the Modern World, p. 203).
120
Most notably, Robert Solomon (1996) has suggested that Clamence can be interpreted
through this Nietzschean prism. “Crushed by the weight of his guilt and his punishment,”
Solomon writes, Clamence salvages “his last crumb of self-respect through resentment,
scorn, and silent defiance” (The Passions, p. 45).
99

insistence that they are unworthy and guilt-ridden.”121 Kaufmann’s insight here is
important because it offers an interpretive framework for Clamence and the Underground
Man’s compulsive and contradictory actions.
Nietzschean Resentment in The Fall and Notes From Underground
Nietzsche’s notion of bad conscience defies simple explanation. Nietzsche is
clearest about its meaning and origins in his essay On the Genealogy of Morality. Here
bad conscience is associated with man’s entrance into society. “I take bad conscience to
be the deep sickness into which man had to fall under the pressure of that most
fundamental of all changes he ever experience – the change of finding himself enclosed .
. . within the sway of society and peace.”122 The emphasis on society is particularly
important here. For Nietzsche, society profoundly altered human consciousness. Presocietal man lived primarily on instinct. Questions of meaning, morality, and justice
were entirely alien. In society, however, man was divorced “from his animal past” and
plunged “into new situations and conditions of existence.”123 Suddenly, Nietzsche writes,
instincts were repressed and men
were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, connecting cause and
effect, these unhappy ones, reduced to their consciousness, to their poorest
and most erring organ! I do not believe there has every been such a
feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort – and yet those old
instincts had not all at once ceased to make their demands: for the most
part they had to seek new and as it were subterranean gratifications. All
instincts that do discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inward –
this is what I call the internalizing of man.124
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Along with this new state of consciousness, man also experienced a radical new freedom
– the freedom to decide good and evil, just and unjust, guilt and innocence. Out of this
situation, Nietzsche argues, there emerged a consciousness of others and, more
importantly, a concern with “the relationship of those presently living to their
ancestors.”125 This produced in turn a sense of obligation, both to those with whom we
live and to those whose previous sacrifices helped to ensure our present existence.
According to Nietzsche, this sense of indebtedness is at the root of man’s religious
impulse. “In the end,” he writes, “the progenitor is necessarily transfigured into a god . . .
This may even be the origin of the gods.”126
Nietzsche’s account of consciousness and human obligation is important in this
context for two reasons. First, it connects two of the central themes in The Fall and
Notes From Underground, namely absurdity (nihilism) and guilt. Nietzsche, for
example, surmises that the death of God should have resulted in a “final victory of
atheism” which “might free humanity from the entire feeling of having debts to its
beginnings, its causa prima. Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong
together.”127 However, this prospect is lost with the rise of Christianity, which proposed
a paradoxical solution to the problem of guilt: “God sacrificing himself for the guilt of
man, God himself exacting payment of himself, God as the only one who can redeem
from man what has become irredeemable for man himself.”128 By offering this remedy,
Nietzsche argues, Christianity necessitated the modern “bad conscience.” By this he
means that Christianity spared man the burden of true freedom and, secondly, preserved
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“the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to the point that it cannot be
atoned for.”129 The guilt-ridden minds of Clamence and the Underground Man are
perfect illustrations of this bad conscience. They are isolated egos thrust into a world
without God, and are unable to bear the consequences.130 This is particularly true of
Clamence. “The essential,” he says, “is to cease being free and to obey, in repentance, a
greater rogue than oneself. When we are all guilty, that will be democracy.”131 It is to
this attitude that Camus refers when he describes Clamence as a “modern nihilist” who
“exalts servitude.” As David Sprintzen correctly observes, Clamence’s “response to the
death of God,” like the modern bourgeois he mocks, “has been to assume the unbearable
burden of an absolutized individualism in the context of a pervasive political cynicism
glossed as morality and practical idealism.”132 Sensing the shallowness of modernity as
well as his own complicity, Clamence becomes a “judge-penitent.” The religious aspect
of this pathology is prefigured by Nietzsche in a remarkable passage in The Antichrist:
Let us not be led astray: they say “judge not,” and yet they condemn to
hell whoever stands in their way. In letting God sit in judgment they
judge themselves; in glorifying God they glorify themselves; in
demanding that everyone show the virtues which they themselves happen
to be capable of – still more, which they must have in order to remain on
top – they assume the grand air of men struggling for virtue . . . in point of
fact, they simply do what they cannot help doing. Forced, like hypocrites,
to be sneaky, to hide in corners, to slink along in the shadows, they
convert their necessity into a duty.133
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Clamence does precisely what Nietzsche describes above, only in a post-Christian,
nihilistic context. Hence he readily admits his delight in being seen as noble and
virtuous:
It cleansed me of all bitterness toward my neighbor, whom I always
obligated without ever owing him anything. It set me above the judge
whom I judged in turn, above the defendant whom I forced to gratitude.
Just weigh this, cher monsieur, I lived with impunity. I was concerned in
no judgment; I was not on the floor of the courtroom, but somewhere in
the flies like those gods that are brought down by machinery from time to
time to transfigure the action and give it its meaning. After all, living aloft
is still the only way of being seen and hailed by the largest number.134
Implicit in Clamence is the notion that man’s thirst for an absolute, for salvation and
repentance, persists even in the shadow of God.135 Furthermore, that without God or
some unifying idea, this impulse degenerates into the sort of morose, self-serving
cynicism typified by Clamence. In his analysis of The Fall, Sagi points more directly to
this Nietzschean aspect of Clamence:
Religion is an endless human attempt to reject guilt, namely, to renounce
freedom and personal responsibility, since only a free creature can be
guilty, and only a person who can be guilty can also be free. Like
Nietzsche, Camus emphasizes that religion is an escape from freedom,
responsibility, and guilt.136
As for the Underground Man, though his need to project guilt is less pronounced
than Clamence’s, the confessional quality of his account is itself a manifestation of this
134
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need. Moreover, he continuously shifts from “I” to “we” when addressing his own
shortcomings. “I missed life through decaying morally in a corner, not having sufficient
means, losing the habit of living, and carefully cultivating my anger underground,” he
begins, and then immediately says that “we have all got out of the habit of living, we are
all in a greater or lesser degree crippled.”137 As Robert Solomon has noted, Clamence
adopts the same tactic, “imperceptibly passing from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’” when describing
his own lowliness.138 For Clamence and the Underground Man, then, implicating others
is inherently self-serving. In Clamence’s case, a moral advantage is gained: “The more I
accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you.”139 For the Underground Man, it is a
means of abdicating personal responsibility and justifying his underground status.
The second reason Nietzsche’s historical account of consciousness is important is
that it helps to elucidate the domineering tendencies of Clamence and the Underground
Man. As noted previously, Clamence is immobilized by contradictory impulses. One of
the reasons for this is that he is unable to displace his resentment in the Nietzschean sense
of the term. This is evident in Clamence’s compulsive need to dominate others, which, as
Kaufmann notes, is a clear manifestation of Nietzschean bad conscience.140 Recognizing
that he “can’t get along with domineering or being served,” Clamence finds that his sense
of superiority is best maintained in solitude: “In a general way, I like all islands. It is
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easier to dominate them.”141 This is precisely how the Underground Man justifies his
isolation. “Without power and tyranny over somebody I can’t live,” and “I could no
longer fall in love because, I repeat, with me love meant to tyrannize and hold the upper
hand morally.”142 The Underground Man is also plagued by an internal dialectic, which
Donna Orwin suggests is the defining characteristic of his personality. Each of his
moods, she writes, “succeeds the previous one as its opposite and as a reaction to it.”143
The Underground Man expresses this in the following lamentation:
When I was most capable of recognizing all the subtle beauties of the
highest and the best . . . I could not only fail to recognize them, but could
actually do such ugly repulsive things as . . . well, such things, in short, as
perhaps everybody does, but which always happened to me, as if on
purpose, when I was most conscious that I ought not to do them?144
The paralysis described above recurs throughout Dostoevsky’s novels – indeed it is one
of his most pervasive themes.145 In Notes From Underground and The Fall, it can be
seen in the internal dynamic of contradiction that propels the protagonists. Noticing this
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parallel, Maria Banerjee maintains that “Camus, following both Dostoevsky and
Nietzsche, zeroed in on this addictive aspect of resentment which affects the self as an
autointoxication, the malignant secretion of one’s preconceived impotence inside the
enclosure of the self.”146 As hyper-conscious egos struggling to reconcile their individual
freedom in a social context, Clamence and the Underground Man are trapped “in
permanent self-contradiction.”147 For this reason, they act in spite of themselves, and
their irony is indistinguishable from their sincerity.
The alienating effects of Clamence and the Underground Man’s states of
consciousness can be seen in several analogous episodes, which help to clarify the
connection between resentment and estrangement. To begin with Notes From
Underground, there is a pivotal scene in which the narrator lures a prostitute to his home.
She comes out of sympathy, hoping to comfort this strange man whom she hardly knows.
But owing to his pathological need to justify his underground status, he immediately
shuns her. When this fails, he tries once more to provoke her to reject him:
But at this point something exceedingly strange happened. I was so used
to thinking and imagining everything like a book, and seeing everything in
the guise in which I had previously created it in my dreams, that at first I
didn’t even understand this strange circumstance. But this is what
happened: Liza, whom I had so abused and humiliated, understood a great
deal more than I imagined. She understood that part of it that a woman
always understands first, if she sincerely loves, and that was that I myself
was unhappy.148
Despite Liza’s compassion, the Underground Man is unable to accept her love. His
moods swing pendulously from one emotion to its opposite; and he is constantly
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responding, resisting, mastering.149 This episode mirrors Clamence’s scene on the bridge
insofar as both are presented with a choice. For Clamence, the choice is to act virtuously
or not; for the Underground Man, it is to accept or reject Liza’s love. Neither is able to
do what they know they ought to do, and consequently they succumb to guilt and,
eventually, resentment. The sense of self-judgment that follows these episodes, however,
overwhelms both characters, and their solipsism deepens as a result.
The Underground Man is also paralyzed by a simultaneous (and contradictory)
desire to be recognized and humiliated. Like Clamence, he has need of others but
obstinately distances himself from them.150 Moreover, he is seeking self-justification,
and because he cannot resolve his internal contradictions, he is overpowered by a sense
of his own humiliation and, consequently, a general contempt for mankind.151 This is a
consistent theme in both texts, and is illustrated in a number of tragic-comic incidents. In
The Fall, for instance, there is a revealing scene in which Clamence leaves his car to help
a man move his stalled motorcycle off the road. An argument ensues and Clamence
receives “a violent blow on the ear.”152 “Instead of giving a drubbing to the idiot,”
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distance” (101).
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Eventually, he declares that “Man,” in general, “is stupid, phenomenally stupid” (33).
Clamence likewise grows disdainful of mankind. “Anyone who has considerably
meditated on man,” he says, “is led to feel nostalgia for the primates” (4).
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Clamence recalls, “I docilely returned to my car and drove off.”153 This otherwise banal
affair becomes debilitating when Clamence is unable to forget it. For several days he
stews in solitude.154 The psychic consequences of this event mirrors an incident in Notes
From Underground in which the protagonist is casually brushed aside by a military
office:
I had been standing by the table and unknowingly blocking the way; he
wanted to get past, and he took me by the shoulders and silently . . .
moved me from the place where I stood to another; then he walked past as
if he hadn’t seen me . . . I had been treated like an insect.155
For Clamence and the Underground Man, these humiliating incidents are destructive of
both their public and self-images.156 “After having been struck in public without
reacting,” Clamence says, “it was no longer possible for me to cherish that fine picture of
myself.”157 As for the Underground Man, his agony is such that he dreams (for an entire
year) of “challenging my enemy to a duel” so as to reclaim his sense of honor.
Ultimately, Clamence and the Underground Man are immobilized by their solipsistic and
self-undermining need to assert themselves in an intersubjective context. Indeed, Robert
Solomon has suggested that Clamence assumes the role of judge-penitent in a “desperate
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“I ran off this little film a hundred times in my imagination,” he says, “but it was too
late, and for several days I chewed a bitter resentment . . . it was no longer possible for
me to cherish that fine picture of myself” (54-55).
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Hence both Clamence and the Underground Man try desperately to convince
themselves that their inaction was not the result of cowardice. “It was not cowardice that
made me shrink,” the Underground Man insists, “but infinite vanity. I was not afraid of
the height of six feet, or the fact that I should be painfully beaten . . . I really had no lack
of physical courage, but I had not enough moral courage. I was afraid that everybody
present . . . would fail to understand, and laugh at me when I made my protest speaking in
bookish style” (49). Similarly, Clamence laments that “I had collapsed in public . . . I
had let myself be beaten without replying, but I could not be accused of cowardice” (53).
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effort to remain proud and feel superior in the face of his ever-increasing humiliation.”158
Although there is no direct analogue to the judge-penitent in Notes From Underground,
the self-justifying antics of the Underground Man mirror Clamence’s in this respect.
Finally, it is important to restate the link between the spiritual disorder of
Clamence, Stavrogin, and the Underground Man and broader problem of absurdity and
nihilism. The internal confusion of these absurd figures corresponds to the cultural
confusion wrought by nihilism. To understand their depravity is to understand to what
extent, as Dostoevsky writes in The House of the Dead, society is “already contaminated
to its foundations.”159 In the texts above, absurdity has abolished absolutes; nihilism has
rendered everything equivalent; and human beings have abandoned the “noble ideas”
which bind them together. Hence Camus and Dostoevsky imbue their nihilists with the
psychic traits shared (and exemplified) by Clamence and the Underground Man.
Furthermore, Camus explores religious themes (exile, judgment, guilt, innocence) in The
Fall in order to show how absurdity problematizes them anew. Dostoevsky preceded
Camus’ efforts in this respect. His absurd characters (particularly the ones discussed
above) demonstrate how nihilism disorients – and alienates – the modern psyche by
delivering it over to solipsism; Dostoevsky merely helps to illuminate the political
implications of this for Camus. When Camus sums up Dostoevsky’s central thesis as
“The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the society to revolution,” this is
precisely what he has in mind.160
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Conclusion
To sum up, let us distill what Camus takes from Dostoevsky and Nietzsche at this
stage, and try to situate it in the context of Camus’ larger thought. In terms of the
individual’s relation to absurdity, it is Dostoevsky as psychologist that most influences
Camus. Dostoevsky’s insights into the nature of consciousness and the sources of
estrangement pervade Camus’ absurdist works. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus asks
whether man can find meaning and value in an absurd world. Camus responds
affirmatively, and even takes issue with Dostoevsky’s leap into faith.161 However,
beginning with Caligula, Camus appears to re-examine Dostoevsky’s insights. In
Caligula, the absurd problem is made manifest, men are deprived of transcendent
meaning, and political nihilism is the result. This is Camus’ most forceful depiction of
Dostoevsky’s link between metaphysical angst and nihilism (negation and crime). In The
Fall, Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky is more pronounced. Indeed, Camus applies
Dostoevskyian themes in a contemporary context, and appears to corroborate many of
Dostoevsky’s ideas. While Camus’ full engagement with Dostoevsky cannot be
understood without an analysis of Camus’ revolt writings (the subject of the following
chapter), the works above suggest that Camus began to reconsider some of his previous
claims in The Myth of Sisyphus, particularly as it relates to the need for transcendence.
Camus’ depiction of modern ideology – its emptiness, its pseudo-humanitarianism, and
its destruction of social harmony – in The Fall indicate at the very least that Camus was
struggling to reconcile his absurd humanism with the bleak nihilistic vision of
Dostoevsky.
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Indeed, for this very reason, Camus refers to Dostoevsky as “an existential novelist,”
not “an absurd novelist” (The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 111).
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Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche in the above works is less extensive, but
nonetheless important. As discussed previously, Nietzsche crystallizes Camus’ early
conceptions of reason and truth. This was evident in Camus’ sensualist writings. In
these texts, however, Nietzsche’s metaphysics are applied in an absurd context, and the
results are devastating.162 In the case of Caligula, Nietzsche’s call to self-affirmation and
freedom is carried to its logical extreme. Having confronted the absurd, Caligula’s
reaction is to mirror nature, “to be as cruel” as the Gods.163 Indeed, Caligula is liberated
by the absurd and, consequently, embraces “the power to enforce my will.”164 As I tried
to show above, Caligula makes two mistakes. First, like Ivan Karamazov, he deduces the
equivalency of things and accepts the absurd as the only rule of action. Second, he turns
inward, severs his connection to others, and blindly exercises his will. For this reason, I
read Caligula both as a critique of the implications of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and as an
affirmation of Dostoevsky’s link between negation and crime.
In The Fall, Nietzsche’s psychological insights are as significant as Dostoevsky’s.
Nietzsche’s bad conscience, his will to power of the weak, and his pathos of guilt are all
woven into Clamence’s psyche. In terms of Camus’ broader interaction with Nietzsche’s
ideas, The Fall suggests three things. First, that Camus continued to grapple with
Nietzsche’s ideas well beyond his sensualist writings. Second, that Camus located the
pathologies identified by Nietzsche in the modern bourgeois culture, and that he believed
they intensified in a climate marred by individualism and political realism. Finally, that
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Nietzsche’s philosophy, however insightful, was ethically problematic in Camus’ view.
In fact, Camus declared in 1946 that it was “time to start the critique of
Nietzscheanism.”165 When Camus wrote these words to his mentor Grenier, it was with
the historical consequences of Nietzsche’s metaphysics in mind.166 Hence as Camus
develops his theory of revolt, Nietzsche remains an important influence, but Camus’
orientation to Nietzsche’s ideas shifts dramatically. Having endured the “cult of history
and the will to power,” as Camus calls it, it was necessary to confront Nietzsche and to
transcend his thought without betraying its inmost truths.
So far we have seen how the absurd psyche struggles for unity and purpose in a
world divested of transcendent meaning. But equally important is the means by which
these struggles give way to ideology and dogmatism. In the following chapter I connect
the personal pathologies identified above to the persistence of absolutism in modern life.
Nietzsche’s “will to truth,” Dostoevsky’s desire for a “sublime idea,” and what Camus
calls “the nostalgia for unity” all point to the same fundamental impulse for order. This
impulse is laid bare by absurdity, and it is channeled in destructive ways in much of
Camus’ writings. Above I discussed these destructive tendencies at the level of the
individual psyche. The next chapter demonstrates how totalizing ideologies emerge as
false solutions to the ontological and epistemological problems posed by absurdity.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ABSURDITY AND THE APOTHEOSIS OF REASON
“The ideologies which guide our world were born in the time of absolute scientific
discoveries. Our real knowledge, on the other hand, only justifies a system of thought
based on relative discoveries.” – Camus
Following his early absurdist inquiries, Camus’ attention turned increasingly to
the political sphere. This was due in part to his particular historical moment, but it was
also because he sensed an important connection between nihilism, absurdity, and reason.
More precisely, Camus thought reason emerged as a false and dangerous solution to the
problem of absurdity. Indeed reason was co-opted in man’s essentially religious pursuit
of totality. However, reason does not supplant the God impulse; it merely aids in the
construction of ideologies that replace religious truths with ideological dogmas. For
Camus, the use of such ideologies to justify crime and political terror was the defining
problem of the twentieth century.
Camus engages Nietzsche and Dostoevsky continually as he wrestles with the
metaphysical roots of ideologies. Nietzsche in particular illuminates the religious origins
of ideology for Camus, and Camus more or less follows Nietzsche in his depiction of
socialism as a “degenerate form of Christianity.”1 Nietzsche’s influence can also be seen
in Camus’ critique of Hegel, which amounts to an existential critique of rationalism. In
Dostoevsky’s works, Camus discovers a vision of nihilism that prefigures the
revolutionary excesses of his own epoch. In a 1959 interview, for instance, Camus
identifies Dostoevsky’s The Possessed as “prophetic because of the nihilism that is now
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Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p.
69.
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part of ideologies.”2 In this text Camus encounters characters whose inner nihilism
leaves them susceptible to the murderous logic of political realism. For this reason,
Camus believed it was Dostoevsky who most anticipated the modern ideological
manifestations of nihilism. In this chapter, I interpret Camus’ political thought against
the backdrop of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Camus’ resistance to reason, his
metaphysical account of ideology, and his critiques of totalitarian regimes are seen as
extensions and syntheses of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s thought.
Camus’ confrontation with absurdity begins in 1942, when The Myth of Sisyphus
and The Stranger are published. This is a pivotal point in Camus’ intellectual life.
Having experienced the peculiar disorder of twentieth-century politics, Camus is
increasingly concerned with the reality of nihilism. The abstract themes that pervade his
earlier writings give way to a growing concern over the political implications of
absurdity. Camus’ attitude is summed up well in a 1944 article he wrote for the
resistance newspaper Combat:
We believe that the truth of this century cannot be discovered unless its
tragedy is explored to the bitter end. If the age is afflicted with nihilism, it
is not by ignoring nihilism that we will discover the morality we need.
True, not everything can be summed up by the words ‘negation’ or
‘absurdity.’ We know this. But negation and absurdity must be posited as
ideas because our generation has encountered them and we must learn to
live with them.3
Whereas previously Camus sought responses (on an individual level) to nihilism and
absurdity, now he wonders if it is possible to live peacefully and meaningfully in an age
defined by them. So Nietzsche’s problematization of absurdity, initially a life-affirming
2

Quote from a 1959 interview with Pierre Dumayet. This was one of several interviews
Camus conducted prior to the opening of his theatrical adaptation of Dostoevsky’s The
Possessed.
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Albert Camus, Camus at Combat, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006), p. 100.
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revelation for Camus, is now both a metaphysical and a political crisis. Referring to the
impetus for this crisis, Phillip Rhein writes that
Camus could say in 1943 that the only serious philosophical problem was
the one of suicide; but confronted with the Hitler terror, the occupation,
resistance, and final liberation of France, the Communist successes in
France, and the events of the Cold War, he soon discovered that the stoic
comfort offered by Sisyphus was of little solace or value. As early as
1943 and 1944, although still enmeshed in the theory of the absurd, Camus
began . . . a search for some way to transcend the nihilism of his early
writings.4
This shift in Camus’ philosophical and political attitude is evident in his
notebooks and in The Myth of Sisyphus. In these texts Camus searches for value and
meaning in an explicitly absurd context. This is particularly true in The Myth of
Sisyphus, where the guiding question is whether absurdity devalues life. Camus begins,
however, by asking whether life has (or can have) value for the individual absurd man:
“The fundamental subject of The Myth of Sisyphus is this: it is legitimate and necessary to
wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of
suicide face to face.”5 Camus seeks to justify the individual’s life without sacrificing or
denying the absurd. In this pursuit, and yet again, Camus draws heavily on Nietzsche.
After quoting a lengthy Nietzsche passage from Nietzsche’s The Twilight of the Idols,
Camus writes that Nietzsche effectively “points the way of the absurd man.”6 Here
Camus is referring to Nietzsche’s emphasis on man’s creative possibilities; “art, music,
dance, reason” and “the mind” are all listed as potential sources of meaning.
Art becomes central to Camus’ absurdism for two reasons. First, it is only
through art that an absurd world can be made meaningful. Second, art adds aesthetic
4
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value to life without dogmatically reducing reality or pretending to ultimate knowledge of
things. Camus’ embrace of art also reflects a key point in his transition from sensualism
to absurdity. In many ways, sensualism is the posture of the artist; that is, the artist does
not define the world so much as experience and transfigure it. If anything, the artist uses
myth and symbolisms to communicate experiential truths. As Camus engages the
absurdist stance, then, art becomes an invaluable source of meaning. Indeed absurdism is
rescued by his sensualism.
Perhaps the most significant convergence between Camus and Nietzsche in The
Myth of Sisyphus concerns the epistemological implications of absurdity. This can be
seen in Camus’ attempt to delineate the limits of knowledge in absurdist terms. Here
Camus makes considerable use of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. However, to illustrate this
requires that we first examine Nietzsche’s perspectival account of truth. For Nietzsche,
truth is a product of man’s desire for coherence and fixity. A living and thinking thing
requires a horizon, he claims, and if “it is unable to draw one around itself . . . it will
come to an untimely end.”7 Understood in this way, truth is an existential ground, an
indispensable fiction that serves life. Truth, however, remains an anthropomorphic
projection; it is always an interpretation of things.8 Hence Nietzsche considers truth a
kind of error that emerges out of the need for intelligibility. Without truth, the ability to
order the world and to pass definitive judgment would be greatly diminished. “We can
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Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. Anthony Ludovici and Adrian Collins
(New York: Digireads, 2009), p. 101.
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In The Will to Power, Nietzsche makes this point with regard to all knowledge: “Of
what alone can knowledge consist? – Interpretation, the introduction of a sense into
things, not explanation . . . There is no such thing as an established fact, everything
fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things are
our opinions” (351).
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only take cognizance,” Nietzsche writes, “of a world which we ourselves have made.”9
Nietzsche points to the utilitarian function of truth in order to refute the notion that a
thing or proposition is true insofar as it corresponds to reality. Instead, by exposing truth
as a human contrivance, he can argue that things are considered true in virtue of their
utility to life itself.
Nietzsche hoped to undermine the conventional sense in which truth is
understood. Truth typically implies objectivity or certainty. But this erroneously
assumes that truth is independent of human volition.10 Even science, our most reliable
instrument of knowledge, fails to meet this standard. “How is it possible for an
instrument to criticize itself,” Nietzsche asks, “when it is itself that exercises the critical
faculty?”11 This is not to say that knowledge is impossible or that all truth claims are
equivalent; rather, the point is that science relies upon certain constructs and
presuppositions that are themselves determined by practical human needs.12 The same is
true of reason. Man uses reason as a conceptual tool in order to differentiate phenomena;
in this way, it helps to conceal the chaos of nature. But reason does not produce a
dispassionate account of reality; on the contrary, it bears the stamp of its human origins.
9

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony Ludovici (New York: Barnes
and Noble Publishing, 2006), p. 290.
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Maudemarie Clark has emphasized why Nietzsche’s metaphysics does not permit such
a conception of truth. Nietzsche, she writes, maintains that “once we get rid of the thingin-itself, we lose all basis for regarding objectivity as the transcendence of subjective
factors. If we recognize the perspectival character of knowledge, our only alternative is
to think of objectivity as openness to perspectives other than our own” (1990, p. 148).
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As an example of this, Nietzsche points to the assumed distinction between appearance
and reality. “We have no categories,” he says, “which allow us to separate a world as
thing-in-itself from a world of appearance” (The Will to Power, p. 287). There are
several other constructs to which Nietzsche points as well, including subject, ego, object,
being, thingness, essence, causality, etc. He claims, moreover, that it was “artists in
abstraction who created these categories” (Ibid).
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“The world appears to us logical,” Nietzsche says, “because we first logicized it.”13
Reason is quite literally, then, a metaphysical illusion; by allowing man to interpret the
world as reasonable, it possibilizes truth and imposes sense – but that is all it does.14
Nietzsche tries constantly to expose this aspect of truth and to identify its origins in the
human psyche.
Despite his epistemological critique, Nietzsche does not deny the utility of truth.
Instead he emphasizes the consequences of grounding truth outside experience. The need
to place truth above the flux of experience has produced a host of suprasensory grounds
(God or History, for instance); this is problematic inasmuch as it obscures the creative
origins of human values.15 In fact, Nietzsche attributes the rise of nihilism to this mass
obfuscation. As faith in God began to recede in the eighteenth century, the metaphysical
justifications of values collapsed. It was apparent to Nietzsche that “the highest values”
were “losing their value.”16 Recognizing the moral implications of this, Nietzsche writes
in The Gay Science:
Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him – you and
I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we
drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns?
Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all
directions? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to
light lanterns in the morning? Who will wipe this blood off us? What
13
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water is there for us to clean ourselves? Is not the greatness of this deed to
great for us?17
Considering his view of nihilism, it is unsurprising that Nietzsche’s philosophy is
largely an attack on truth as such. Nietzsche was responding to the emergent positivist
model, which associated truth with empiricism. Much of his metaphysics, in fact, is a
refutation of positivism. In The Will to Power, for example, Nietzsche speaks to the error
in divorcing truth from the interpreting subject. “In opposition to positivism, which halts
at phenomena and says, these are only facts and nothing more, I would say: No facts are
precisely lacking, all that exists consists of interpretations. We cannot establish any fact
in itself.”18 That we cannot establish a fact in itself means that knowledge is necessarily
nonfoundational. A particular belief may be true or false, but it must perforce rest on
relative foundations.19 Nietzsche’s broader point is that truths are incommensurable
insofar as they can only be judged relative to a perspective.20 This is consistent with
Nietzsche’s belief that human beings adopt a conceptual scheme by default in order to
make sense of the world. Whether this scheme is scientific, religious, or ideological, it
begins fundamentally with a choice. Nietzsche insists that this choice is permeated by
17
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its relation to the perspective it is meant to support” (1980, p. 77). Alexander Nehamas
similarly argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivist doctrine precludes the possibility of a
“privileged perspective” (1985, p. 49).
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valuations. “It is our needs,” he writes, “that interpret the world; our instincts and
impulses for and against.”21 In every conceivable case, then, it is this original impulse
that determines truth and falsity, not the physical world. Maudemarie Clark explains this
aspect of Nietzsche’s perspectivism by noting that perspectives can be seen as “noncompetitors, as offering answers to different questions, in accord with different standards
of acceptability.”22 Clark’s point here illustrates what Nietzsche means when he speaks
of truth as utilitarian. We choose an interpretive scheme or a perspective on the basis of
our prejudices and preferences. Because the standards of that scheme will determine
what we accept as true, truth effectively helps us to get what we antecedently preferred.
It is in this sense that Nietzsche believes truth claims are reducible to “value
judgments.”23
Nietzsche’s perspectivism informed much of Camus’ absurdist thought. Indeed
Camus’ essay on absurdism takes Nietzsche’s epistemology as a point of departure.
Consider Camus’ assertion in The Myth of Sisyphus that “In psychology as in logic, there
are truths but not truth.”24 Camus’ point here is essentially Nietzschean. At bottom he
accepts the view that a permanent divide separates the thinker from the object of thought.
For this reason, Camus advocates the use of critical reason, but he objects to the sort of
uncritical rationalism which assumes that complete knowledge of the world is possible.
Indeed, in this way, Camus embodies what Karl Popper called “pragmatic rationalim.”25
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Ultimately, Camus adopts Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism and regards all knowledge as
construction. 26 Science, philosophy, art, all of these activities represent the world; they
do not apprehend it. Camus also appears to borrow Nietzsche’s conception of truth as
metaphor. Camus, for instance, describes the limits of science thus:
All this is good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an
invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus.
You explain this world to me with an image. I realize then that you have
been reduced to poetry: I shall never know. Have I the time to become
indignant? You have already changed theories. So that science that was
to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art . . . I realize that if
through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for
all that, apprehend the world.27
In his essay On Truth and Untruth, Nietzsche similarly reduces truth to
anthropomorphisms and metaphors.28 The overlap here is worth noting as it highlights
the shared basis of Camus and Nietzsche’s epistemological skepticism.
Eventually, Nietzsche’s perspectivism becomes politically problematic to Camus.
As the later Camus (primarily in The Rebel) deals with responses to absurdity at both the
individual and the collective level, Nietzsche’s insight into the perspectival nature of
truth helps to clarify Camus’ early understanding of modern absolutism; specifically,
Camus views ideologies as disguised manifestations of this Nietzschean will to truth.
Camus hints at this in The Myth of Sisyphus:
The tradition of what may be called humiliated thought has never ceased
to exist. The criticism of rationalism has been made so often that it seems
unnecessary to begin again. Yet our epoch is marked by the rebirth of
those paradoxical systems that strive to trip up the reason as if truly it had
26

“This heart within me I can feel,” Camus writes, “and I judge that it exists. There ends
all my knowledge, and the rest is construction” (18).
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The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 20.
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All truth, Nietzsche writes, is but “a sum of human relations that have been poetically
and rhetorically intensified, translated and embellished” (On Truth and Untruth, p. 29).
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always forged ahead. But that is not so much a proof of the efficacy of the
reason as of the intensity of its hopes.29
The emphasis on “the intensity of its hopes” seems especially important. The language
Camus uses here is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who often spoke of the will to truth as a
manifestation of the human desire for metaphysical solace. In the political realm, Camus
believed this desire produced a distinctly ideological brand of politics. People cling to
ideological systems, he suggests, because ideologies appeal to their thirst for clarity.
“That nostalgia for unity” and “that appetite for the absolute,” he writes, “illustrates the
essential impulse of the human drama.30 Politically, then, Nietzsche’s perspectivism has
two important implications. On the one hand, it abolishes absolutes. By their very
nature, truth claims are interested. Nietzsche is not so much denying certainty as the
notion that beliefs can rest on absolute, epistemologically pure foundations.
Consequently, there can be no privileged account of reality over and above all others.
However, because the impulse for certainty persists, people continue to order the world in
accordance with ideological narratives. Further, ideologies concretize truths that are
based not on common experience but on particular perspectives. This undermines any
experiential basis for shared values and, worse still, it devalues the present by justifying
action in terms of the future.31 It is therefore Nietzsche’s problematization of truth that
crystallizes Camus’ account of the moral and political perils of absurdity.
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Dostoevsky and Reason
In Dostoevsky’s fiction the failure to acknowledge the limits of reason is a
central theme. Indeed Dostoevsky’s most logical characters often descend into
debauchery or give themselves over to nihilism. This motif pervades much of Camus’
work as well. His characters are constantly ensnared by contradictions from which they
cannot escape. In this way, intelligence becomes a kind of pathology in the works of
Dostoevsky and Camus. But the implications of this pathology extend well beyond the
individual. Establishing this point of convergence is necessary before pivoting to the
political consequences of a society grounded entirely on reason.
In 1922 Andre Gide, a French author whom Camus read and admired, delivered a
series of lectures on Dostoevsky. One of Gide’s theses is that Dostoevsky juxtaposes
love not with hate but with excessive mindfulness.32 Dostoevsky’ intent, Gide claims,
was to show that “it is the intellect which individualizes, which is the enemy of the
Kingdom of Heaven.”33 Gide’s interpretation is persuasive, as Dostoevsky continually
contrasts intelligence with self-dissolution. Indeed many of Dostoevsky’s intellectuals
are unable to love because they fail to find reasons for it. Stavrogin, for example, wants
to believe – in goodness, in life, in others – but cannot will himself to do it.34 As he
confesses in a final letter, “I lack greatness of soul . . . because I can never lose my
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reason, and I can never believe in an idea.”35 Kirilov of The Possessed is similarly
undermined by his intellect. Without God, Kirilov is consumed by the problem of
freedom. Logic convinces him of God’s non-existence but his intellect demands reasons
for living. What Kirilov ultimately craves, Dostoevsky implies, is faith. Thus, as
Maurice Friedman notes, Kirilov’s intellectual “denial of God conceals the most
desperate need of him.”36 Kirilov is forced to unbelief by his intellect, which refuses to
accept what it knows to be untrue. In the end, as Stavrogin says, Kirilov “could not
compromise with an idea.”37 Unable to live, he kills himself as an example for others:
I am bound to show my unbelief . . . I have no higher idea than disbelief in
God. I have all this history of mankind on my side. Man has done
nothing but invent God so as to go on living, and not kill himself; that’s
the whole universal history up till now. I am the first one in whole history
of mankind who would not invent God. Let them know it once for all.38
In The Brothers Karamazov Ivan’s brother, Dmitri, is likewise tortured by doubt. Dmitri
tries to live a sensual life, but he is increasingly overwhelmed as he is confronted with
various materialist notions.39 Finally, he succumbs to doubt and confesses to Alyosha
that
I never had any of these doubts before, but it was all hidden away in me.
It was perhaps just because ideas I did not understand were surging up in
me that I used to drink and fight and rage. It was to stifle them in myself,
to still them, to smother them . . . It’s God that’s worrying me. That’s the
only thing that’s worrying me. What if He doesn’t exist? What if
Rakitin’s right – that it’s an idea made up by men? . . . For whom is man
going to love then? To whom will he be thankful? . . . After all, what is
35
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goodness? . . . Goodness is one thing with me and another with a
Chinaman, so it’s a relative thing. Or isn’t it? Is it not relative thing? A
treacherous question! You won’t laugh if I tell you it’s kept awake for
two nights.40
Dmitri’s tranquility is ruined by exposure to European ideas that erode his belief in God.
Gradually his natural contentment gives way to endless questions about the relativity of
values. “Goodness is one thing with me and another with a Chinaman, so it’s a relative
thing? Or is it? . . . You won’t laugh if I tell you it’s kept me awake two nights.”41 As a
result of their disbelief, then, Kirilov and Dmitri are unable to transcend themselves.
Kirilov obsesses over the problem of self-will without God and Dmitri agonizes over the
loss of transcendent standards. In both cases, though, the fixation on ideas and
foundations leads first to doubt and then to solipsistic despair.
This pathological aspect of reason is perhaps best seen in the figure of Ivan
Karamazov. Ivan’s metaphysical rebellion is itself a product of critical reason, and the
nihilism to which it leads is instructive. For one, it illustrates the inability of reason to
definitively justify value claims. Ivan, it is important to remember, assents to nihilism for
the sake of intellectual coherence. As Robert Louis Jackson notes, Ivan “is a victim,
finally, of the fatal logic of his position: believing absolutely in the concrete, as it were,
day-to-day interdependence of virtue and faith but lacking personal belief in immortality,
he arrives at the intellectual position that all is permissible.”42 That Ivan’s conclusion is a
rational outcome of his materialist premise is confirmed by Dmitri: “Excuse me . . . have
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I heard things right? ‘Villainy must not only be permitted but even recognized as the
inevitable and even rational outcome of his position for every atheist’!”43
In addition to exposing the justificatory limits of reason, Ivan’s dilemma also
emphasizes the need for self-transcendence. Ivan cannot transcend himself because he
remains hostage to his intellect. His desire for intellectual consistency condemns him to
the either-or logic of nihilism. “Caught between unjustifiable virtue and unacceptable
crime,” Camus writes, “this man of supreme intelligence is killed by contradiction.”44
Unable to reason his way to God or virtue, Ivan abandons morality altogether. “All I
know,” he concludes, “is that there is suffering and that there are none guilty; that cause
follows effect, simply and directly; that everything flows and finds it level – but that’s
only Euclidean nonsense, I know that, and I can’t consent to live by it.”45 As evident
here, Ivan vainly searches for a rational response to suffering. He talks incessantly of
God, but fails to understand him because he talks (and thinks) only in the language of
logic. In a crucial exchange in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Prince Muishkin clarifies Ivan’s
failure: “The essence of religious feeling has nothing to do with reason, or atheism, or
crime, or acts of any kind – it has nothing to do with these things – and never had. There
is something besides all this, something which the arguments of the atheists can never
touch.”46 For Dostoevsky, then, faith is beyond reason. Indeed a key theme of The Idiot
is the folly of trying to justify one’s faith in terms of reason. Muishkin appears most
idiotic, in fact, when attempting to communicate his religious beliefs in non-religious
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terms. As Robin Feuer Miller rightly notes in her study of Dostoevsky, “The atheist
cannot talk about God because his atheism is caused by his rational response to evil and
to injustice, while faith exists as an instinctual response. The two spheres do not
intersect.”47 The final result of Ivan’s rebellion is thus defiant resignation.
Camus was also concerned with the tendency of intelligence (consciousness) to
overwhelm the individual. As mentioned, this is particularly true of Camus’ Caligula.48
In Dostoevsky’s works, however, reason (divorced from faith) is more than a source of
individuation; it is also destructive of man’s spiritual health. The evolution of Camus’
political thought suggests that this aspect of Dostoevsky was deeply influential. Of
course, as discussed in chapter one, Nietzsche is important to Camus for similar reasons,
but Dostoevsky explores this theme from a uniquely religious perspective. Dostoevsky’s
novels are full of faithless believers who reject God but persist in their rational search for
solidarity and love. Insofar as Dostoevsky connects the religious impulse to modernity’s
faith in reason, his insights converge with Nietzsche’s. Dostoevsky and Nietzsche are
thus concerned with essentially the same phenomenon; they merely interpret it in
different terms. Dostoevsky condemns reason in order to emphasize the fundamentally
irrational nature of man, however. His atheists are instructive because, like Camus, they
are not atheists in the strictest sense.49 Their atheism, as Jackson argues, “is not so much
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an ideology as a state of behavior or consciousness.”50 For Dostoevsky, to be wholly
logical is to be at odds with one’s own nature. As his characters confront the limits of
reason, therefore, they become internally divided; they deny what Dostoevsky calls “the
source of living life” in his novel The Adolescent.51
Despite their divergent perspectives, however, the political implications of
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s insights into human nature, faith and reason are remarkably
similar. For Camus they were indeed prophetic, particularly as it relates to ideology and
the development of reason. This was evident to Camus at both the individual and the
collective level. In terms of the individual, there remains a persistent inability to accept
absurdity, to affirm life (and meaning) in relativistic terms. For those who do not sink
into negation – as Caligula, Stavrogin, Clamence, and Ivan do – this results either in the
exaltation of reason or in a destructive mania for certainty. In his short story The
Renegade, Camus explores the pathological need for certainty in a pseudo-religious
context. The protagonist of The Renegade is a missionary who has traveled to Africa in
search of converts. The renegade is a quintessentially modern man. He is passionate but
inauthentic, and his existential insecurity is apparent in his need to proselytize:
I shook my pig-head and repeated the same thing, to get among the most
barbarous and live as they did, to show them at home, and even in the
House of the Fetish, through example, that my Lord’s truth would prevail .
. . I dreamed of absolute power, the kind that makes people kneel down,
that forces the adversary to capitulate, converts him in short, and the
blinder, the crueler he is, the more he’s sure of himself, mired in his own
conviction, the more his consent establishes the royalty of whoever
brought about his collapse.52
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The renegade represents the worst instincts of the absolutist man. He seeks converts not
because of the truth (or utility) of his doctrine but because of the consolation he derives
from being right. His beliefs are surface-level props, designed to justify action and the
worldview on which those actions are based.53 The renegade is problematic in a modern
context because his thirst for meaning is not satisfied by reason alone. Initially he tries to
reduce the world to oppositional categories such as good and evil. However, his selfserving Manichaeism is upended as a result of his confrontation with the native Africans,
whose fidelity to force awakens him to the truth of things:
I had been misled, solely the reign of malice was devoid of defects, I had
been misled, truth is square, heavy, thick, it does not admit distinctions,
good is an idle dream, an intention constantly postponed and pursued with
exhausting effort, a limit never reached, its reign is impossible. Only evil
can reach its limits and reign absolutely, it must be served to establish its
visible kingdom.54
Here the renegade recognizes the contingency of human judgments, and consequently
accepts force as the sole arbiter of truth. If there is no God, there is no binding idea, no
standard for good and evil beyond the realm of man. Reason is thus revealed as a tool,
capable of guiding action but not of grounding it. This is the beginning of what Camus
refers to as political realism; it is the individual’s realization that the “reign of truth” can
only be established on the plane of force.
In a world ruled by force, truth is the province of the strong. Ideologies, shrouded
in reason, define the world in absolutist terms and, in this sense, instantiate a particular
view of “truth.” However, if they are to be binding, these ideological worldviews must
be accepted by others or, if necessary, imposed. Hence in The Fall Camus associates
53

In this respect the renegade is reminiscent of the shallow religious man Nietzsche
identifies in Beyond Good and Evil. Such a man, Nietzsche writes, uses “principles to
tyrannize or justify or honor or affront or conceal” (75) his habits.
54
Ibid, p. 54.
129

ideologies with the suppression of alternative views. What was once “This is the way I
think. What are your objections?” has become “This is the truth . . . You can discuss it as
much as you want; we aren’t interested. But in a few years there’ll be the police who will
show you we are right.”55 At the collective level, then, the existential impulse identified
by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche results in sweeping ideologies, which exalt reason, eschew
epistemological limits, and construct (and defend) fixed interpretations of reality. The
consequence of this is a world defined increasingly by totalizing (and irreconcilable)
systems.
Ideology and Logical Crime
Camus and Dostoevsky’s critique of ideologies led to a mutual concern with the
relationship between reason, ideology and violence. Indeed the most enduring political
concern of both writers was the collapse of foundations and the concomitant justification
of crime. Camus begins The Rebel, for instance, with the following observation:
There are crimes of passion and crimes of logic. The boundary between
them is not clearly defined . . . We are living in the era of premeditation
and the perfect crime. Our criminals are no longer helpless children who
could plead love as their excuse. On the contrary, they are adults and they
have a perfect alibi: philosophy, which can be used for any purpose – even
for transforming murderers into judges.56
The purpose of The Rebel was thus to try to understand logical crime and “to examine
meticulously the arguments by which it is justified.”57 Ideologies are central to Camus’
analysis because they typically supply the theoretical justification for murder.58
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Dostoevsky was similarly concerned with the antecedent causes of logical crime. Indeed,
in a rejoinder to critics, Dostoevsky wrote that his intent in The Possessed was to
understand “how, in our contemporaneous, transitional and peculiar society, are the
Nechayevs, not Nechayev himself, made possible?”59 Here Dostoevsky is referring to the
anarchist on which The Possessed is based. Dostoevsky’s aim in The Possessed, then,
was the same as Camus’ in The Rebel: to understand how ordinary men are able to take
part in the most extraordinary crimes.
On Dostoevsky’s view, eighteenth century Russia was “contaminated” by the
influx of various socialist doctrines.60 Among the most pernicious was the belief in the
progressive power of reason, which supported the Russian mind’s mania for meaningful
action. Under the sway of “European progressives,” Dostoevsky argued, socialism
emerged as a corrective to Christianity, a modern means to universal harmony.61 He
attributed the rise of political crime, in fact, to a belief in the purifying power of these
ideas:
In my novel The Possessed I made the attempt to depict the manifold and
heterogeneous motives which may prompt even the purest of heart and the
naïve of people to take part in the perpetration of so monstrous a villainy.
The horror lies precisely in the fact that in our midst the filthiest and most
villainous act may be committed by one who is not a villain at all! . . . This
rationalizing criminality and effacing any reliable boundary between innocence and guilt”
(56).
59
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is the most pathological and saddest trait our present time – the possibility
of considering oneself not as a villain, and sometimes almost not being
one, while perpetrating a patent and incontestable villainy - therein is our
present-day calamity!62
Here Dostoevsky prefigures Camus’ argument about the capacity of ideology to imbue
action with a sense of justice.63 Dostoevsky also points to specific European thinkers –
Mill and Darwin, for instance – as emblematic of the modern devotion to reason, utility,
and empiricism. In their pursuit of political perfection, these thinkers declared everything
sacred false and outdated.64 They were united, moreover, by a fidelity to logic without
transcendent foundations. For Dostoevsky, this meant a love of theoretical truth but a
complete indifference to truths of experience. Hence there was a willingness to follow
the dictates of reason without regard for social consequences. This was the essence of
political nihilism for Dostoevsky.
Dostoevsky’s account of logical crime informs much of Camus’ political thought.
In The Rebel, for example, such Dostoevskyian themes pervade Camus’ analysis of
Marxism. There particular attention is paid to the use of logic in the justification of
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violence. When describing the “All or Nothing” mentality of historical rebels, for
instance, Camus writes
Just as the movement of rebellion led to the point of ‘All or Nothing” and
just as metaphysical rebellion demanded the unity of the world, the
twentieth century revolutionary movements, when it arrived at the most
obvious conclusions of its logic, insisted with threats of force on
arrogating to itself the whole of history . . . Now that God is dead, the
world must be changed and organized by the forces at man’s disposal.65
In The Possessed Dostoevsky expresses this attitude through the character Chigalev.
Chigalev is the learned rebel who reasons his way to a perfectly harmonious society.
Believing he has solved the problem of freedom and equality, he announces his findings
to the group:
Dedicating my energies to the study of the social organization which is in
the future to replace the present condition of man, I’ve come to the
conviction that all makers of social systems from ancient times up to the
present year . . . have been dreamers, tellers of fairy-tales, fools who
contradicted themselves, who understood nothing of natural science and
the strange animal called man . . . But, now that we are all at last preparing
to act, a new form of social organization is essential. In order to avoid
further uncertainty, I propose my own system of world-organization.66
Chigalev’s “system” is finally embraced on account of its logical consistency. But its
methods sacrifice present experience entirely. Like the historical rebels Camus
condemns in The Rebel, Chigalev is obliged to act in the name of a hope. His actions are
directed toward the future, toward the realization of some obscure freedom. As
suggested above, denial of the present is a recurring theme in both The Possessed and The
Rebel. To take one example from The Possessed, there is a young socialist, Yulia, who is
pathologically fixated on the future. “The public must understand,” she demands, “that
the attainment of an object of universal human interest is infinitely loftier than the
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corporeal enjoyments of the passing moment.”67 Camus thought such utopian aspirations
fundamental to modern revolutionary ideologies. Marx, he claims, “was obliged to speak
in the future tense and in the abstract. Thus it is not astonishing that he could blend in his
doctrine the most valid critical method . . . with a utopian messianism.”68 For men
deprived of God, the future was the only transcendental value.69
Against the backdrop of their political thought, then, Camus and Dostoevsky’s
resistance to scientism is much clearer. Translated to the political realm, the methods of
science – reason, empiricism, and logic – become extensions of the will to mastery. For
Camus this was particularly manifest in Nazism. Here science serves as a cover for
various irrational impulses. “The systematic and scientific aspect of the Nazi
movement,” he claims, “hides an irrational drive that can only be interpreted as a drive of
despair and arrogance.”70 In this way, Nazism illustrates the consequences of divorcing
science and technology from a transcendent or external value system.71 It also connects
Dostoevsky’s philosophical anthropology to Camus’ political thought; that is to say,
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Nazism imbues the negation of nihilism with the individual’s passion for higher meaning
in a terrifyingly stark way. And this is precisely the vision of nihilism foreshadowed in
Dostoevsky’s works. When Camus writes, therefore, that Dostoevsky’s characters
“prefigure our nihilism,” this is likely what he had in mind.
In his study of totalitarianism, Camus asks why modern revolutions tend to betray
in action what they affirm in theory. Communism, for example, begins with noble
aspirations of delivering all men from bondage, but ends nevertheless by enslaving them
all. It was essential for Camus to understand how rebellion reached this point of extreme
contradiction. He begins by understanding it as a function of the absolutist quest itself.
The pursuit of absolute freedom, for instance, collapses into contradiction because such
freedom is possible only through totalitarian means; that is, through absolute negation.
Thus Camus argues that “complete freedom can only exist and justify itself by the
creation of new values identified with the entire human race . . . The shortest route to
these new standards passes by way of total dictatorship.”72
Camus’ admonitions concerning absolutist pursuits are forcefully anticipated in
Dostoevsky’s works, particularly The Possessed and The Brothers Karamazov. Indeed in
The Rebel Camus devotes an entire section to the legacy of Chigalev, whose system he
compares to the totalitarian defenders of State terrorism in the twentieth century.73 For
Camus, it is the “implacable” nature of Chigalev’s mind that marks him as a precursor to
modern revolutionaries. The premise of Chigalev’s system, for example, is unlimited
freedom. “I am perplexed by my own data,” he says, “and my conclusion is a direct
contradiction of the original idea with which I started. Starting from unlimited freedom, I
72
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arrive at unlimited despotism.”74 According to Chigalev, a scientific account of man
shows that “that there can be no solution of the social problem but mine.”75 This same
theme is expressed in The Brothers Karamazov through the Grand Inquisitor. Here,
however, slavery is offered as a gift to mankind. The uncertainty of freedom is replaced
by the stability of slavery. Like Chigalev, the Inquisitor’s arguments are rooted in a
purely objective view of human nature. To stifle doubt, he claims, men have
Set up gods and challenged one another, “Put away your gods and come
and worship ours, or we will kill you and your gods!” And so it will be to
the end of the world, even when gods disappear from the earth; they will
fall down before idols just the same. Thou didst know, Thou couldst not
but have known, this fundamental secret of nature, but Thou didst reject
the one infallible banner which was offered Thee to make all men bow
down to Thee alone – the banner of earthly bread; and Thou hast rejected
it for the sake of freedom and the bread of Heaven. Behold what Thou
didst further. And all again in the name of freedom! I tell Thee that man
is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quick to whom he
can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is
born.76
The Grand Inquisitor thus fancies himself as a redeemer. Convinced that men crave
coherence more than freedom, he offers them a respite.77 At bottom, the inquisitor is a
simplifier; he relieves men of the burden of choice.78 “Didst Thou forget,” he asks, “that
man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and
evil?”79 For the inquisitor, then, men are suited to slavery despite their rebellious
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nature.80 Hence he regards the tyrants of the world as “the unconscious expression” of
man’s “craving for universal unity.”81
It is significant that Dostoevsky considered the Grand Inquisitor the “culminating
point . . . of his religious and political thought.”82 For his part, the inquisitor’s blueprint
represented the realization of a political order dedicated exclusively to order and reason.
Indeed the point of his system, as Bruce Ward justly argues, is to “articulate a social
order which most closely corresponds to human nature.”83 Thus in his repudiation of
Christ, the inquisitor insists that his formula is a logical inference derived from empirical
observations of life and man. In this way, he crowns a central theme of Dostoevsky’s,
which remains undeveloped in previous works such as The Adolescent. There, for
example, revolutionaries, inspired by Europe, vow to “live according to the laws of
nature and of truth.”84 But despite their grandiose aims, they fail to realize their political
Utopia. Like the nihilists in The Possessed, they incite chaos in order to build a “modern
well-organized state.”85 But they succeed only in the creation of disorder. In the
inquisitor’s social formula, however, the well-organized state of which they dream is
fully articulated.
Ultimately, for both Dostoevsky and Camus, totalitarian systems exalted reason at
the expense of reality; that is, they assumed life could be made coherent. The absurd
teaches the contrary. But the absurd is a truth of experience; it is not a discovery of
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reason. Totalitarian regimes are blind to this fact; they are propelled by an internal logic
that aspires to a level of unity unattainable in an absurd world. On Camus and
Dostoevsky’s view, the pursuit of this illusion obscures the ambiguities of life and
produces a politics that reinforces rather than resists the absurd.
It is worth noting that neither Camus nor Dostoevsky were opposed to reason or
science as such; instead they objected to scientism or belief in the universal applicability
of the scientific method.86 Science helps to enumerate the material world but it does not
(and cannot) give meaning to history. Totalizing ideologies, however, tend to make two
mistakes. First, they presuppose that the world’s structure is fully intelligible or follows
some general order. It is precisely this sort of epistemological certitude that supports the
ideologue’s pursuit of totality.87 Second, they deny man’s existential (that is, irrational)
needs. In Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky insists that “man’s nature acts as one
whole, with everything that is in it, conscious or unconscious, and although it is
nonsensical, yet it lives.”88 To ignore this is to diminish man’s capacity to live and
choose. As Fred Willhoite aptly notes, Camus followed Dostoevsky in this respect.
“Camus,” he writes, “implicitly maintained that what we learn through existential

86

This distinction has been noted in the literature as well, most notably by Avi Sagi, who
also argues that Camus’ “rejection of classic rationalism . . . does not necessarily imply a
rejection of critical-rational thought” (Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd, p.
59).
87
As Fred Willhoite (1968) has pointed out, “Camus attributed the totalitarian impulse to
philosophic claims to comprehension of the ultimate order of things” (Beyond Nihilism,
p. 97). Pete Petrakis (1998) has also noted Camus’ connection between inflated
epistemological claims and totalitarian regimes. “This false certitude,” he writes,
“concerning human nature and the path required for its perfection is the central feature of
the murderous political regimes of the twentieth century” (Exile, Judgment, and
Kingdom, p. 187).
88
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, trans. David McDuff (New York:
Penguin Books, 1972), p. 36.
138

knowing is just as valid for our genuinely human needs and purposes as are the
discoveries and theories of empirical science.”89 There is thus an important link between
Camus and Dostoevsky’s conceptions of human nature and their epistemological views.
It must also be remembered that Camus’ aim was always to defend the dignity of man,
the very “dignity that rebellion affirms.”90 The experience of the twentieth century taught
him that human values required more than a rational defense. As an instrument of
knowledge, reason is quite useful. But reason is abstract; it is a conceptual tool that
interprets the world but does not speak to meaning or ends. The potentialities for
communion and dialogue are thus greatest in experience. Political orders that fail to
account for this inevitably exceed the bounds of human reason.
Hegel and the Deification of Reason
To better illustrate Camus’ engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky on the
problem of historical progressivism, I turn now to their overlapping critiques of
Hegelianism. This will help to clarify three points. First, Camus, Nietzsche, and
Dostoevsky each understood Hegelianism as an essentially religious impulse.91 This is a
critical point of convergence, the implications of which become clearer in Camus’
writings on revolt.92 Second, it emphasizes what Camus, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky
viewed as the Enlightenment effort to ground morality on purely rational grounds. For
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Camus and Dostoevsky in particular, this fidelity to reason alone was integral to what
Camus often referred to as “crimes of logic.”93 Lastly, Hegel’s enormous influence
illustrates the totalizing role of reason in the modern world. In the absence of God,
reason emerges as the only source of certainty, the only guide to action. Camus refer
specifically to this in his discussion of Hegel in The Rebel:
If history is, in fact, independent of all principles and composed only of a
struggle between revolution and counterrevolution, there is no way out but
to espouse wholeheartedly one of the two and either die or be resurrected.
Nechaiev [the Russian nihilist and the inspiration for Dostoevsky’s The
Possessed] pursues this logic to the bitter end. With him, for the first time,
revolution is going to be explicitly separated from love and friendship.94
This is the sense in which logical crime and the loss of faith are concomitants of the
apotheosis of reason; it is also the sense in which reason serves as a defense against
absurdity.
Dostoevsky rejected secular ideologies as morally vacuous; they lacked the
transcendent ground of Christianity and they were too abstract to bind a community or a
country. As evidence of this, Dostoevsky pointed to the religious fervor with which
Russian intellectuals embraced socialism.95 For his part, this was a consequence of the
collapse of faith and the desperate need for a binding idea.96 In works such as The
Possessed, therefore, socialist schemes are described as “new religions . . . coming to
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take the place of the old one.”97 This was also the view of Nietzsche, in whose texts
historical movements like Marxism are seen as frustrated religions or attempts to
replicate the moral effects of Christianity (the equality of men under God, for example)
while denying its transcendent justifications. This is quite clear in Twilight of the Idols,
where Nietzsche insists that “When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives
oneself of the right to Christian morality.”98 Similarly in his attack on Hegel in Untimely
Meditations, Nietzsche claims that “Christianity has been naturalized by historical
treatment . . . until it has been resolved into pure knowledge and destroyed in the
process.”99 In The Rebel Camus adopts the same view. “Socialism,” he maintains, “is
only a degenerate form of Christianity. In fact, it preserves a belief in the finality of
history . . . which substitutes ideal ends for real ends.”100 Camus even aligns himself
specifically with Nietzsche, who “saw clearly that humanitarianism was only a form of
Christianity deprived of superior justification, which preserved final causes while
rejecting the first cause.”101 Camus thus follows both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche and
equates humanitarianism with ideologies that justify action in the name of humanity.
For Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, the tendency to act in the name of some
abstract love for humanity was a hallmark of ideologies. Indeed for each of them the
Christian roots of secular doctrines (particularly socialism) were most apparent in this
manifestation. As noted previously, the impossibility of loving mankind in the abstract
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was a recurring theme in The Brothers Karamazov. But Dostoevsky also associates this
sort of abstract love with socialism. In The Idiot, for instance, Dostoevsky dismisses the
socialist’s “abstract love of humanity” as nearly always love of self.”102 Interestingly
enough, Camus echoes this sentiment in The Fall, as Clamence repeatedly mocks the
ideologue’s “love of mankind” and implies that such men are moved primarily by “selflove.”103 And Clamence’s failure to save the drowning woman is itself a sign of his
shallow humanism. In Diary of a Writer Dostoevsky continues his critique of secular
humanism, asserting that Russians, “having detached themselves from the people . . . and
God,” necessarily turn to reason for a justification for solidarity. Consequently, humanity
is converted into an “abstract ideal,” rooted in “logic” and “ideas.”104 It was
inconceivable, Dostoevsky contended, to love one’s fellow man this way; it was too
disconnected, too theoretical. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche makes essentially the
same point:
To love mankind for God’s sake has up to now been the most
distinguished and far-fetched feeling that mankind has reached. That love
for mankind, without some sanctifying reservation, is only one more
stupidity and brutishness, that the impulse to such love must first get its
proportion, its delicacy, its grain of salt and dash of ambergris from a
higher impulse.
Although Nietzsche is not interested in defending Christianity, it is remarkable how
similar his critique of humanism is to Dostoevsky’s. Both hold that love of humanity is
unsustainable without some higher inclination. Kroeker and Ward have emphasized this
parallel in their study of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: “Secular humanism,” the authors
claim, “is not tenable, according to Nietzsche, because it is driven by a fundamental
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theoretical contradiction: one cannot do away with the ideal of God while holding onto
the ideal of humanity . . . the love of humanity depends on belief in God.”105 As the
authors also suggest, Nietzsche’s argument here mirrors that of Ivan in The Brothers
Karamazov.106 Camus similarly condemns socialists for failing to serve man in the
concrete. In a 1944 essay for Combat, for example, Camus writes:
There is a certain form of socialist doctrine that we detest, perhaps even
more than we detest the politics of tyranny. It is a doctrine that rests on
optimism and invokes the love of humanity to exempt itself from serving
human beings, the inevitability of progress to evade the question of wages,
and universal peace to avoid necessary sacrifice. This kind of socialism
relies mainly on the sacrifices of others. Those who preach it never
commit themselves.107
The Dostoevskyian hue of this passage is apparent. Indeed for Camus as much as for
Dostoevsky, one either served man in the concrete or not at all. As Camus remarks in the
final chapter of The Rebel, true rebellion begins with a peculiar form of love, which is
“crowned with the heart-rending cry of Karamazov.”108 However, rebellion betrays its
noble origins the moment it prefers “an abstract concept of man to a man of flesh and
blood.”109 This moment of betrayal is marked by the shift from rebellion to revolution in
which ideas – of man, of history, of justice – become the object of devotion.
Camus also argues that progressive ideologies mirror religions in their re-location
of salvation at the end of history. This effort to preserve transcendence is for Camus the
result of a misguided belief in “the enlightening powers of science.”110 Further, it is born
of a Utopian fantasy, which seeks to “replace God by the future” and to “identify the
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future with ethics.”111 This aspect of Camus’ critique is significant in this context for two
reasons. First, it elucidates why Camus’ political thought is more aligned with
Dostoevsky than Nietzsche. In The Rebel, for example, Camus suggests that Nietzsche’s
philosophy (as well as Hegel’s) helped to justify a certain kind of political realism.
“Nietzsche’s responsibility,” Camus writes, “lies in having legitimized, for reasons of
method – and even if only for an instant – the opportunity for dishonesty of which
Dostoevsky had already said that if once offered to people, one could always be sure of
seeing them rushing to seize it.”112 Here Camus is referring to the use of “great ends” to
justify present action. Dostoevsky also warned against this sort of logic; indeed he
insisted that belief in Christ, in the immortality of the soul, was essential to resisting it.
For Dostoevsky, this was an existential imperative; it satisfied the irrepressible desire for
salvation, for a final goal. But it also preserved the political order by uniting people
around a common ideal. In the absence of such a belief, there was an ever-present danger
of historical ideologies filling this vacuum and distorting the present in the name of some
future Utopia. This Dostoevskyian insight is fundamental to Camus’ argument in The
Rebel. In fact, Camus condemns such historical doctrines as Marxism and Nazism for
positing visions of the future and recognizing only those values “which serve this
particular future.”113
The second reason why Camus’ critique is important is that it reveals the extent to
which Camus critically engages Nietzsche. As noted previously, Nietzsche enjoined men
to embrace the earth and to find freedom in fate and creation. However, Camus was
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increasingly opposed to the affirmative implications of Nietzsche’s philosophy. “With
Nietzsche,” he writes, “rebellion ends . . . in the exaltation of evil.”114 While Camus
understood that Nietzsche sought only to replace “the judge and the oppressor” with “the
creator,” he also believed that, for the majority of mankind, “the intoxication of freedom
ends in biological or historical Caesarism.”115 As his political novel The Possessed
demonstrates, Dostoevsky was deeply troubled by this tendency as well, and his defense
of faith cannot be understood apart from it.
Let us return to Hegel, a figure of considerable importance in the writings of
Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Dostoevsky traced much of Russia’s political
disorder to the influence of Hegel. So important, in fact, was Hegel to Dostoevsky that
Dostoevsky remarked in a letter to a friend, from whom he was borrowing a copy of
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, that “my whole future” depends upon a firm
understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of history.116 In Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky
specifically condemns the Hegelian roots of Russia’s socialist movement, calling it a
“distressing, pathological phenomenon . . . yet one that was inevitable by reason of its
historical logic.”117 Camus was also opposed to the totalizing logic of historical
movements. He regarded Hegel’s system in particular as an example of the modern
apotheosis of reason. As Jeffrey Isaac notes, for Camus “the deification of man
characteristic of Enlightenment thinking reaches its culmination in the writings of Hegel .
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. . which . . . unites a modernizing historicism with a dangerous faith in reason.”118
Hegel’s secular philosophy, Camus argued, preserved the certainty of religious
conviction by reducing man and history to reason. In this way, Hegel denied the ground
of freedom by subordinating human agency to history. Camus suggests as much in a
notebook entry in which he refutes both the existentialists and the Hegelians:
“Existentialism kept Hegelianism’s basic error, which consists in reducing man to
history. But it did not keep the consequence, which is to refuse in fact any liberty to
man.”119 Nietzsche rejected Hegel on similar grounds as Dostoevsky and Camus. In The
Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche claims that Hegel has put “history in the place of
other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the one sovereign.”120 This Nietzschean point
is echoed in The Rebel. After Hegel, Camus argues, “The whole effort of German
thought has been to substitute for the notion of human nature that of human situation and
hence to substitute history for god and modern tragedy for ancient equilibrium.”121 In
any case, the key point here is that Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche all converge in
their repudiations of Hegel. They reject not only Hegel’s system but also the living
influence of his philosophy.
With Hegel, history supplants God and the real becomes indistinguishable from
the rational. In effect, though, Hegel only reconciles the real and the rational by
identifying one with the other. The result of this distortion of reality is a kind of blanket
justification of present action. “Truth, reason, and justice,” Camus writes in The Rebel,
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are “abruptly incarnated in the progress of the world.”122 Values, in other words, are
either supplanted by facts or “found at the end of history.”123 And without independent
principles to guide action, the task of shaping history falls to reason and force. This is
what Camus means when he maintains that Hegel furnished “the decisive justification of
the spirit of power in the twentieth century.”124 In the case of Nazism, force is exalted
and history is reduced to its purest form. The goal of evolution displaces the process
itself. Such an attitude was expressed perfectly by Ernst Junger, the leading intellectual
behind Nazism: “Evolution is far more important than living.”125 For Camus, this is the
culmination of a logic rooted in historical dynamism.
The fusion of power and historicism thus leads to an obsession with progress and
motion. Camus speaks to this in a series of Combat articles, in which he argues that the
leading ideologies of his time (capitalism and Hegelian-Marxism) were
based on the idea of progress . . . and convinced the application of their
principles must inevitably lead to social equilibrium . . . They are
extracting a very heave price from us. In practical terms, it follows that
the battle that will be waged in years to come will not pit the forces of
utopia against the forces of reality. Rather, it will pit different utopias
against each other as they try to gain a purchase on the real, and the only
choice remaining will be to decide which form of utopia is least costly.126
As implied here, Camus considered Hegelianism the culmination of idealism. This could
be seen in its pretension to knowledge of the course of history, which is also a denial of
absurdity. Recall that both Nietzsche and Camus believed the world was justifiable only
as an aesthetic phenomenon. To imbue history (or the world) with some higher meaning,
therefore, is to negate the absurd. Furthermore, by making idols of history and reason,
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Hegelianism elevates ideas over experience. The denial of experience is a crucial point
for Camus. Indeed, it is here that Camus extends Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s ideas to
contemporary politics.
For Camus, the elevation of ideas over experience was a byproduct of historical
teleology; that is, of a linear and determined conception of history. “Confronted with the
possibility that the idea may be realized in the future,” he notes in The Rebel, human life
can be everything or nothing.”127 Teleological thinking, of which Hegel is a prime
example, helped to instantiate political realism and, consequently, to legitimize crime.
Camus also addresses this in Combat: “terror can be legitimized only if one adopts the
principle that the end justifies the means. And this principle can be embraced only if the
efficacy of an action is taken to be an absolute end . . . as in philosophies that take history
as absolute.”128 This passage distills Camus’ argument against political realism. As an
outgrowth of teleology, political realism is defined by its resistance to limits. Every
encroachment upon reality is but a necessary step on the road to absolute freedom.
Hence much of Camus’ political thought aims at discrediting this approach to action.
When he condemns communism in Combat, for example, he expresses his solidarity with
the collectivist vision but says explicitly that “their adherence to a very consistent
philosophy of history justifies their acceptance of political realism as the primary method
for securing triumph of an ideal shared by many Frenchmen . . . We do not believe in
political realism. Our method is different.”129 Fundamentally, Camus rejects political
realism for the same reasons he rejects historical progressivism: it denies experience in
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defense of abstract truths. In this respect, Camus’ position is indistinguishable from
Nietzsche’s. Nietzsche, for instance, writes that “We should serve history only so far as
it serves life; but to value its study beyond a certain point mutilates and degrades life: and
this is a fact that certain marked symptoms of our time make it as necessary as it may be
painful to bring to the test of experience.”130 In a 1947 notebook entry, Camus similarly
asks: “Being in history while referring to values that go beyond history – is it possible?
Does not the value of ignorance itself cover a convenient refuge? Nothing is pure,
nothing is pure – this is the cry that has poisoned our century.”131 For Camus, then,
history was a source of nihilism, not of values or limits.
Before continuing, it is worth noting that several commentators have questioned
Camus’ reading of Hegel.132 However, it is of little consequence to this study whether
Camus’ interpretation of Hegel was justified or not. Here it suffices to note the degree to
which Camus’ understanding of Hegel’s philosophy (and its enduring influence) was
informed by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. Camus understood his century as one that “tried
to live without transcendence.”133 For Camus, Nietzsche diagnosed the peculiar brand of
nihilism that resulted from this effort. Modern nihilism, he concludes in a footnote in
The Rebel, “is still nihilism in the Nietzschean sense . . . to the extent that it is a calumny
of the present life to the advantage of a historical future in which one tries to believe.”134
The modern attempt to live without transcendence failed because it was still animated by
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the “appetite for divinity,” which Camus considered the chief characteristic of the
revolutionary mind. Nietzsche (along with Dostoevsky) helped to crystallize the origins
of this for Camus. Dostoevsky’s contribution consisted more in his understanding of the
political importance of foundations. Indeed Dostoevsky was arguably the first modern
writer to articulate the consequences of replacing religion with politics, God with History.
He also understood, perhaps more than Nietzsche, the social utility of shared traditions
tied to a web of transcendent beliefs. While Nietzsche grasped this historical link,
Dostoevsky (at least in Camus’ view) seems to have better understood the perils of
egoism. In any event, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky both saw Hegelianism as a
manifestation of the human need for clarity and transcendence of one form or another.
With Hegel, however, the desire for transcendence is concealed and expressed in terms of
the flow of history. That Camus also understands Hegel and his successors in this way
shows to what extent he continued to develop his thought against the backdrop of
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.
Freedom and Despotism
There are sporadic references to Dostoevsky’s critique of despotic regimes in
Camus’ fiction. On at least two occasions in The Fall, Clamence invokes the Grand
Inquisitor’s ideas concerning man’s preference for slavery over freedom.135
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Clamence, for example, insists that he is “for any theory that refuses to grant man
innocence and for any practice that treats him as guilty. You see in me . . . an
enlightened advocate of slavery. Without slavery, as a matter of fact, there is no
definitive solution” (132). This more or less echoes Chigalev’s claim that slavery is the
only solution to the social problem. Later, Clamence invokes the Grand Inquisitor’s view
of freedom and slavery: “after having solemnly paid my respects to freedom, I decided on
the sly that it had to be handed over without delay to anyone who comes along. And
every time I can, I preach in my church of Mexico City, I invite the good people to
150

Commentators have also suggested that Chigalev’s “system” was a kind of blueprint for
Camus’ Caligula.136 Certainly there is evidence for this, but Dostoevsky’s influence is
arguably clearer in Camus’ State of Siege. Performed in 1948, State of Siege is a
theatrical exploration of totalitarianism. Set in the Spanish city of Cadiz, it begins as the
town is besieged by a mysterious plague. Unlike Camus’ novel The Plague, however,
State of Siege is not so much about the individual as it is the state. Camus describes his
intention thus:
I did not seek to flatter anyone in writing the State of Siege. I wanted to
attack directly a type of political society which has been organized or is
being organized, to the right or to the left, on a totalitarian basis. No
spectator can in good faith doubt that this play takes sides with the
individual, in that which is noble in the flesh, in short, with terrestrial love,
against the abstractions and the terrors of the totalitarian state, whether this
be Russian, German, or Spanish.137
The Plague is primarily about the ineradicability of evil and suffering in an absurd world.
In State of Siege, however, the plague is human; it is born of ideas and reason.138 Hence
a despot personifies the plague and the regime itself is seen as an organizational
manifestation of absurdity. The Plague, moreover, deals with lapses of attention and the
tendency of individuals to retreat into routine. State of Siege addresses this as well, but
here such failures are worse because they perpetuate an evil that is human and therefore
preventable.
submit to authority and humbly to solicit the comforts of slavery, even if I have to present
it as true freedom” (137).
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In any event, there are some important parallels between the inquisitor’s social
doctrine and the authoritarian regime in State of Siege. To begin, in State of Siege the
protagonist (named The Plague) functions as a theoretical defender of despotism. He is
opposed to the play’s hero, Diego, who leads the revolt against the regime. The dramatic
tension revolves around these two characters, and it is in their exchanges that The Plague
reveals himself as a modern inquisitor. For example, The Plague promises to simplify
life by bringing “order, silence, and total justice.”139 Instead of uncertainty and “cheap
emotion,” he offers “organization” and freedom from the irrational.140 He aims,
moreover, to substitute the uncertainty of life with a self-imposed tyranny that is
amenable to human control. Even death, the ultimate symbol of absurdity, is made
orderly and rational.141 The Plague also absolves the people of their thirst for answers by
abolishing inquiry altogether. We will “do all the thinking” for them, he proclaims.142
The Grand Inquisitor adopts this approach as well: “The most painful secrets of their
conscience, all, all they will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all.”143 Also
like the inquisitor, The Plague imagines himself a savior, a benevolent dictator who
brings peace and stability to his subjects. He says to the citizens of Cadiz that “I don’t
ask you to thank me for this; it’s only natural, what I am doing here for you.”144 This is
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reminiscent of the inquisitor, who “vanquishes freedom” in order to “make men
happy.”145 In this way, the false and paternalistic humanism for which Dostoevsky and
Camus condemned socialists appears in these works at the root of totalitarian regimes.
Dostoevsky’s influence on State of Siege can also be seen in the related theme of
social isolation. The Plague, for example, tries to atomize the populace, to destroy the
bonds between people. This is accomplished in several ways, most of which are
prefigured in The Brothers Karamazov. This is most apparent in the political use of
hunger to stifle the seeds of revolt. For instance, the inquisitor chastises Christ for the
gift of freedom and says
Thou wouldst go into the world, and art going with empty hands with
some promise of freedom which men in their simplicity and their natural
unruliness cannot even understand, which they fear and dread . . . But
seest Thou these stones in this parched and barren wilderness? Turn them
into bread, and mankind will run after Thee like a flock of sheep, grateful
and obedient, though forever trembling, lest Thou withdraw Thy hand and
deny them Thy bread.146
Near the end of the second act, Diego reproaches The Plague for precisely this sort of
tactic:
It’s true that you are lying and that you will go on lying until the end of
time. Yes, I’ve seen through your famous system. You have imposed on
men the pangs of hunger and bereavement to keep their minds off any
stirrings of revolt. You wear them down, you waste their time and
strength so that they’ve neither the leisure nor the energy to vent their
anger . . . which is what you want, isn’t it? Great as their numbers, they
are quite as much alone as I am.147
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For The Plague and the inquisitor, then, cultivating dependency helps to shatter
solidarity.148 However, in State of Siege, when Diego refuses to submit, The Plague
proposes an inquisitor-like exchange. Diego’s love, Victoria, falls ill. The Plague offers
to spare both of their lives if only he would cease revolting. “Don’t you realize,” he
urges, “that ten years of this girl’s love are worth far more than a century of freedom for
those men?”149 The inquisitor also works to undermine communal bonds. “Miracle,
mystery, and authority,” he proclaims, suffice to “conquer and hold captive . . . the
conscience of these impotent rebels.”150 For The Plague, the principal instrument of
division is authority. As the outbreak spreads, therefore, he issues a series of bizarre
edicts that are designed to isolate. The first edict forbids citizens from helping “any
person stricken with the disease.”151 He then demands that each citizen “keep
permanently in his mouth a pad soaked in vinegar.” The stated purpose of these decrees
is to teach “discretion and the art of silence.”152 But more fundamentally, they destroy
dialogue and, consequently, the possibility for shared meaning and collective action. I
seek “to fix things up in such a way,” The Plague says, “that nobody understands a word
of what his neighbor says . . . [Then] we shall be well on the way to that ideal
consummation – the triumph of death and silence.”153 The Grand Inquisitor’s effort to
diminish thoughtfulness and deconstruct the subject is thus apparent in the actions of The
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Plague. In the place of individual choice and freedom, moreover, both despots substitute
the twin virtues of duty and obedience. The Plague insists that what he desires of the
people “isn’t comprehension but execution of their duties.”154 As seen above, the
inquisitor similarly sought to stupefy the masses through the contrived use of “miracle,
mystery, and authority.”
In State of Siege and The Brothers Karamazov, alienating the populace also
prepares the way for the rationalization of existence. Isolated and deprived of
community, the state becomes the sole locus of meaning and order for the individual.
Totalitarian regimes capitalize on this need for direction by applying the principles of
reason to the mechanization of society. This can be seen in the use of ants as a kind of
political model for humanity. The inquisitor, for instance, aspires to reduce humanity to
one “unanimous and harmonious ant-heap.”155 The bureaucrat in State of Siege, Nada,
similarly announces The Plague’s efforts to ensure that the “world acquires that neat,
nicely ordered layout whose template is the gibbet,” and is “shared between well-drilled
ants and the placid dead.”156 In both texts, then, ants are exalted on account of their
efficiency and order. An ant-heap consists not of people but of parts, which act without
regard for motive but which nevertheless fulfill their role. To condition human action in
this way is the chief aspiration of all totalitarian states. Camus and Dostoevsky suggest
that such an aspiration follows naturally from the fusion of nihilism and reason; that is to
say, nihilism abolishes human telos, reality is seen as infinitely malleable, and reason
emerges as the ultimate instrument of human mastery.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to understand the process by which reason and
ideology emerged as totalizing political forces in the modern world. In terms of Camus’
broader dialogue with Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, several developments are worth noting.
First, Camus brings to his political analysis a fundamental lesson he absorbed from
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, namely the psychological significance of guiding principles.
In earlier absurdist inquiries, Camus affirmed man’s inability to justify traditional sources
of meaning. From a political perspective, however, transcendent beliefs acquire a new
significance; they are standards through which man gleans meaning and on the basis of
which he acts. As Camus deconstructs historical ideologies, this lesson pervades his
thought; specifically, Camus identifies scientism, which Dostoevsky and Nietzsche both
understood as an extension of the will to totality, as the means by which such
metaphysical aspirations are realized. This is the sense in which Camus understood
progressive ideologies, and in Camus’ analysis of Hegel’s revolutionary legacy,
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s influence was apparent.
Owing in part to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, then, Camus approached reason (in
his political thought, at least) not as an epistemological phenomenon but as an extension
of metaphysical drives. But Camus also appears to develop Dostoevsky’s thesis
concerning the link between individual crime and societal disorder. For Dostoevsky,
political nihilism was the inevitable result of metaphysical nihilism. As the previous
chapter argued, Camus’ absurdist literature affirms this at the level of the individual.
In The Rebel, however, Camus uses the destructive legacy of Nietzsche’s philosophy to
corroborate Dostoevsky’s political hypothesis. Dostoevsky’s fiction, for example,
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anticipates the nihilism of political systems founded wholly on reason. In his account of
Marxism in particular, Camus implies Dostoevsky’s prophetic vision has been fulfilled.
In this way, Camus uses Dostoevsky’s art as a framework for understanding the modern
phenomenon of logical crime. Indeed Camus extends the logic of Dostoevsky’s nihilists
to account for the excesses of historical revolt. Without foundations, Camus finally
concludes, limits are abolished, expediency is exalted, and belief in the progressive
power of reason guides action. These developments defined the modern era, and Camus
rightly identifies Dostoevsky as its leading political prophet.
The foregoing analysis also points to the increasing tension of Camus’ thought.
In many ways, Camus is suspended between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s thought.
Nietzsche, for instance, is a philosopher of freedom and doubt; he denies absolutes and
urges acceptance of untruth. Despite his ethical reservations, Camus is persuaded by
Nietzsche’s epistemological critiques. On the other hand, Dostoevsky appears to
understand everything Nietzsche does, but insists on the moral necessity of transcendence
and the Christ-ideal. Dostoevsky argues that the loss of transcendent values will disturb
the individual and upend the political order. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus defines
absurdity in Nietzschean terms; transcendence is rejected and man is charged with
creating value and meaning in this life. In The Rebel, there is a subtle shift. Camus does
not abandon his absurd position, but he is forced to acknowledge the consequences of a
world without God. While Nietzsche was aware of the metaphysical struggles that would
follow in the wake of God, his solution is politically inadequate in Camus’ view. Rather
than affirm values on individual terms, as Nietzsche hoped, men made a divinity of
history and the future. As Camus put it, sensing the absence of transcendence, men
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decided to kill “so that it might exist.”157 With this insight, Camus aligns himself more
with Dostoevsky than Nietzsche.
In the following chapter, Camus’ problematization of transcendence is seen as the
impetus for his philosophy of revolt. As Camus develops his conception of revolt, the
tensional relation to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky is preserved, but Dostoevsky’s claims
concerning transcendence remain paramount. Camus refuses to adopt Dostoevsky’s
religious hypothesis, but the need to affirm something beyond one’s self undergirds
Camus’ thought. The difference is that Camus replaces Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal with
the image of the rebel. In doing so, Camus posits something experiential (and symbolic)
in the name of which men can act and judge. On his view, this undercuts the theoretical
justifications for crime and violence – or at the very least imposes limits on actio
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE POLITICS OF REVOLT
“Man can master in himself everything that should be mastered. He should rectify in
creation everything that can be rectified. And after he has done so, children will still die
unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to
diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering of
the world will remain, and no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an
outrage. Dimitri Karamazov’s cry of “Why?” will to continue to resound” - Camus
Following the positivist revolution in science, religious authority waned and
ideologies emerged as the dominant forces in political life. For Camus, the result of this
shift was a new kind of politics, one in which abstract ideologies replaced religions as
sources of identity and meaning. As an artist, Camus struggled constantly against these
sources of immoderation. Indeed, this was the defining theme of his revolt writings. In
The Rebel, for example, Camus reacts against the nihilism of his age by seeking to relocate the ground for action in the realm of experience. However, the theoretical basis of
Camus’ philosophy of revolt can also be seen in his fiction, particularly in the evolution
from The Stranger to The First Man.
Beginning with The Stranger, Camus develops an increasingly broader
conception of revolt, in which consciousness extends outward from the individual to the
collective. In The Plague and The Growing Stone, this collective consciousness has the
potential to create a community of revolt as well as a basis for solidarity and limits. And
in his final novel, Camus represents the experience of revolt through the myth of the first
man. The aim here is to follow these movements as they unfold in Camus’ texts.
Additional attention is paid to the role of antinomies in Camus’ thought. In addition to
clarifying the links between Camus’ absurd and revolt writings, this will allow for a
clearer distinction between Camus’ mature thought and that of Nietzsche and

159

Dostoevsky. I begin, however, with a brief explication of the problem of foundations, as
conceived by Dostoevsky and Camus.
One of the fundamental problems raised by Dostoevsky is that of foundations.
Nietzsche grasped the critical link between foundations and values, but his aim was
always to affirm the individual as the creative locus of meaning. For Dostoevsky,
individual meaning and social values could not be separated in this way; they were rooted
in a common idea, and the cost of divorcing them was disorder. Hence Dostoevsky
addressed the problem of foundations in terms of the inseparability of values and
transcendence. Camus sensed the importance of foundations, but he opposed
foundationalism as such. Despite his admiration for Dostoevsky, then, Camus remained
ambivalent towards Christianity. At the same time, Camus was equally dissatisfied with
the ideological alternatives to Christianity, particularly Communism. In a letter to his
mentor, Jean Grenier, Camus expresses his frustration:
And as for me, am I so confident? If there are no eternal values,
Communism is right and nothing is permitted, human society must be built
whatever the price. If it is wrong, then the Gospel and Christianity must
be followed. Never before has this dilemma been given an image more
distressed and insistent than today. And men like myself who dream of an
impossible synthesis, who refuse violence and lies without having to
justify their opposite, and who, nevertheless, cannot keep from screaming,
are going crazy.1
Camus is thus torn between Christianity and Communism, both of which denied the
primacy of experience. But Camus was similarly troubled by postmodernism, which
eschewed foundations altogether. As Cecil Eubanks has noted, Camus hoped to avoid
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“the essentialism of metaphysical thinking” while speaking “to a politics of value.”2 This
captures Camus’ project well, and illustrates the sense in which he sought foundations
without foundationalism. For Camus, values and justifications for action had to be rooted
in experience. Jeffrey Isaac makes a similar point with regard to Camus’ project.
Camus, Isaac claims, asserted human values in non-essentialist terms and denied
unequivocally that reason could “apprehend the historical absolute.”3 To accept the
relativity of values while affirming the dignity of human life was therefore a key tension
in Camusian revolt.
The focus on foundations points to an important convergence between
Dostoevsky and Camus, particularly as it relates to the link between order and ideas. As
mentioned, Dostoevsky refused to defend faith on epistemological grounds; instead he
emphasized the centrality of ideas to human living. For Dostoevsky, in fact, the loss of
God (or more precisely, the loss of the idea of God) meant the loss of the source of order
– at both the individual and the social level.4 The nihilists of The Possessed, for example,
are preoccupied with new “ideas” in proportion to their uprootedness from God and
tradition. This is evident in a key passage in the text:
"Not a single nation," he went on, as though reading it line by line, still
gazing menacingly at Stavrogin, "not a single nation has ever been
founded on principles of science or reason. There has never been an
example of it, except for a brief moment, through folly. Socialism is from
its very nature bound to be atheism, seeing that it has from the very first
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proclaimed that it is an atheistic organization of society, and that it intends
to establish itself exclusively on the elements of science and reason.
Science and reason have, from the beginning of time, played a secondary
and subordinate part in the life of nations; so it will be till the end of time.
Nations are built up and moved by another force which sways and
dominates them, the origin of which is unknown and inexplicable: that
force is the force of an insatiable desire to go on to the end, though at the
same time it denies that end. It is the force of the persistent assertion of
one's own existence, and a denial of death. It's the spirit of life, as the
Scriptures call it, 'the river of living water,' the drying up of which is
threatened in the Apocalypse. It's the aesthetic principle, as the
philosophers call it, the ethical principle with which they identify it, 'the
seeking for God,' as I call it more simply. The object of every national
movement, in every people and at every period of its existence is only the
seeking for its god, who must be its own god, and the faith in Him as the
only true one. God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken
from its beginning to its end. It has never happened that all, or even many,
peoples have had one common god, but each has always had its own. It's a
sign of the decay of nations when they begin to have gods in common.5
The character Shatov utters these words, but they are consistent with Dostoevsky’s
personal views. In a very literal sense, then, as Bruce Ward has suggested, Dostoevsky
held that “the sine qua non of human order is the possession of an idea of life.”6 To
Dostoevsky, Christ was an idea in precisely this way. Christ preserved order in society
by presupposing the purpose of life. Consequently, people were able to live by the light
of a common idea, and to judge action by a common standard. This is the sense in which
Dostoevsky preferred Christ to truth and thought religion the foundation of societal order.
Although he rejects the church as a source of societal order, Camus’ search for
foundations and values was prompted in part by Dostoevsky’s defense of faith.7 To
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begin, part of Camus’ resistance to Christianity was practical. He did not think it was
possible to reconcile faith with modern knowledge. To uphold the doctrines of
Christianity, he wrote in a 1942 notebook entry, “we should have to act as if our acquired
knowledge had ceased to exist, as if we had learned nothing, and pretend in short to erase
what is inerasable.”8 Camus does not therefore reject the substance of Dostoevsky’s
religious vision. On the contrary, he argued, much like Nietzsche, that reason
undermined faith and that such beliefs have consequently lost their motive force.
However, viewed in conjunction with works such as The Fall, Camusian revolt can be
seen as a foundational construct in much the same way the Christ-ideal was for
Dostoevsky.9 That is to say, both function as guides for action and experiential sources
of order – although Camus is concerned more with limits than order.
The emphasis on experience is particularly significant. At first glance,
Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal seems divorced from experience. However, to understand
Christ in this way is to miss Dostoevsky’s point altogether. Dostoevsky held that one’s
experience of reality was inextricably linked to one’s ideas concerning reality. What one
regards as real, in other words, is often a function of one’s ideas or beliefs. Ward
elucidates this Dostoevskyian concept nicely in the following passage:
For Dostoevsky . . . human order . . . depends upon an idea of the ultimate
meaning or purpose of existence – an idea which is not consciously
perceived as ‘idea’ but is simply and unquestioningly accepted as ‘reality’
itself. In the ordered human being this fundamental, though largely
implicit, idea of life seeks and finds outward expression in the concrete
world. The human need for order is thus a two-fold need for an ideal of the
8
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ultimate meaning of life, and a way of living out one’s daily life in accord
with this idea.10
Christ is thus not so much an idea as a mechanism by which to experience reality;
through it one’s orientation to others and the world is fundamentally altered. The idea of
Christ is therefore secondary to the living faith made possible by belief in Christ.
Dostoevsky’s experiential account of belief is best expressed through Father
Zossima of The Brothers Karamazov. In a series of exhortations, Zossima laments the
loss of foundations as well as the subsequent efforts to replace Christ with reason.
Russian aristocrats, he claims, “want to base justice on reason alone, but not with Christ,
as before, and they have already proclaimed that there is no crime, that there is no sin.
And that’s consistent, for if you have no God what is the meaning of crime?”11 Here
Zossima is implicitly referring to Ivan, whose internal love of mankind and justice
founders without God. Having lost the idea that bound him to others, Ivan’s experience
of reality is marred by doubt and contradiction. Zossima describes the torment of such
thus:
Unable to love . . . they live upon their vindictive pride . . . they are never
satisfied, and they refuse forgiveness, they curse God who call them. They
cannot behold the living God without hatred, and they cry out that the God
of life should be annihilated, that God should destroy Himself and his own
creation. And they will burn in the fire of their own wrath forever and
yearn for death and annihilation.12
Ivan Karamazov’s inertia thus follows from the absence of an idea concerning the
meaning of life. Affirming only what he can empirically verify, Ivan remains unable to
understand himself as part of a whole.
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In its essentials, Camusian revolt closely resembles Zossima’s active love. Indeed
both aim at the same thing, namely human solidarity. There are, however, two key
differences. First, Camus replaces the symbol of Christ with the image of the Rebel and,
second, as Avi Sagi claims, revolt aims at creating “a just world instead of a world of
divine grace.”13 This is significant because, as Sagi also notes, divine grace requires an
active God whereas “creating a just world is a human task.”14 Camus’ Rebel also
represents the shared nature of experience. In this way, Christ and the Rebel are symbols
grounded in the reality of human experience. They merely justify human solidarity and
love in different ways. In the case of Christ, solidarity is the result of man’s equality
before God. In the case of revolt, solidarity is born of a simultaneous denial and
affirmation. On the one hand, man protests his condition; at the same time, he affirms his
desire to live. In The Rebel Camus insists that the choice “to live is, in itself, a value
judgment.”15 Furthermore, because the affirmation of life is a “collective experience,”
revolt reveals a transcendent (and worldly) ground for value.
Zossima’s active love is thus different from Camusian revolt primarily in its
religious dimension. Yet it can be argued that Zossima’s ethical injunctions do not
require external compulsion. This is suggested in Zossima’s own remarks, which are
cloaked in divine language but amount essentially to a worldly call to action. Zossima,
for example, holds that all love is but a reflection of divine love. “Love a man in his sin,”
he says, “for that is the semblance of Divine Love and is the highest love on earth. Love
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all God’s creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it.”16 Later, however, he urges
men to
Seek no reward, for great is your reward on this earth: the spiritual joy
which is only vouchsafed to the righteous man. Fear not the great nor the
mighty, but be wise and ever serene. Know the measure, know the times,
study that . . . Love to throw yourself on the earth and kiss it. Kiss the
earth and love it with an unceasing, consuming love. Love all men, love
everything. Seek that rapture and ecstasy.17
Zossima’s decree contains nothing of the otherworldly and, in fact, is reminiscent of
Camus’ momentist affirmations of nature. Zossima says only that loving and acting is its
own reward. His statements reflect his (and presumably Dostoevsky’s) belief that God
leads to an awareness of the reciprocal contact of things. Since acknowledgment of such
interconnections is the basis of Zossima’s active love, God is central to his vision; while
Camus does not invoke God, he nonetheless appropriates much of Zossima’ ethos.
Indeed both seem to affirm the interdependence of experience, self-transcendence, and
value.
The question we must ask is whether Camus achieves Zossima’s (Dostoevsky’s)
aims on purely experiential terms. For Zossima, divine love (symbolized by Christ) is
manifested through individual acts of love. In this way, the act of love is itself creative of
value.18 Camusian revolt can be seen as a worldly extension of Zossima’s vision. Just as
Christ’s love becomes a basic reality through affirmative acts, in Camus’ thought the
choice to side with man and life reveals the existence of a common value. In an
important study of Camus, Jean Onimus argues that transcendence is achieved through
16
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the act of revolt itself, which “plays the role of the absolute.”19 By absolute Onimus does
not mean dogmatic; rather, he means something akin to universality. On this
interpretation, universal value emerges out of the individual’s metaphysical revolt.
Following Onimus, then, I trace the movement from individual to collective revolt in
Camus’ fiction. This will help to clarify two points. First, it speaks to the broader
development of Camus’ thought. The sensual individualism of his early period is never
refuted, but there is a clear shift towards a more inclusive, intersubjective reality.
Second, it shows how Camus tries to locate a ground for solidarity and limits in the realm
of concrete experience. Before proceeding, however, it is important to explain the
additional ways in which Camus engages Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in his formulation of
the problems inherent in the act of revolt.
Freedom and Morality Without God
One of the core problems Camus’ theory of revolt sought to resolve was the
conflict between the individual and the community (or between subjectivity and
intersubjectivity). More precisely, Camus struggled to reconcile Nietzsche’s individualist
calls to self-affirmation with his desire to impose limits on action. Camus’ engagement
with Nietzsche on this front unfolds largely in his fiction, particularly in works such as
Caligula, The Plague, and The Just Assassins. In his non-fiction, Camus explores this
problem in terms of values and limits. In The Rebel in particular, Camus regards
Nietzsche’s individualism as antithetical to communal life, which requires mutual
understanding and dialogue. Nietzsche, for example, enjoins the individual to create for
himself, to become a lawgiver. By empowering the individual in this way, however,
19
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Nietzsche undermines the basis for shared values. This was a central concern as Camus
began to develop his philosophy of revolt. In a 1946 letter to his mentor Jean Grenier,
Camus states openly that his essay on revolt is in part a response to the destructive legacy
of Nietzsche’s thought:
I will use my essay on revolt to say that this cult of history and the will to
power in which we live is both an insanity and a theoretical error. It’s
time to start the critique of Nietzscheanism (in its Hegelian aspect), not
from the traditional viewpoint, but from a contemporary one. Out of
nostalgia, no doubt, I am turning more and more toward that side of
mankind that does not belong to history. If it’s true that we live in history,
I know that we die outside history.20
This passage is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, it shows the extent to which
Camus remains engaged with Nietzsche. Even as Camus begins to diverge from
Nietzsche, he is still confronting the implications of Nietzsche’s thought. Second, it
highlights Camus’ increasing concern with values and foundations. As mentioned,
Camus thinks Nietzsche is fundamentally right about nihilism and the limits of human
knowledge. But Nietzsche’s ideas, Camus concludes, helped to usher in the age of
political nihilism. This was partly a consequence of Nietzsche’s desire to hasten the
crisis of nihilism, which was inevitable in any case. As Alexander Nehamas and many
other commentators have noted, it was this negative aspect of Nietzsche’s project that
accounted for his unusually hyperbolic style.21 Nietzsche, of course, was well aware of
20
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this, and consequently referred to himself as “dynamite.”22 Nietzsche expresses his intent
quite clearly in one his final works, Ecce Homo:
I am by far the most terrible man that has ever existed; but this does not
alter the fact that I shall become the most beneficent. I know the joy of
annihilation to a degree which is commensurate with my power to
annihilate. In both cases I obey my Dionysian nature, which knows not
how to separate the negative deed from the saying of Yea. I am the first
immoralist, and in this sense I am essentially the annihilator.23
Nietzsche’s goal is thus to force a confrontation with nihilism.24 Camus finds this
problematic, however. By questioning the origins and foundations of prevailing values,
Nietzsche comes perilously close to embracing a narrow and radical kind of limitless
freedom. With Nietzsche, Camus writes in a 1946 notebook entry, “liberty is an
exaltation” – there is no concern whatsoever for limits.25 Camus is even more direct
about this in his discussion of Nietzsche in The Rebel.
From the moment that it is admitted that the world pursues no end,
Nietzsche proposes to concede its innocence, to affirm that it accepts no
judgment since it cannot be judged on any intention, and consequently to
replace all judgments based on values by absolute assent, and by a
complete and exalted allegiance to this world. Thus from absolute despair
will spring infinite joy, from blind servitude, unbounded freedom. To be
free is, precisely, to abolish ends.26
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Camus’ discussion of Nietzsche in The Rebel highlights the importance of
Nietzsche to Camus’ search for values and limits. Camus makes clear in several
notebook entries during the years in which he wrote The Rebel that Nietzsche, whatever
his intentions may have been, provoked a crisis that could no longer be ignored.27 In this
way, Camus’ philosophy of revolt can be seen as a response to Nietzsche; it is Camus’
attempt to go beyond Nietzsche. Camus hints at this in The Rebel when he writes that
“Nietzsche did not formulate a philosophy of rebellion, but constructed a philosophy on
rebellion [italics mine].”28 Camus appears to do precisely the opposite: he uses a
philosophy on rebellion (Nietzsche’s) to construct a philosophy of rebellion.
If Nietzsche helps to frame the conflict between the individual and community for
Camus, Dostoevsky forces Camus to deal with the political problem of values without
God. In The Rebel, Camus examines this problem in terms of the evolution of revolt. He
begins by drawing a distinction between metaphysical revolt and historical revolution, at
the center of which is Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov. Camus describes metaphysical
revolt as “the movement by which man protests against his condition and against the
whole of creation.”29 Metaphysical revolt is best understood as the individual’s reaction
against meaninglessness as the essence of life. It is also, Camus suggests, an impulse for
order that manifests itself politically in the refusal to submit. In the context of this
discussion, metaphysical revolt is significant for two reasons. First, it is universal. It is
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common to all human beings who seek affirmation or resist oppression.30 Second, it is a
step towards self-transcendence. Metaphysical revolt, at its core, is “not an egoistic
act.”31 It may, as Camus concedes, have egoistic motives, but its expression signals a
demand for respect that transcends the individual. Hence it begins the moment the
individual “identifies himself with a natural community.”32
For Camus, Ivan Karamazov marks a turning point in the history of revolt.33 Like
Voltaire, Ivan challenges God’s moral sovereignty.34 But more importantly, Ivan
subordinates truth to justice; he sums up his rebellious ethos to his brother Alyosha in a
key passage:
Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive
and could forgive? I don’t want harmony. From love for humanity I don’t
want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would
rather remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation,
even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it’s
beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give
back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it
back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It’s not God that I don’t
accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket.35
The novelty of Ivan’s rebellion is apparent here. Ivan does not refute the possibility of
truth or God; rather, he is compelled to face the reality of human suffering first, which
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exists independent of God.36 This is critical for Camus because it is fundamentally an
expression of solidarity. “Ivan,” Camus writes, “is the incarnation of the refusal to be the
only one saved.”37 Ivan’s refusal to accept salvation alone alters the dynamics of revolt.
Revolt, which begins as a response to absurdity, becomes a kind of humanism; and
although Ivan’s humanism remains vague and abstract, his defiance represents the initial
“no” of Camusian revolt.38 It is therefore the impetus of Ivan’s refusal that interests
Camus. As Ray Davison writes, Ivan asserts the dignity of man and thereby “legitimizes
the ultimate metaphysical rebellion: to murder God in the name of human justice and
solidarity and to begin the work of building man’s kingdom on earth.”39 It is true that
Ivan’s rebellion lacks positive content, but this does not diminish its significance. His
exaltation of justice over grace, whatever else it leads to, is a crucial step in expanding
the consciousness of revolt.
Again, Ivan matters to Camus because he problematizes morality in the absence
of God. Thus it is with Ivan’s “everything is permitted” that “the history of
contemporary nihilism really begins.”40 Ivan also anticipates Nietzsche’s prophetic
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warning in The Gay Science about the consequences of losing God.41 The implications of
such a loss appear to Ivan in a dream in which the devil warns that “As soon as men have
all of them denied God . . . the old conception of the universe will fall of itself without
cannibalism and what’s more the old morality, and everything will begin anew.”42 This
realization is what lends Ivan’s revolt its moral seriousness. On the one hand, Ivan’s
rejection of God in the name of man creates the possibility of moral value; however, it
can also result, as Fred Willhoite notes in his study of Camus, in “deification of the total
rejection of what exists.”43 This concern with negation animated much of Camus’
thinking on rebellion. Ivan’s inability to avoid this temptation helped to crystallize
Camus’ conception of revolt – as well as his burgeoning opposition to Nietzsche.
In his biography of Camus, Olivier Todd notes a key disagreement between
Camus and Dostoevsky. Camus, he writes, “did not agree with Dostoevsky that if God
did not exist, all was possible. Certain acts, which are crimes, must be rejected.”44
Ivan’s dilemma clarifies this dispute. Ivan reasons fallaciously that without absolutes
there is nothing to justify virtue. There is “nothing in the world,” he claims, “to make
men love their neighbors . . . no law of nature that men should love mankind, and that, if
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there had been any love on earth hitherto, it was not owing to a natural law, but simply
because men have believed in immortality.”45 Here Ivan articulates a (perhaps distorted)
view of man’s fallen nature in the traditional Christian sense, which Camus refused to
countenance.46 Ivan’s view of human nature appears to have been shared by Dostoevsky
as well. In Diary of a Writer, for instance, Dostoevsky asserts that “love of mankind in
general, as an idea, is one of the most incomprehensible ideas for the human mind.”47
This is largely why Dostoevsky defended Christianity. God existed because He must,
because men require an object of eternal love.48 There is little doubt that Camus was
sympathetic to Dostoevsky’s religious impulse. Camus, in fact, made no attempt to
conceal his admiration for Christian thought.49 But as many commentators have noted,
particularly Thomas Hanna, Camus believed critical reason (as well as absurdity) had
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effectively undermined belief in Christianity.50 Camus is most forceful on this point in
an early 1942 notebook entry:
Modern intelligence is in utter confusion. Knowledge has become so
diffuse that the world and the mind have lost all point of reference . . . But
the most amazing things are the admonitions to turn backwards. Return to
the Middle Ages, to primitive mentality, to the soil, to religion, to the
arsenal of worn-out solutions. To grand a shadow of efficacy to those
panaceas, we should have to act as if our acquired knowledge had ceased
to exist, as if we had learned nothing, and pretend in short to erase what is
inerasable.51
Camus thought it too late, then, to return to Christianity or to any transcendent source of
meaning.
For Camus, Ivan’s value problem also points to Dostoevsky’s failure to see the
creative potential of rebellion. Contra Dostoevsky, Camus approaches Ivan’s “everything
is permitted” as a point of departure. Hence he remarks in a notebook entry that “we
must follow out all the consequences of his [Ivan’s] remark.”52 To declare that God is
dead neither permits nor forbids anything. Ivan’s declaration is only a beginning. As
Camus writes in The Rebel, the absence of eternal laws authorizes nothing, as “there must
also be values and aims in order to choose another course of action.”53 Ivan carries us to
a moral precipice of sorts, but that is all he does. Camus’ task was to find an experiential
alternative to Ivan that defended human dignity and supplied a ground for rebellious
action. To the extent that Camus formulates such an alternative, he does so in The Rebel
and The Plague. It is therefore to these texts that I now turn.
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From Solipsism to Revolt
In The Rebel Camus understands historical revolution as a form of collective
action, but one in which action is divorced from experience. For Camus, if revolt is to
remain authentic, it must transition from the individual to the social sphere without
denying its experiential origins. Giving form to this transition is the aim of Camus’ The
Plague. Indeed, Camus indicated this in an interview shortly after The Plague was
published:
“Compared to The Stranger, The Plague does beyond any possible
discussion, represent the transition from an attitude of solitary revolt to the
recognition of a community whose struggles must be shared. If there is an
evolution from The Stranger to The Plague, it is in the direction of
solidarity and participation.”54
Viewed in conjunction with The Stranger, then, The Plague crystallizes the evolution
from metaphysical protest to participatory action, and it presents a concrete extension of
the theoretical account of revolt in The Rebel. This section begins, therefore, by
contrasting the opposing images of revolt in The Stranger and The Plague.
First, it is important to situate The Plague in the larger context of Camus’ thought.
Published in 1947, The Plague occupies a central place in the arc of Camus’ career; it is
the point at which Camus the artist and Camus the moralist merge. Camus’ biographer,
Olivier Todd, points to this in his observation of The Plague’s significance: “With The
Plague the reader can observe the novelist’s changing attitude toward the absurd . . .
Camus and his characters in The Plague would distance themselves from the absurd in
order to find the pathway to revolt.”55 As Todd suggests, The Plague marks a shift in
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Camus’ thought. In previous works like The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus,
absurdity was the dominant theme. In The Plague absurdity persists, but it is examined
from an ethical standpoint, and so there is a greater emphasis on responsibility. In The
Myth of Sisyphus, moreover, the guiding question is, how does one live in spite of the
absurd? In The Plague the principal question is, how does one wrest a moral imperative
out of the absurd? For this reason, The Plague is the first work of fiction in which the
problems of revolt are dramatized.
The Plague is pervaded by two themes: death and suffering. Set in the Algerian
city of Oran, it follows a small group of citizens as their town is beset by a plague. As an
allegory, the novel operates on a number of levels. According to Camus, The Plague can
be read in three different ways. “It is at the same time a tale about an epidemic, a symbol
of Nazi occupation, and, thirdly, the concrete illustration of a metaphysical problem, that
of evil.”56 The third interpretation is particularly important in this context. For Camus,
the problem of evil was essentially the problem of suffering. It was critical to move
beyond absurdity because the absurd, as Camus wrote in his notebooks shortly after The
Stranger was published, “teaches nothing” concerning suffering and evil.57 The question
for Camus was thus how to conceive of suffering as a shared experience and, in so doing,
give birth to a collective consciousness of revolt.
The hero of The Stranger is a rebellious but solitary figure.58 In The Plague,
Camus departs from this image of revolt. Indeed through the protagonist Rieux, Camus
seems to counter the failed revolts of Mersault and Ivan Karamazov. For example,
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Rieux’s moral outrage rivals Ivan’s, but Rieux is able to channel that outrage into action
because, as Camus writes in The Rebel, “Ivan’s drama . . . arises from the fact that there
is too much love without an object.”59 For Ivan, humanity’s suffering is an abstraction
rather than an immanent problem founded in a concrete other. In a private letter to
Grenier, Camus emphasizes his attitude toward suffering:
Thank you also for what you wrote me about The Plague. But I believe
less and less that man is innocent. The thing is, my basic reaction is
always to stand up against punishment. After the Liberation I went to see
one of those purge trials. The accused was guilty in my eyes. Yet I left
the trial before the end because I was with him and I never again went
back to a trial of this kind. In every guilty man, there is an innocent part.
This is what makes any absolute condemnation revolting . . . Man is not
innocent and he is not guilty. How to get out of that? What Rieux means
is that we must cure everything we can cure while waiting to know, or see.
It’s a waiting situation and Rieux says, “I don’t know.” I came a long way
to reach this admission of ignorance.60
Two things distinguish Rieux from Ivan: his acceptance of ignorance and his devotion to
action. It is this devotion to action that I want to contrast with Mersault in particular. A
key theme of The Plague is the conflict between individual happiness and moral
obligation. Each character in The Plague, as Robert Solomon suggests, struggles “to
come to terms not so much with imminent death as with their own happiness in conflict
with their sense of obligation.”61 Rieux exemplifies the spirit of revolt because, unlike
Martha of The Misunderstanding, he refuses happiness on individual terms; instead he
devotes himself to resisting the plague and achieving solidarity with its victims. Rieux’s
happiness, in other words, consists in shared struggle and sacrifice.
As a model of revolt, Rieux resembles Camus’ absurd hero, Sisyphus. In The
Myth of Sisyphus, for instance, Camus writes that Sisyphus is heroic because he finds joy
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in futility. “Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks.
He concludes that all is well . . . The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a
man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”62 In the case of Rieux, however, the
futile struggle is against the reality of evil and suffering. Rieux’s revolt is thus Sisyphean
insofar as it entails commitment without promise of reward. This is apparent in the final
passage of The Plague:
And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux
remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those
jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the
plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant
for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in
bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day
would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it would rouse
up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.63
Rieux’s revolt is meaningful precisely because he knows it is a losing struggle. Just as
Sisyphus raises himself above his condition by becoming “stronger than his rock,”64
Rieux transcends his individual destiny by declaring his solidarity with those who share
his fate. Acknowledging the futility of one’s struggle is thus a critical step for Camus; it
entails acceptance of suffering and a renewed commitment to the present. The Stranger
similarly explores questions of meaning and happiness, but from an individualist
perspective. Moral obligation is not problematized in this text, as Mersault’s awareness,
much like Ivan’s, never extends beyond private experience. With Rieux, however, the
solipsism of Sisyphus and Mersault is transcended, and consciousness itself is changed.
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The Cartesian “I,” as Sagi rightly notes, gives way to an “interpersonal we.”65 As I argue
below, this shift in consciousness is a consequence of Rieux’s revolt. Mersault’s
indifference also helps to illustrate the ethical significance of human volition, which is a
point of emphasis in The Plague. Here, as Roger Quilliot argues, “characters are
revealed to us as the scourge comes to them or they go to meet it.”66 By defining the
characters in this way, Camus suggests that everything turns on our conscious response to
absurdity. As the characters eventually discover, no one escapes the torments of the
plague. But those who actively revolt against it, who reduce the suffering of others, are
able to find meaning in their struggles. Those who yield to diversions or abstractions or
self-interest, on the other hand, only exacerbate matters.
Camus also uses events in The Plague to awaken the collective consciousness of
the Oranais. Sagi has made a similar point regarding The Plague. For this first time in
this work, Saga writes, Camus explicitly suggests that a “solipsistic description of human
experience does not exhaust the human condition, which is intersubjective by
definition.”67 This is a critical point. Confronted by crisis, the citizens of Oran suddenly
understand their shared fate. But the plague dramatizes a permanent (and universal) truth
about the human condition, namely its susceptibility to suffering and death. In The
Plague, in fact, it is identification with the other’s suffering that leads to solidarity.68
Like Dostoevsky, Camus sought to harness the power of pathos; he used the absurd
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(symbolized by the plague) to communicate the proper orientation toward suffering.69
Indeed as Camus notes in the foreword to his theatrical adaptation of The Possessed, it is
“the thread of suffering and affection that makes Dostoevsky’s universe so close to us.”70
As a symbol, then, the plague emphasizes the contingent character of human existence.71
This is equally clear at the biological level. A man is not responsible for his genes or
intelligence, yet these factors shape much of his life. To grasp this is to see man as a
victim, rather than a cause, of his condition. The ethical implications of this are
significant. First, it arouses compassion and a sense of the contingency of human life,
which in turn points to a basic human equality.72 As Camus writes in his notebooks for
The Plague, “People live according to different systems. The plague abolishes all
systems.”73 The plague is thus an equalizer. Second, it stresses the importance of choice.
Robert Zaretsky has referred to this as Camus’ “ethics of attention.”74 Zaretsky’s
description is apt. For Camus, the only meaningful choice one can make concerns the
proper response to absurdity. Indeed this is the principal lesson of The Plague. Acting
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justly is the work of attention and care.75 Rieux accepts the reality of the plague and
consciously stands “with the defeated.”76 Mersault, on the other hand, has no concept of
solidarity. He pursues his happiness alone. Consequently, he undermines the possibility
of true revolt, which is fundamentally a collective experience. As Camus concludes in
The Rebel, “the first step of a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realize
that this feeling is shared with all men.”77 Mersault fails to do this, and as a result his
revolt does not go beyond the bounds of the absurd.
To further distinguish Rieux’s revolt, let us return to The Brothers Karamazov.
This will help to clarify the dispute between Camus and Dostoevsky on the question of
transcendence. To begin, there is a shared impulse at the root of Ivan and Rieux’s revolt.
Ivan, for example, rejects God on account of the injustice of innocent suffering,
particularly the suffering of children:
But then there are the children, and what am I to do about them? That’s a
question I can’t answer. For the hundredth time I repeat, there are numbers
of questions, but I’ve only taken the children, because in their case what I
mean is so unanswerably clear. Listen! If all must suffer to pay for the
eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, please! It’s
beyond all comprehension why they should suffer, and why they should
pay for the harmony.78
Rieux likewise invokes the imagery of children suffering. “I refuse to love a scheme of
things,” he tells Father Paneloux, “in which children are put to torture.”79 The impetus
for Ivan and Rieux’s revolt is thus hatred of suffering. By pointing to the suffering of
children, they highlight human innocence. But the capacity to identify with another’s
75
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suffering is paramount, and in fact becomes a precondition for the creation of a
community of revolt.
Although his ethical posture resembles Ivan’s, Rieux is not an abstract
humanitarian. Suffering is always a concrete problem for Rieux, not a theoretical
paradox. In this sense, Rieux is closer to Zossima, whose living faith inspires by
example. Ivan, however, appears to hate suffering more than he loves life. Despite his
moral outrage, Ivan’s rebellion remains internal and static. This dichotomy between Ivan
and Zossima is central to The Brothers Karamazov. Ivan and Zossima present two ways
of being. Zossima goes the way of grace and love; Ivan revolts and condemns. But the
choice between Zossima and Ivan is crude. It implies, as Maurice Friedman argues, that
one must “choose between rebellion and submission, social and spiritual freedom, social
and spiritual equality, individual consciousness and cosmic solidarity.”80 In the figure of
Rieux, Camus destroys this dichotomy; that is, Rieux combines the moral outrage of Ivan
with the living love of Zossima.
Rieux thus presents an alternative to Dostoevsky’s binary choice. It is common of
Dostoevsky’s rebels, for example, to either deny transcendence altogether or to become
mired in internal confusion. Rieux is different in this regard. He does not agonize over
the existence of suffering; he accepts it without resigning himself to it, and he has no
desire to anchor his actions in some higher metaphysical order. Further, Rieux resists the
attempts of others (notably Father Paneloux) to make a virtue of suffering. For his part,
this is an abnegation of one’s responsibility to heal and to pay attention to the sick. Here
Camus’ anti-Christian sentiment is most discernible. Indeed Camus remarks in Carnets
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that “there is an intoxication which is two thousand years old,” as a result of which men
“are exasperated by evil or resigned to it, which amounts to the same thing.”81 For
Rieux, one is obliged to engage and resist. More importantly, though, Rieux implies that
one can go the way of Christ (as Dostoevsky urges) without transcendent injunctions.
His fellowship with men is rooted instead in the reality of human suffering and in his
sympathy for the living. To quote Friedman once more:
In Doctor Rieux….Camus offers us a third alternative to his own - and to
Dostoevsky’s - god-man and man-god. Rieux neither submits to reality as
objectively meaningful, as does Paneloux, nor rebels against it on the
ground of pure subjectivity, as does Tarrou. His rebellion is neither that of
the Modern Promethean nor of the Modern Sisyphus, but of the Modern
Job.82
Rieux’s decision to act suggests that morality (and by extension, revolt) is neither a
metaphysical nor a religious precept but rather an experiential injunction arising naturally
out of life with others. This can be seen in the following exchange between Rieux and
Tarrou:
It comes to this,” Tarrou said almost casually; “what interests me is
learning how to become a saint.”
“But you don’t believe in God.”
“Exactly! Can one be a saint without God? – that’s the problem, in fact the
only problem, I’m up against today.” Tarrou said in a low voice that it was
never over, and there would be more victims, because that was in the order
of things.”
“Perhaps,” the doctor answered. “But, you know, I feel more fellowship
with the defeated than with saints. Heroism and sanctity don’t really
appeal to me, I imagine. What interests me is being a man . . . Yes, we’re
after the same thing, but I’m less ambitious.83
The desire to be only a man is especially important. In Camus’ thought, to be a man
means to live an absurd life and to share this condition with others. Rieux is an authentic
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rebel because he “knows it’s an absurd situation,” but insists that “we’re all involved in
it, and we’ve got to accept it as it is.”84 Ivan falters because he deifies what he rejects.
Rieux avoids the abyss of negation by focusing on the concrete and the immediate; the
contradictions of an absurd existence are immaterial. By means of this affirmation,
Rieux moves beyond the exile of Ivan and Mersault’s individual revolt.
The foundational implications of The Plague have been recognized by several
commentators. Most notably, David Sprintzen has argued that the outbreak of plague in
Oran symbolizes “the social order” being put “to the metaphysical rack.”85 The people of
Oran were “no longer able to take tradition as a self-evident guide to action, they had to
reconstitute their sense of the meaningful . . . they were forced to attend to the present.”86
Sprintzen makes an important point. By dramatizing the universality of the human
condition in experiential terms, Camus points to the primacy of the present. The future
and the past are dismissed as abstractions and only the present is seen as real and shared.
Suffering, in turn, is removed from the theoretical realm and made concrete. As a result
of this shift in orientation, new values are born and solidarity emerges organically.
Finally, as Cecil Eubanks has suggested, by grounding revolt in the realm of experience,
Camus posits “a prototype for a politics of foundations without foundationalism.87
Eubanks is correct to emphasize the undeveloped nature of Camus’ vision; however,
insofar as The Plague represents Camus’ search for a secular alternative to Dostoevsky’s
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religious foundationalism, it marks an important development in the authors’ dialogic
relationship.
The Growing Stone
The image of revolt depicted in The Plague is extended roughly a decade later
when Camus released a collection of short stories entitled Exile and the Kingdom. Here
the exile of absurdity becomes the basis of a worldly kingdom, and solidarity emerges out
of isolation. Published in 1957, The Growing Stone is the concluding story in Camus’
Exile and the Kingdom. The hero is D’Arrast, a French civil engineer who has been
commissioned to build a dam in a remote Brazilian village. Upon arriving in the village,
D’Arrast befriends a young cook. In a series of cryptic exchanges, the cook tells
D’Arrast of a promise he made to God. Having survived a recent shipwreck, the cook
vowed to “carry a hundred-pound stone” to the church at the center of town. 88 Though it
is not clear that D’Arrast understands, he tells the cook that “a man has to do what he has
promised.”89 Surprised by his response, the cook asks D’Arrast if he has ever made a
similar promise in a moment of desperation. When D’Arrast says “no,” the cook insists
that tomorrow “you are going to help me keep my promise, and it’s as if you had made it
yourself.”90 The conversation ends as the two men part with something like a silent
agreement.
The next day the procession proceeds as planned. Seated on a balcony beside the
church, D’Arrast awaits the cook. As he approaches, the cook collapses in exhaustion.
D’Arrast immediately tries to help him the rest of the way. They walk together until, just
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short of the church steps, the cook collapses again. In a pivotal scene, D’Arrast then
takes the stone onto his shoulders and continues marching toward the church. Suddenly,
however, he turns
away from the church, forcing the pilgrims to face. Behind him, he heard
someone running . . . He didn’t understand what they were shouting . . .
Suddenly Socrates appeared before him, rolling startled eyes, speaking
incoherently and pointing out the way to the church behind him . . . Yet
D’Arrast continued in the direction in which he was launched . . . He
settled the stone firmly on its cork base and went down with a cautious but
still steady tread toward the huts. When he reached them, his breath was
beginning to fail, his arms were trembling under the stone. He hastened his
pace, finally reached the little square where the cook’s hut stood, ran to it,
kicked the door open, and brusquely hurled the stone onto the still glowing
fire in the center of the room.91
The interaction between D’Arrast and the cook can be interpreted in several ways. Most
significant in this context is the theme of solidarity. In an insightful study of The
Growing Stone, Irina Kirk points to the implicit link between solitude and solidarity. “By
taking up the burden of a man with whom he can have no possible communion,” Kirk
writes, “D’Arrast saves himself from isolation.” “Out of this seeming futility,” she
concludes, “man creates his own meaning; and out of his inherent isolation, man creates
solidarity among other isolated beings. In the face of universal exile, the very basis of
human solitude becomes the means for union.”92 Kirk’s emphasis on shared meaning is
certainly justifiable. But equally important is the experiential context. Unlike The
Plague, there are no crises in The Growing Stone. Instead two men, divided by culture
and language, encounter one another under mostly ordinary circumstances. What they
share is a common experience (exile) and a common desire for salvation. This is a
significant point for Camus. In his universe,” as Lev Braun writes, “all differences –
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racial, cultural, social – could be remedied if only the flickering light of human
communion was preserved.”93 Though somewhat naïve, Camus persisted in his
conviction that such communion was achievable through openness to shared experience.
D’Arrast, then, may not understand the cultural significance of the stone or the church,
but he can understand the experiential impetus behind it as well as the sense of honor
attached to it. Camus suggests that this suffices (or must suffice) as a means to crosscultural solidarity.
The experiential context of The Growing Stone is central to its thematic intent.
As we have seen, Camus regards ideologies and even language itself as inherently
divisive.94 Indeed anything abstracted from experience has the potential to separate
action from meaning or, more importantly, symbols from their experiential origins. In
The Growing Stone, therefore, much like The Plague, individual as well as cultural
differences are transcended through awareness of a common condition. As a symbol,
then, the stone represents the burdens of an absurd life, which everyone must bear in their
own way. It may be true, Camus implies, that exile follows from absurdity, but it is also
true that an earthly kingdom is forged through acts of solidarity. The cook carries his
stone just as Sisyphus takes up his rock. D’Arrast merely accepts the responsibility of the
absurd man to ensure that no one carries his stone alone.95 Thus D’Arrast willingly takes
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on the yoke of another, just as Christ or Father Zossima would do. That he takes the
stone not to the church but to the cook’s hut is also symbolically important; it reflects the
true locus of revolt, namely the community. As Camus emphasizes in The Rebel, revolt
“acts on behalf of life . . . That is why it relies primarily on the most concrete realities –
on occupation, on the village, where the living heart of things and of men is to be
found.”96 This is consistent with The Plague, which similarly points to fellowship and
shared suffering as the foundation of revolt. In The Growing Stone, the hut represents
“the living heart of things.” It is a symbol of poverty. By placing the stone there,
D’Arrast expresses his solidarity with the villagers.
The vision of solidarity and revolt expressed in The Plague and The Growing
Stone is further developed in Camus’ last known work, The First Man. The First Man
occupies a unique place in Camus’ corpus. Incomplete at the time of his death, the
manuscript was not released until 1995. As an unfinished text, it is difficult to make
definitive claims about Camus’ intent. However, as his most autobiographical work, it
offers a rare glimpse into the author’s life and mind.97 It also helps to clarify the general
direction of Camus’ thought. Camus insisted that each of his works must be seen as
“stages on the way to unrewarded perfection.”98 Each text must therefore be understood
as part of a larger whole. This is particularly true of The First Man. Though incomplete,
the meaning of the text becomes clearer when viewed alongside Camus’ previous works.
In conjunction with The Stranger, The Plague, and The Growing Stone, The First Man
“participating in a way that preserves his individuality yet reduces the suffering of
others” (Exile, Judgment, and Kingdom, p. 281).
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presents a fuller picture of Camusian revolt. For this reason, it warrants a brief
examination here.
The First Man
The hero of The First Man is Jacques Cormery, a French Algerian whose father
died in combat shortly after he was born. The novel begins as Jacques searches for his
father’s burial site. When he discovers it, Jacques is overwhelmed with compassion. But
his compassion is not for his father, a stranger for whom “he could not muster a filial
devotion.”99 Instead, Jacques senses the larger injustice of a world in which the young
and innocent die. Camus describes the experience thus:
And the wave of tenderness and pity that at once filled his heart was not
the stirring of the soul that leads the son to the memory of the vanished
father, but the overwhelming compassion that a grown man feels for an
unjustly murdered child – something here was not in the natural order and,
in truth, there was no order but only madness and chaos when the son was
older than the father.100
The sensation described above signals Jacques’ encounter with absurdity. As Avi Sagi
points out, “the confrontation with his father’s tomb forces Jacques to experience the
limits of existence and its collapse.”101 Sagi’s account is confirmed in the text,
particularly in the emphasis on disorder and chaos. It can also be seen in the link
between absurdity and finitude, a consistent theme in Camus’ absurd works, particularly
Caligula and The Stranger. But more importantly, Jacques’ experience at the graveyard
symbolizes the movement from absurd awareness to conscious revolt. This is evident in
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Jacques’ initial reaction. Confronted by the spectacle of death, Jacques’ first thought is
not of himself or his father but of the finitude he shares with all men:
He looked at the other inscriptions in that section and realized from the
dates that this soil was strewn with children who had been the fathers of
graying men who thought they were living in the present time. For he too
believed he was living, he alone had created himself, he knew his own
strength, his vigor, he could cope and he had himself well in hand. But, in
the strange dizziness of that moment, the statue every man eventually
erects and that hardens in the fire of the years, into which he then creeps
and there awaits its final crumbling.”102
Rather than revolt angrily against the absurd, as Ivan and Martha of The
Misunderstanding do, Jacques affirms the universality of his experience. As Camus
writes in The Rebel, “the first step of a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is
to realize that this feeling is shared with all men.”103 Revolt begins, therefore, with
awareness, and Camus dramatizes this experience in the graveyard scene.
It is essential to understand Jacques – and his experiences – as symbolic of the
human condition. This is suggested in a crucial passage in which Camus implies that the
first man is like all men in that “he had to bring himself up, without a father . . . and he
had to grow alone, in fortitude, in strength, find his own morality and truth, at last to be
born a man.”104 This reading also finds support in a concurrent notebook entry: “The
First Man repeats the entire journey in order to discover his secret: he is not the first.
Every man is the first man, nobody is.”105 Viewed in this light, Jacques’ indifference to
his father is more intelligible. Initially the reader understands Jacques’ reaction at his
father’s grave as a function of the distance between them. But this misses the symbolic
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intent of The First Man, which is to understand Jacques not as a self but rather as a
manifestation of the spirit of revolt. Hence as the story progresses, it is increasingly
unclear who is speaking or to whom the narrator is referring; indeed Camus’ larger aim
does not crystallize until the text transitions from a historical narrative to a memoir.
The shift to a memoirist account occurs as Jacques begins to reconstruct his
father’s past. Henceforth it is apparent that Jacques is based on fragments of Camus’
own life and that, more importantly, Jacques’ father is a symbolic representation of
Camus’ ideal rebel. The father, for example, is described as an attentive man who is both
aware of absurdity and devoted to the values of revolt. This can be seen in the exchanges
between Jacques and various people who knew his father. Describing an incident in
which their patrol group encountered a desecrated body, a soldier recalls the moral
outrage of Jacques’ father:
But Cormery shouted as if crazed with anger: No, a man doesn’t let
himself do that kind of thing! That’s what makes a man, or otherwise . . .
I’m poor, I came from an orphanage, they put me in this uniform, they
dragged me into the war, but I wouldn’t let myself do that.106
The demand for limits and humanity is implied here. Later, however, it is emphasized.
“He submitted to everything that could not be avoided,” the man continues, “but had
preserved some part of himself where he allowed no one to trespass.”107 A recurring
theme in Camus’ writings is that absurdity fails as a guide for action and a source of
limits.108 For Camus, this was akin to Ivan’s “everything is permitted.” That Jacques’
father refuses to transgress certain limits, even in war, is continuation of this same theme.
It is also, as Robert Zaretsky suggests, a reflection of “Camus’ loyalty to the visceral
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ethics expressed by his father – the intuitive conviction that humankind, if it wishes to
preserve this status, must obey certain limits on its freedom.”109
The First Man has received comparatively little attention in the literature, which
is unsurprising given the incomplete nature of the text as well as its delayed publication.
Most recently, Ronald Srigley has argued that The First Man is Camus’ account of man
before the fall. It depicts human nature, Srigley writes, “before or in the absence of the
corruption of the religious dogmas that have guided the west for some two thousand
years.”110 Srigley’s account is partially true; here, however, I regard the first man as a
kind of proto-rebel. The image Camus crafts is one of man as he can and should be:
honest, measured, attentive, compassionate, and grounded in experience.111 This is
clearly the posture of Camus’ authentic rebel. In his notebooks, Camus also emphasizes
the theme of intersubjectivity. Against the individual’s “desire for power,” he writes, the
first man exalts the virtues of solidarity and self-transcendence.112 In the text Jacques’
solidarity can be seen in his denial of moral distinctions between men; instead all are
regarded as “victims.”113 And the transcendence to which he aspires is not otherworldly;
instead it is achieved the moment man imagines himself “reborn in the eyes of others.”114
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This act of imagination, because it makes identification with the suffering of others
possible, is for Camus the ground of revolt.
From The Stranger to The First Man, then, there is a linear progression from
solipsism to revolt. In the course of this movement, men find something in the name of
which to act and on the basis of which to judge. In each of these texts, moreover,
consciousness extends outward, culminating in a community of revolt. And the impetus
for revolt becomes increasingly commonplace. In The Plague it is a mass epidemic; in
The Growing Stone it is a man under duress; and in The First Man it is simply awareness
of death. These stories are linked, moreover, by a concern with alienation and
beginnings. In each case, by virtue of circumstance, men are alienated either from
themselves, their loved ones, or the world. Each time, however, their exile becomes an
opportunity for renewal. Absurdity remains a source of alienation, but the barriers
between men give way. And revolt becomes the mechanism through which the
metaphysical demand for unity is transformed into an earthly kingdom. This is what
Camus means when he describes revolt as “a fabricator of universes.”115
So far I have delineated the experiential origins of revolt. To illustrate the
foundational implications of revolt, the role of antinomies must be examined as well.
Beginning with his sensualist period, Camus’ writings are replete with antagonisms. Be
it the tension between means and ends or between thought and action, Camus is
constantly preserving tragic paradoxes. This endures in his theory of revolt, which is
similarly grounded in contradiction.116 At bottom, revolt seeks to balance competing
claims – freedom and justice, immanence and transcendence, being and becoming.
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Reconciliation between these demands is impossible, Camus insists; they must instead
find their limits in each other. The way to absolute unity is always through the
“suppression of all contradiction.”117 Revolt resists the excesses of revolution through
the preservation of this tension; to abandon it, to drift too far in either direction, is to
exceed the limits of revolt – this is the danger to which Camus refers above. Thus Camus
insists that revolt “is nothing but pure tension.”118
Revolt as Tension
In many ways, tension is the crowning concept of Camus’ thought. Indeed as
Camus’ thought progressed, he understood life in increasingly dialectical terms. He
refers to this in the final chapter of The Rebel:
Where could one perceive essence except on the level of existence and evolution? But
nor can it be said that being is only existence. Something that is always in the process of
development could not exist – there must be a beginning. Being can only prove itself in
development, and development is nothing without being. The world is not in a condition
of pure stability; nor is it only movement. It is both movement and stability.119

Camusian revolt is a reflection of this dialectic. Just as the world is suspended between
being and becoming, revolt is the resulting tension between man’s assertion of value
(life) on the one hand and the silence of the world on the other. Camus describes this
tension as “an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is looking for
its most perfect and profound rhythm.”120 Revolt is rhythmic because it is neither pure
flux nor constant stability; instead it is a harmony of opposites. On the basis of this logic,
Camus holds that there are no absolutes; “there are only limits.”121
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Acceptance of contradiction remains a dominant theme in Camus’ work from the
absurdist period onward. As argued below, Camus’ contradictory thoughts concerning
the legitimacy of violence is a notable example of this. The concept of absurdity is also
rooted in contradiction. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus makes no effort to resolve this
paradox; on the contrary, he asks whether one can live with or in spite of it. In The Rebel
Camus accepts the relativity of values and the necessity of limits precisely because the
contradictions of life demand it. This is a significant point of contrast between Camus,
Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky. As noted, for Nietzsche relativity is liberating. In a world of
pure becoming, values are impermanent and thus non-binding. Hence Camus argues that
Nietzsche’s philosophy eschews limits.122 Dostoevsky similarly associated relativism
with the loss of limits. The logic of this is best expressed through Ivan’s “everything is
permitted.” For Camus, however, “the absurd does not liberate; it binds.”123 If anything,
by revealing the tension between man and the world, absurdity demands the assertion of
human value. At the same time, it commands moderation, as the absence of eternal
values sanctions nothing. “There must also be values and aims,” Camus argues, “in order
to choose another course of action.”124 Camus maintains, furthermore, that if man
decides to live, it is because he has judged life valuable. By extension, “if we decide to
rebel, it must be because we have decided that a human society has some positive
value.”125 Revolt is thus a natural progression from absurdity in that it makes a universal
value of the individual’s affirmation of life. But revolt does not supply definitive rules
for action; rather, it marks a limit. To revolt is to agree to live in tension, and to
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continually re-affirm the dignity of human life.126 The moderating values of revolt are
therefore held together by a tension born of man’s contradictory condition.127
Before continuing, it is essential to explain in what sense revolt (and its
conception of tension) crowns Camus’ thought. As the quote above demonstrated,
Camus conceived of his work as a series of “stages on the way to an unrewarded
perfection.” The best way to track the development of Camus’ thought is to correlate the
symbols he uses with their corresponding themes and cycles. As Robert Zaretsky
recently noted, Camus was constantly mining symbols and Greek myths “not only to
make sense of his life, but also to make sense of our lives.”128 In an important study of
Camus, Pete Petrakis focuses exclusively on this aspect of Camus’ work, identifying
exile, judgment, and kingdom as the defining symbols of his thought. “Exile,” argues
Petrakis, “is a more personal and evocative experience of the absurd; judgment is the
fundamental ground of revolt; and kingdom building . . . embraced the limits of human
endeavors.”129 Exile, judgment, and kingdom are thus correlated with the themes of
absurdity, revolt, and limits. Petrakis’ thesis is consistent with the evolution of Camus’
thought, and Camus seems to corroborate it in a 1947 notebook entry, in which he
associates these themes with the first three stages of his work.130 In the context of this
study, Camus’ conception of limits is significant for two reasons. First, it speaks to the
larger coherence of Camus’ thought. In his transition to absurdity, Camus does not
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negate his early sensualist commitments; instead they are subsumed under his absurdist
thought.131 Likewise, as Camus progresses from absurdity to revolt, he is careful not to
abandon previous insights. Hence when he seeks a ground for value in The Rebel, he
does not exceed the bounds (existentially or epistemologically) marked by absurdity.
Having acknowledged the impossibility of absolute certainty, he looks to common
experience as a ground for revolt. And because absurdity imposes limits on reason, he
turns to symbols as means of examining contemporary life and of universalizing the
truths of experience.
Camus’ call to moderation can also be seen as the culmination of his dialogue
with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. To begin, Camus’ philosophical disposition was largely
a product of his rootedness in Mediterranean culture.132 A native of Algeria, Camus tried
constantly to reconcile what he considered the defining conflict of the century, namely
the battle between “German dreams and Mediterranean traditions.”133 This was a conflict
between ideas and experience, between divine nostalgia and an active love of life. The
origins of this internal struggle could be seen already in Camus’ early sensualist
literature. Camus’ biographer, Herbert Lottman, refers to Camus’ dilemma in a key
passage:
Camus explained that the Mediterranean divided him from most of his
fellow French writers, who had been nourished on German literature while
he had been raised on Greek. Plato was more important to him than Hegel.
But he admitted the influence of Pascal, Tolstoy, and Nietzsche: ‘This
choice will seem strange to you, and I myself agree that they don’t go
together. To tell the truth I haven’t managed to work out my own internal
contradictions.’134
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Camus’ uneasiness with his European and Mediterranean roots is important
because it helps to explain his tensional relation to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Camus is
clearly influenced by these thinkers, but he remains suspended between their
incompatible visions. With his philosophy of limits, however, Camus comes closest to
striking a middle path. As we have seen, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky disagree about the
proper response to the human condition. Nietzsche’s solution springs from his ontology
of power; Dostoevsky’s to his understanding of the sources of order in society. Although
Camus diverges from both of these solutions, his theory of revolt is fundamentally a
product of both.
The Nietzschean roots of Camusian revolt can be seen in its Hellenic antecedents.
Near the end of The Rebel, for example, Camus invokes Heraclitus as a model for his
dialectical view of experience:
Heraclitus, the discoverer of the constant change of things, nevertheless
set a limit to this perpetual process. This limit was symbolized by
Nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the implacable enemy of the
immoderate. A process of thought which wanted to take into account the
contemporary contradictions of rebellion should seek its inspiration from
this Goddess.135
It was thus within a Heraclitian framework that Camus developed his conception of
tension and limits. However, Camus likely borrowed his interpretation of Heraclitus
from Nietzsche. As Samantha Novello has noted, Camus consumed Nietzsche’s writings
on the Greeks between the years of 1938 and 1941, and “Nietzsche’s early pages on
Heraclitus are likely to have captured Camus’ attention and to have been interpreted in
light of the criticism of reason that the German philosopher expresses in his later

135

The Rebel, p. 296.
199

works.”136 Novello’s claim is more than justified, particularly her emphasis on reason.
Camus embraces contradiction, in part, because he was convinced of the fundamental
unintelligibility of the world. When he develops his notion of revolt, tension is posited as
a concomitant of this disunity. A close reading of Nietzsche’s texts also supports
Novello’s claim. In Twilight of the Idols, for instance, Nietzsche identifies Heraclitus as
the first philosopher to understand the importance of “plurality and change” as well as the
illusoriness of “duration and unity.”137 While Camus clearly departs from Nietzsche, it is
significant that he sought to ground revolt within this Nietzschean and Heraclitian
framework.138 And in light of the broader importance of Nietzsche’s metaphysics to
Camus, I regard Camus’ emphasis on tension as emblematic of Nietzsche’s enduring
influence.139
To the degree that Dostoevsky influences Camus, he often does so at the expense
of Nietzsche. This is particularly true on the subject of limits.140 In many of his writings,
Camus articulated the problem of limits in terms of foundations. Rather than embrace the
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religious foundationalism of Dostoevsky, however, Camus tries to establish foundations
on his essentially Nietzschean edifice. Camus’ aim is to reconstruct the experience of
limits by reinvigorating the classic Greek symbol of moderation, Nemesis. In a critically
important essay, Helen’s Exile, Camus contrasts the Greek sense of balance with the
modern thirst for totality: “The Greeks, who for centuries questioned themselves as to
what is just, could understand nothing of our idea of justice. For them equity implied a
limit, whereas our whole continent is convulsed in its search for a justice that must be
total.”141 Camus uses the symbol of Nemesis to represent the Greeks refusal to carry
“anything to extremes, neither the sacred nor reason, because it negated nothing, neither
the sacred nor reason.”142 This fidelity to limits, Camus argues, has been lost in the
modern world, and can only be recovered by a return to nature and lived experience.
Camus even links Nietzsche and the absence of God to the total embrace of “history and
power.”143 At the same time, however, Camus insists that we must live in the world of
uncertainty unmasked by Nietzsche while also cultivating a sense of the sacred as
Dostoevsky constantly urged. In this way, Camus tries to avoid the religious
transcendentalism of Dostoevsky while preserving his sense of order and limits.
Similarly, Camus remains committed to Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism but he condemns
Europe’s Nietzschean rejection of values. “Nietzsche is outdistanced,” he writes,
“Europe no longer philosophizes by striking a hammer, but by shooting a canon.”144
For Camus, the only way to communicate the core and eternal truths of
experience is to evoke them through myth. “Myths,” he wrote, “have no life of their own
141
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. . . They wait for us to give them flesh.”145 As a symbol, Nemesis represents not just
moderation but also the dangers of excess. In his notebooks, Camus refers to Nemesis as
“the goddess of measure . . . All those who have overstepped the limit will be pitilessly
destroyed.”146 For the Greeks, moreover, Nemesis was a distributor of divine retribution.
She exemplified the resentment aroused in men by those who disrupted the natural
equilibrium. As a foundational symbol of limits, then, Nemesis was ideal.
Camus does not reference Dostoevsky in his brief discussions of Nemesis, so
there is no explicit connection in that sense. However, Nemesis was the symbol Camus
correlated with the third phase of his work, which was unfinished at the time of his death.
What little Camus did write, then, was incomplete. Had Camus lived to develop this
phase of his thought, Dostoevsky would likely have figured prominently. In any event,
given Dostoevsky’s more general influence, Camus’ initial concern with limits likely
stemmed from his intense reading of Dostoevsky. As noted previously, Camus’ view of
the nihilistic consciousness was deeply influenced by Dostoevsky’s Notes from
Underground, The Brothers Karamazov and The Possessed. In these works, Dostoevsky
traced political nihilism to its origins in human consciousness; there is little doubt that
Camus’ political thought was transformed as a result of this. Along with the political
crises of his time, moreover, Dostoevsky’s art illuminated the Promethean excesses of
Nietzschean rebellion. Camus explains in The Myth of Sisyphus why he sides with
Nietzsche over Dostoevsky on the philosophical question of transcendence.147 Despite
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his refusal “to conjure away one of the terms” of the absurd problem, however,
Dostoevsky’s existential defense of the transcendent loomed large in Camus’ subsequent
thought.148 By grounding revolt in tension and by symbolizing the experiential source of
foundations, Camus bridges – or at the very least aspires to bridge – the gap between
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. This is the sense in which revolt both crowns Camus’ early
thought and represents the culmination of his dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.
Thus far the practical implications of Camusian revolt remain unclear. Previously
I concluded that revolt does not admit of definitive standards for action. The question is
therefore what would an ethics of revolt look like without such standards? What, in other
words, does Camus concretely advocate? Furthermore, if the act of revolt is creative of
value, in what sense are those values universal or binding? If Camus’ thought is to have
any practical relevance, these questions must be answered in the clearest of terms. Here I
present a provisional response by first addressing some of the common objections to
Camus’ political theory and then looking to Camus’ fiction for illustrations of authentic
revolt. To help clarify the practical import of Camus’ conception of limits, I also
delineate his notion of legitimate political violence.
Revolt in Practice
Several commentators have suggested that Camus’ thought is too vague or
unsystematic to guide action in the world. Ronald Srigley, for example, recently argued
that Camus’ “methodological skepticism” constrained his analysis because it prevented
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him from exploring “experiences that went beyond the limits they prescribed.”149 Srigley
is right to emphasize Camus’ skepticism, but it is untrue that Camus was prevented from
exploring such experiences. Camus does not go beyond the limits of his presuppositions
because that would exceed the bounds of absurdity. Again, Camus’ aim is to impose
limits on political action.150 He advocates an epistemological skepticism because it is
ideas (of God, of history, of human nature) that give intellectual cover to violent actions.
Hence he resists all claims to ultimate truths concerning reality or purpose. But this does
not mean that Camus was closed to experiential truths. Instead he sought to reinvigorate
those truths through the medium of art and fiction.
Critics have also claimed that Camus’ unwillingness to commit politically
rendered his thought practically insignificant. A recent example of this critique can be
found in Tony Judt’s The Burden of Responsibility, which treats Camus as an important
but largely unpolitical thinker. “Not unconcerned with public affairs or uncaring about
political choices,” Judt writes, Camus was nevertheless “by instinct and temperament an
unaffiliated person.”151 For Judt, then, Camus’ reluctance to take sides reflected the
ambiguity of his thought. Camus’ most vociferous critic, Jean-Paul Sartre, condemned
Camus on similar grounds. Following the publication of The Rebel, Sartre dismissed
Camus’ thought as unclear and ahistorical. On Sartre’s view, a political philosophy that
failed to address historical conditions amounted to “an abstract, introspective search for
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principles to solace our metaphysical unhappiness.”152 Whereas Camus looked to the
metaphysical origins of revolt, Sartre approached the problem from the perspective of the
worker. Against Camus’ metaphysical analysis of revolt, Sartre argued: “The
circumstances which bring about the crystallization of the masses into revolutionary
mobs can with good reason be called historical: they arise from the social, economic and
political transformations of the continent.”153 Sartre rejected Camus’ call for limits
because of the rebel’s asymmetrical relation to the power structure.154 Indeed, for Sartre,
a moderate revolt was a contradiction in terms. By virtue of his circumstance, the rebel
confronts an order he cannot defeat conventionally. Andre Breton, a prominent poet and
surrealist of the era, proffered a similar objection to Camus:
What is this phantom of revolt that Camus is trying to credit, and behind
which he takes shelter, a form of revolt into which moderation has been
introduced? Once the revolt has been emptied of its passionate substance,
what could possibly remain? I have no doubt that many people will be
duped by this artifice: it is a case of keeping the word and eliminating the
thing itself.155
Though hyperbolic, Breton’s (and Sartre’s) appraisal raises an important question.
Without a willingness to take extraordinary action, what becomes of revolt? Is it possible
to retroactively impose upon revolt the kinds of unclear limits Camus propounds in The
Rebel?
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To begin, it must be remembered that Camus’ concern was to undermine
theoretical justifications for violence. As the discussion of Hegel demonstrated, Camus
was sensitive to the totalizing tendencies of movements obsessed with change and justice;
and he was particularly disturbed by the capacity of intellectuals to justify crime on
ideological grounds. Critics like Sartre and Breton misunderstand (or deliberately
neglect) this aspect of Camus’ thought. Revolt should not be seen as an attempt to
explain reality or prescribe political action.156 Camus was drawn to figures like Ivan
Karamazov because he understood metaphysical revolt as a negation of reality.
However, as Eubanks and Petrakis observe, such negation can lead “to a form of exile in
which human beings are fundamentally unable to make judgments.”157 This inability to
make judgments (impose value) was the cardinal problem of revolt for Camus. To
historicize action, as Sartre urges, is to separate it from immediate experience; it also
divorces the rebel from absurdity – indeed it forces him into a position in which his
rebellion is contingent upon his non-recognition of reality; he must live in and constantly
reorder the false world he has created. This has disastrous consequences for human life.
It sets up a conflict between reality and the system purporting to explain it; and too often,
Camus believes, it is reality that must give way. This is the point at which “rebellion,
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forgetful of its origins . . . denies life, dashes toward destruction, and raises up the
grimacing cohorts of petty rebels.”158
Camus is thus not so much interested in defining revolt as he is in moderating its
effects. He begins with the observation that revolt, whatever its origins, can lead either to
solidarity or suffering.159 In defense of solidarity, Camus sought a proximate form of
rebellious politics that acknowledged the limits of human action. Jeffrey Isaac has
offered what seems to me a much better understanding of Camus’ political aims.
According to Isaac, it is a mistake to accuse Camus of ignoring history or of treating
revolt as a purely metaphysical undertaking. Responding to critics who charge Camus
with misrepresenting the nature of political struggle in The Plague, Isaac writes
They correctly saw that the rebellion depicted in The Plague is not a class
struggle, that it involves no political parties or mass movements and has
neither grandiose ideological ambitions nor any deep interest in state
power. But they were wrong to conclude that it therefore represents a kind
of pristine and moralistic political withdrawal. Rather, it depicts new kind
of politics . . . In no way does it abandon history. But it refuses any kind of
grand historical justification like that found in Marxism . . . Rieux lives
thoroughly in the present. This does not make him indifferent to
consequences. It is just that he chooses his ends and means soberly, and
justifies them not in terms of a grand narrative but in terms of an active
solidarity.160
Here Isaac captures the essence of Camusian revolt. From an ethical perspective, Camus
aims only to establish a pluralistic framework within which actions can be measured and
judged.161 It lacks the certainty of metaphysical systems because this is what life with
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others demands. Values are self-constituted products of a political community; to be
binding they must emerge from and be guided by dialogue and experience. This is what
it means to participate in political life, and Camusian revolt cannot be understood apart
from this fact.
The Just Assassins
In the play The Just Assassins, Camus offers a practical example of political
action guided by a rebellious ethics. Here revolt is seen from the perspective of the
revolutionary. Camus draws on historical events to show that even under extreme
circumstances, we cannot speak of just and unjust action but only of action that
recognizes limits. The Just Assassins is not a paean to pacifism, however. Violence is
accepted as a necessary and indefensible reality. But at the same time Camus tries to
establish a sense of measure and illustrate how the totalizing impulses of revolutionary
action can be moderated by an authentic politics of rebellion.
Performed for the first time in 1949, The Just Assassins is the story of an
insurrectionist group that aims to assassinate the Russian grand duke. It includes a small
cast of three characters, each of whom represents a different rebellious attitude. Stephan
is the absolutist; his devotion is total and he refuses to impose limits on action.162

action; ethics is not mathematics or even law. Rather, we grasp limits to humane action
and recognize that certain commitments cannot go together with others. This approach
reveals limitations intrinsic to the realm of values, establishing binding hypotheticals,
constraints of action within particular frameworks. Thus value claims should take an ifthen form: if that is wished, then this must be taken into view. But the need to act in
accordance with any specific ethical or human framework – with the if-clause of the
hypothetical – can never be deduced” (131).
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Kaliayev is the compassionate and authentic rebel; he opposes all attempts to rationalize
murder. “When we kill,” he says, “we’re killing so as to build up a world in which there
will be no more killing. We consent to being criminals so that at last the innocent . . .
will inherit the earth.”163 Kaliayev is continually troubled by the potential consequences
of his actions.164 Dora is the conscience of the characters; she is perpetually reminding
them that there are moral limits that cannot be transgressed.165 The tension that results
from the interactions of these characters reflects the dynamic between rebellion and
revolution; that is, it highlights the balance the rebel must strike between his demand for
justice and his refusal to justify murder.
The key struggle in the play revolves around Stephan and Kaliayev. These men
exemplify the opposing attitudes of rebellion and revolution. Stephan is the cocksure
revolutionary. His world is simple and free of ambiguity. Exasperated by the group’s
unwillingness to sacrifice children, Stephan explains his philosophy in clear terms:
There are no limits! The truth is that you don’t believe in the revolution,
any of you. No, you don’t believe in it. If you did believe in it sincerely,
with all your hearts; if you felt sure that, by dint of our struggles and
sacrifices, some day we shall build up a new Russia, redeemed from
despotism, a land of freedom that will gradually spread out over the whole
earth; and if you felt convinced that then and only then, freed from his
masters, and his superstitions, man will at last look up toward the sky, a
god in his own right – how, I ask you, could the deaths of two children be
weighed in the balance against such a faith? Surely you would claim for
when we stop sentimentalizing about children will the revolution triumph, and we be
masters of the world” (256).
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yourselves the right to do anything and everything that might bring that
day nearer!166
There are several things worth noting here. First, Stephan has no regard for the present.
When Camus speaks of revolutionary ideologies as “frustrated religions,” this is precisely
what he has in mind.167 Stephan rejects God but he cannot let go of transcendence. For
him “the future is the only transcendent value.”168 Stephan devalues life by using the
nobility of his ends as justification for murder. Second, he eschews limits. At no point
does Stephan consider the consequences of his actions. He is prepared to sacrifice
anything in service to the revolution. Stephan is the sort of pseudo-humanist that Camus
often associated with socialism: he “rejects the man of today in the name of the man of
the future.”169 Finally, Stephan’s aspirations are utopian. Against an absolute despotism
he seeks to impose an absolute freedom, which is as undesirable as it is unattainable.
Stephan’s actions reflect the “all or nothing” attitude of which Camus writes in The
Rebel.”170 Interestingly, Stephan’s attitude is mirrored in The Possessed by
Verkhovensky, who issues an analogous defense of unlimited action:
I ask you which you prefer: the slow way, which consists in the
composition of socialistic romances and the academic ordering of the
destinies of humanity a thousand years hence, while despotism will
swallow the savory morsels which would almost fly into your mouths of
themselves if you’d take a little trouble; or do you, whatever it may imply,
prefer a quicker way which will at last untie your hands, and will not let
humanity make its own social organization in freedom and in action, not
on paper.171
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Verkhovensky exhibits the same revolutionary mindset as Stephan; both advocate
unlimited action in the name of a future freedom.
If Stephan is defined by certainty, Kaliayev is defined by doubt. Kaliayev affirms
life and is prepared to act, but he will not blindly accept murder. In a revealing exchange
with Stephan, Kaliayev says
Quite likely you are right. But those I love are the men who are alive
today, and walk this same earth. It’s they whom I hail, it is for them I am
fighting, for them I am ready to lay down my life. But I shall not strike my
brothers in the face for the sake of some far-off city, which, for all I know,
may not exist. I refuse to add to the living injustice all around me for the
sake of a dead justice . . . Killing children is a crime against a man’s
honor. And if one day the revolution thinks fit to break with honor, well,
I’m through with revolution.172
Kaliayev’s desire to act is moderated by his conscience. Unlike Stephan, Kaliayev is not
immersed in utopian fantasies of absolute freedom and justice. To be sure, he recognizes
injustice, but he is faithful to the impulses of rebellion in a way that Stephan clearly is
not. Rebellion remains for him both a declaration of human innocence and a protest
against death. “I have chosen death,” he declares, “so as to prevent murder from
triumphing in the world.”173 Hence he will not consent to crime unless it can be justified
in present experience. Kaliayev’s revolution is only a means – to justice, to peace, to life.
He refuses to countenance Stephan’s rationalizations of murder. 174 Kaliayev is
constantly questioning himself and the group as to their motives and aims. “Kaliayev
doubted to the end,” Camus writes, “but this doubt did not prevent him from acting; it is
for that reason that he is the purest image of rebellion.”175
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The third character, Dora, mediates the moral struggle between Stephan and
Kaliayev. Her insistence on limits helps to balance the tension between them. She is the
embodiment of Camus’ ethical attitude. Like Kaliayev, Dora is continually burdened by
the necessity of violence. Mindful of what they have done, she wonders whether their
actions will ultimately prove self-defeating. “Nobody,” she worries, “will want to look
justice in the face again.”176 Dora is willing to adopt violence but only up to a certain
point. She believes that to go too far, to try to achieve too much, is to betray the people
in whose name they fight. Just as Ivan thinks the acceptance of suffering too high a price
for salvation, Dora deems the acceptance of murder too high a price for justice. If you
are willing to accept this, she says, it means “you have gone about it too fast . . . you are
no longer men.”177 At its core, rebellion is an affirmation of life; to unconditionally
accept murder is to abandon the entire project. This is the moral measure of revolt for
Camus, and Dora’s duty is to ensure that her fellow rebels do not exceed it.
Conclusion
Let us conclude by restating Camus’ aims during this final period of thought.
Camus is seeking a philosophy of politics that imposes limits and is consistent with the
demands of absurdity. By this measure, his conception of revolt is perfectly coherent. In
The Myth of Sisyphus, for example, Camus invokes absurdity to establish the
impossibility of absolute knowledge. He then rejects suicide as a consequence of the
absurd.178 In doing so, Camus lays the groundwork for a meaningful response to
absurdity. Life is said to have meaning and value if it is lived within the limits of the
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human condition. The ethical implications of this, while initially unclear, are quite
significant. For one, Camus’ absurdism nullifies the epistemological basis of ideologies.
As I argued above, this undercuts the ideologue’s moral certitude. The absurd is also a
declaration of human innocence; as the discussion of The Plague suggested, it defines the
human condition. For Camus this is a source of communion as well as an imperative to
serve those with whom this condition is shared.179
In The Rebel Camus extends his absurdist vision to include a positive philosophy
of revolt. In The Myth of Sisyphus, suicide was rejected, but murder was not. At this
stage, Camus’ metaphysics remain solipsistic, and there is not yet an ethics of
responsibility and solidarity. This is no longer the case in The Rebel and The Plague. In
these texts, Camus maintains his concept of the absurd, but, as Sagi notes, he develops “a
metaphysics of human unity” within that very framework.180 The limits marked by the
absurd, moreover, are transferred to the political realm and action is constrained by
experiential factors. Such grounds for action are hardly definitive, but again this is
precisely Camus’ point. Foundations must maintain their relative and provisional
character, as they exist only insofar as they are continually re-affirmed in experience.
Camus’ meaning here is perhaps better expressed by the French sociologist Raymond
Aron, who claimed that “Relativism is the authentic experience of politics.”181 At any
rate, to criticize Camus for failing to offer a practical guide to revolutionary action is to
misunderstand his intent. After all, Camus is responding to the plague of nihilism. In his
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view, it was important to, first, reclaim the value of human life and, second, to establish
moral limits on the basis of that claim. This is what the specter of nihilism in the
twentieth century demanded. “The world that people like me are after,” Camus wrote, “is
not a world in which people don’t kill each other . . . but a world in which murder is not
legitimized.”182
In terms of Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, the revolt period
is arguably the most significant. During his sensualist and absurdist periods, Camus is
largely converging with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. In his revolt works, Camus
develops their insights in an effort to move beyond them. The worldliness of Nietzsche is
translated into an experiential ground. Indeed because of its rootedness in reality, Camus
writes, revolt “tries to realize itself . . . from bottom to top.”183 The primacy of
experience and the denial of transcendentals are thus key Nietzschean influences on
Camus. At the same time, Nietzsche’s rejection of idealism (as well as his exaltation of
becoming) committed him to a philosophy of action without apparent limits; as we have
seen, Camus reacts strongly against this. Hence as Camus’ conception of revolt
progresses from The Stranger to The First Man, there is an increased concern with limits.
These limits were marked in The Rebel, but the medium of fiction allows Camus to
concretize them in dramatic fashion.
Although it is never explicit, Camus’ critique of revolution seems to follow
directly from his critique of Nietzsche.184 Camus objects to Nietzsche’s emphasis on
becoming because it negates being and therefore the source of living tension. Deprived
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of a moral counter-force, Nietzsche’s world is propelled perpetually by affirmations of
power and will. The result of this is a kind of circularity without limits or direction.185 In
the political realm, this circularity imperils the course of revolution. Here, as Camus
writes, “the word revolution retains the meaning that it has in astronomy. It is a
movement that describes a complete circle.”186 Revolutionary action thus turns endlessly
upon itself as it seeks to impose form on the world. In this way, it begins in the realm of
ideas and ends by translating those ideas onto the historical plane. Revolt is distinct from
revolution in that it reverses this movement; that is to say, “it leads from individual
experience into the realm of ideas.”187 Well beyond his sensualist and absurdist periods,
then, Camus continues to take his philosophical bearing from Nietzsche. That Camus
does so while rejecting Nietzscheanism only confirms the fundamental importance of
Nietzsche to Camus’ thought.
Lastly, one of the primary claims of this study is that Camus’ thought is often
suspended between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. This is most evident in Camus’ revolt
period. In The Rebel, for instance, Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche is almost inversely
proportional to his convergence with Dostoevsky. Indeed Camus invokes Ivan
Karamazov’s “everything is permitted” in order to highlight the problematic nature of
Nietzsche’s logic.188 Thus when Camus announced to Grenier that he would use his
essay on revolt to “start the critique of Nietzscheanism,” it was in part because of
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Dostoevsky.189 This juxtaposition suggests, furthermore, that Dostoevsky’s arguments
concerning values and foundations influenced Camus’ mounting concern for limits. In
The Rebel, therefore, there is a sustained emphasis on foundations, and the agonism of
revolt functions as a tensional source of order. While it is not clear that Camus is able to
preserve the unifying force of Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal, he does posit an experiential
basis for limits, values, and solidarity. In view of Camus’ resistance to essentialism, this
is the most his political thought could hope to accomplish.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
“If the duration of history is not synonymous with the duration of the harvest, then
history, in effect, is no more than a fleeting and cruel shadow in which man has no more
part. He who dedicates himself to this history dedicates to nothing and, in his turn, is
nothing. But he who dedicates himself to the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to
the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from it the harvest and
sows its seed and sustains the world again and again.” – Camus
Camus was never content with theorizing about justice and suffering. Indeed he
was one of the few French intellectuals to risk his life in service to the resistance. This
won him a considerable amount of praise and admiration. It also exasperated his
contemporaries, many of whom decried his high-mindedness. But Camus’ commitment
to action was quite sincere. He tried desperately to avoid the ideological posturing on all
sides. Instead he sought to serve justice at the most concrete level. In the ideological
climate of post-World War II Europe, this was extraordinarily rare.
Despite the criticism he endured in the latter part of his life, Camus’ humanist
legacy has grown steadily since his early death in 1960. In France and much of the world
his works are continually published and consumed. In addition to his literary success,
many of Camus’ political ideas, particularly his insights into ideology and revolt, have
proven increasingly prescient. The task of this final chapter is threefold: to summarize
what Camus takes from his dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky; to explain how he
transforms these insights; and to clarify the lasting significance of his project.
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky orbited around two problems:
nihilism and foundations. During his early sensualist period, Camus’ ideas on these
matters are latent or undeveloped. His writings are highly stylized and his concerns are
mostly aesthetic and existential. However, Nietzsche’s influence is already apparent. As
chapter three demonstrated, Camus’ sensualist works engage a number of Nietzschean
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themes, including aestheticism, foundationalism, and worldly affirmation. Although the
absurd dilemma is not formally articulated, Camus is clearly interested in the problems of
an absurd existence. And while he has not yet considered the political implications of
absurdity, he is already exploring its significance at the level of the individual. This is
evident in Camus’ early essays and notebooks, where happiness in an absurd world is the
central theme. In Nuptials, for example, Camus praises sensual living and denounces
other-worldliness in explicitly Nietzschean terms. The Nietzschean roots of these
convictions are confirmed in Camus’ notebooks, where Nietzsche is often quoted and
referenced.1
In Camus’ early fiction, Nietzsche’s influence persists. In A Happy Death,
Nietzsche’s doctrines of eternal recurrence and amor fati are dramatized and affirmed. In
Caligula, however, which was completed near the end of Camus’ sensualist period, there
is a tonal shift. Whereas in A Happy Death Camus seems to echo Nietzsche’s
momentism, in Caligula a tension emerges between absurdity and sensualism. The kind
of self-affirmation Nietzsche advocated is carried to its logical conclusion and the result
is political nihilism. Caligula is thus the first work in which Camus begins to explore the
social consequences of Nietzsche’s affirmative response to nihilism.
When Camus’ absurdist period begins around 1942, the dialogue with Nietzsche
continues, but the primary focus is meaning and values. This is first apparent in The
Myth of Sisyphus. Here Camus grapples with the epistemological implications of
absurdity and appears to embrace Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Nietzsche’s account of
truth also forms the basis of Camus’ metaphysics of ideology, which is not fully
1
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developed until The Rebel.2 As suggested above, The Myth of Sisyphus is also the text in
which Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky emerges in earnest. Although he does not
abandon Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism, Dostoevsky’s critique of nihilism (in works such
as The Possessed and The Brothers Karamazov) problematizes absurdity in new ways for
Camus. The connections Dostoevsky draws between absurdity and alienation awaken
Camus to the individual’s struggle for meaning in a world without transcendence. In The
Myth of Sisyphus Camus engages Dostoevsky directly and examines suicide. For Camus,
in fact, suicide emerges as an absurd theme in Dostoevsky’s works.3 While Camus
challenges Dostoevsky’s claim that absurdity renders life meaningless, the force of
Dostoevsky’s arguments seem to undermine the worldliness of Camus’ early writings.
Another problematic in Camus’ mature thought concerns the tension between
nihilism and transcendence. This question recurs throughout Camus’ absurdist writings.
As the dialogue between nihilism and transcendence is personified by Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky, these are the works in which Camus’ dialogue with both thinkers begins to
crystallize. Having adopted Nietzsche’s perspectivism in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus
remains committed to an anti-essentialist position. However, by the time he publishes
The Plague and The Rebel, Camus appears to question the logical outcome of Nietzsche’s
radical skepticism. In particular, Nietzsche’s individualist calls to self-affirmation
conflict with Camus’ burgeoning desire to impose limits on action.4 Initially appealing,

2

As chapter five argues, Dostoevsky’s account of historical nihilism and logical crime is
also inform Camus’ understanding of totalizing ideologies.
3
See The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 108.
4
As I argue in chapter four (pp. 8-10), this conflict is at the center of Camus’ play
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Nietzsche’s individualism is now seen as antithetical to communal life, which demands a
shared basis for values.
Camus’ critique of Nietzsche reaches its climax in The Rebel. Here Camus
clarifies his rejection of Nietzscheanism and the implicit link between metaphysical angst
and political nihilism is articulated. For the first time, moreover, Camus applies
Dostoevsky’s psychological insights to his analysis of revolt, and the connections
Dostoevsky makes between individual and societal disorder (notably in The Brothers
Karamazov and The Possessed) are affirmed. This is most apparent in Camus’
engagement with Dostoevsky’s literary character, Ivan Karamazov. As mentioned, with
Ivan metaphysical revolt leads to a moral impasse, and the problem of individual
meaning becomes a question of virtue for society as such. Using Ivan as a model, Camus
traces the movement from metaphysical revolt to historical revolution. Although Ivan’s
revolt gives way to nihilism, his example shaped Camus’ subsequent thought in two
ways. First, Ivan poses the problem of relativity and limits without God. For Camus, this
clarified the political implications of a world without transcendent standards. Second,
Ivan’s subordination of truth to justice as well as his concern for human suffering
constituted a positive ground for human solidarity. Indeed much of Camus’ revolt-era
fiction articulates an experiential alternative to nihilism and transcendence on the basis of
Ivan’s moral declaration.
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky culminates during the revolt
period. As the previous chapter concluded, Camus’ political thought ends with a call to
dialogue and moderation. This is informed in different but equally important ways by
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. On the one hand, Camus’ commitment to uncertainty,
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present experience, and creative engagement are functions of his early embrace of
Nietzsche. These are principles which emerge in Camus’ youthful writings and which
appear to follow from Camus’ initial encounter with Nietzsche’s works. On the other
hand, Dostoevsky’s emphasis on foundations, guiding principles, and order are preserved
in Camus’ politics of revolt. From at least The Plague onward, Camus defines these
problems in distinctly Dostoevskyian terms, and there is little doubt that his solutions are
informed by Dostoevsky’s literature. The question we must now ask is to what extent
does Camus succeed in his synthesis of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky? And what, if
anything, does Camus’ success or failure suggest about the possibilities for an
authentically absurd politics?
Between Nihilism and Transcendence
Much of Camus’ political thought seeks to bridge the gap between nihilism and
transcendence. This work has argued that Nietzsche and Dostoevsky personify Camus’
dialogue with these phenomena. As a diagnostician, Nietzsche identifies nihilism as the
crisis of modernity; he traces its origins to various human pathologies and points a way
forward for the creative individual. However useful it may have been, Nietzsche insisted
that the positing of transcendent ideals was no longer justifiable. The metaphysical
suppositions on which those ideals were based had collapsed, and the consequences of
this were already apparent. Hence he urges mankind (philosophers in particular) to create
new values rooted in worldly affirmations of life and will.
Dostoevsky seems to understand all that Nietzsche does (particularly at the level
of the psyche), but Dostoevsky defends transcendence on existential grounds. Unlike
Nietzsche, Dostoevsky regards transcendence as essential for human flourishing. On his
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view, belief in a higher idea of life was both a moral and a political imperative. The
metaphysical and epistemological foundations of faith were always secondary to its
practical benefits. For Dostoevsky, moreover, a shared conception of the meaning of life
was the true locus of order in society. Divorced from such a conception, individuals
became alienated from their communities and the result was political nihilism.
Camus’ thought is properly situated between these two poles. Fundamentally,
Camus agrees with the spirit of Nietzsche’s “God is dead” remark. That is to say, he
agrees that God as a source of meaning and value has lost its motive force. He also
concedes and laments that enlightenment thought has emptied the world of transcendent
meaning. For Camus, in fact, the nihilism of twentieth century politics is a consequence
of this loss of meaning, and Nietzsche was among the first to awaken him to this fact.
Indeed Nietzsche’s diagnosis is the starting point for Camus’ absurdist inquiries.
Despite agreeing with Nietzsche, Camus appears to be influenced (if not
convinced) by Dostoevsky’s affirmation of the idea of God. As mentioned in chapters
four and five, Camus’ references to Dostoevsky as well as his choice of literary motifs
suggest that Camus grappled constantly with Dostoevsky’s defense of transcendence.
This was not apparent until his revolt period, but from The Plague onward Camus is in
constant dialogue with Dostoevsky in this regard. We have seen the complicated form
this takes in Camus’ works, now we can evaluate Camus’ broader thought in terms of this
struggle between nihilism and transcendence.
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus appears to reject a transcendent ground for
values. As noted, Camus even criticizes Dostoevsky for betraying the absurd by holding
forth on transcendence. In The Rebel, however, Camus notes the persistence of the

222

transcendent impulse in the various ideologies and scientific systems that followed “the
theological era.”5 In historical Marxism and Auguste Comte’s system in particular,
Camus sees models of “the horizontal religions of our times.”6 Although it is never
explicit, Camus’ analysis implies that the hunger for transcendence (of which religions
and ideologies are manifestations) is perhaps irrepressible in the human soul. Nietzsche
reached a similar conclusion in his thought, which is why he insisted that we must choose
our mask of transcendence wisely. Likewise for Camus, the question was how to satisfy
this desire for transcendence without sacrificing the truth of absurdity.
Camus’ experiential alternative emerges in his revolt-era writings, particularly
The Rebel and The Plague. Together these works locate a ground for values that is
beyond the individual but not transcendent in the conventional or religious sense. This
ground is experiential insofar as it begins with the act of revolt; it is transcendent in the
sense that it affirms life and value while also imposing limits on action. The kind of
transcendence that Camus seeks, therefore, is neither vertical (religious) nor horizontal
(historical); it is a universal experience that transforms the isolated individual into a
member of a community of revolt. As the preceding chapter explained, Camusian revolt
is about awareness – of the value of life, of the universality of suffering, and of the
absurd condition which all men share. In The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel,
transcendence is said to escape the problem of life by giving it a false solution. Worse
still, it removes human beings from concrete sources of meaning – nature, suffering,
friendship, and the kinds of individual action that lead to a sense of community; these are
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the sources of an earthly kingdom in Camus’ works. Ultimately, Camus sees revolt as
the basis for an intersubjective consciousness; it uses experience-symbolizations to
inspire a kind of imaginative identification with others. At bottom, Camus tries to
cultivate man’s capacity to think from the standpoint of another. Hence the movement
from individual to collective revolt in Camus’ novels (notably The Stranger and The
Plague) is marked by the outward expansion of the individual’s consciousness.
Although sympathetic to Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal, Camus rejects it as a product
of man’s metaphysical rearing; it is tethered to what Nietzsche often called “idols.”
Perhaps because of his Nietzschean roots, Camus never wavers in his commitment to
anti-essentialism. Thus Camus does not conceive of revolt as an ideal in the traditional
sense; rather, it is an experiential symbol that points to man’s embeddedness in a
common situation. Participation in the community of revolt does not require adherence
to particular doctrine, nor does it demand that one commit to the absolute truth of an idea.
For Camus it is essential to adhere to values and practices that are both contingent and
binding. The values born of revolt (life, limits, compassion, dialogue), though relative,
are affirmed continually through collective action.
In many ways, Camus rejects the language of absolutism and relativism, as both
categories presuppose that values require foundations in the traditional sense. Indeed, as
Nietzsche often noted, nihilism was an inevitable consequence of this model. Camus’
philosophy of revolt escapes this problem by carrying Nietzsche’s perspectivism to its
proper conclusion. That is to say, Camus relinquishes the idea of absolute truth and
advocates an experiential pragmatism in which values are collectively acknowledged and
mutually reinforced. The source of limits and values, he insists, cannot be reduced to a
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unified principle. For this reason, a community of revolt is held together not by a
common conception of truth but rather by a commonly recognized experience and a
commitment to active dialogue. In the end, Camus sought a ground for solidarity that
recognized distinctions and embraced the tensional quality of human existence. This is
why Camus does not so much resolve the problem of foundationalism as reject its
underlying assumptions.
In On Human Conduct, Michael Oakeshott argues that a “morality is neither a
system of general principles nor a code of rules . . . It is not a device for formulating
judgments about conduct or for solving so-called moral problems, but a practice in terms
of which to think, to choose, to act, and to utter.”7 Revolt is a political morality in
precisely this sense; it eschews abstractions and embraces the tensions of a shared and
absurd life. Rather than demand unity, revolt tolerates difference and affirms those
things which all human beings share, namely a desire to live and an aversion to suffering.
In this way, revolt is above all a reorientation toward the world, a renewed commitment
to present experience.
The question of whether Camus succeeds in his synthesis of Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky is difficult to answer. To address it we might also ask whether Camus
successfully bridges the gap between nihilism and transcendence. Even the most astute
critics, such as David Sprintzen, have argued that Camus’ alternatives are vague and
“tend to be little more than moralisms.”8 Like Sartre and others, Sprintzen claims that
Camus fails to appreciate the individual’s relation to historical processes and,
7
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consequently, fails to understand humans “as the product of their own natural, historical,
collective self-creation.”9 As illustrated in chapter five, however, it is untrue that Camus
ignored man’s historical situation.10 Indeed Camus was deeply attuned to the historical
and institutional origins of human suffering. As to the claim that revolt is impractical and
unappreciative of humanity’s “collective self-creation,” I believe this error arises from a
failure to understand the radical nature of Camus’ project. As the Oakeshott quote above
suggested, the ethics of revolt are non-prescriptive by design. Camus’ goal is not to posit
a definitive ground for judging and deciding; for that is what foundationalist systems
have done. Instead he tries to identify the preconditions for a new kind of intersubjective
politics, one in which the body and the present moment are supreme. Experience and
authentic communication are fundamental because they provide a general framework
within with to judge action, but only on a provisional basis. The acceptance of
uncertainty is a product of Camus’ desire to impose limits on action. Given the eruption
of nihilistic violence in Europe, it is not surprising that Camus thought imposing limits
the most urgent problem of his time. As Roger Quilliot observes, Camus believed the
best way to do this was to purge politics of “the prophetic spirit and the romantic sense of
mission” which came to dominate revolutionary politics in the twentieth century.11
Judged in this light, Camus’ notion of revolt is of greater value than many of his critics
suggest, particularly Sprintzen and Sartre.
It is also inaccurate to claim that Camus fails to account for the role of “collective
self-creation.” Indeed the mythology of the rebel and the first man are attempts to re9
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interpret the meaning of metaphysical revolt, to transform it into a collective experience.
By collective experience I do not mean collective action involving the use of a party or
movement to effect political change; this is precisely the sort of action against which
Camus is reacting. In Camus’ writings, particularly his late fiction, individual revolt is
based upon and brings about a collective sense of the human condition. Out of this
collective sense a genuine community of revolt can emerge. Revolt is thus a creative act
whose symbolic significance transcends the individual. Camus does not, therefore, deny
that historical conditions shape human life and consciousness; rather, he is evoking the
classical symbols of exile, judgment, and kingdom to awaken human beings to the reality
of suffering and loss. For Camus, these symbols have the capacity to alter human
consciousness, even in the face of historical necessity and material scarcity. To be sure,
Camus does not present a scheme whereby political institutions or decisions can be
categorically judged. However, as Pete Petrakis concludes, Camus’ “analysis does allow
for a thorough evaluation of social, cultural, and ethical foundations.”12 This is all
Camus intends to do with his theory of revolt, and its significance must be judged on this
basis alone.
It is easier to grasp what Camus is trying to accomplish if it is seen in the larger
context of his thought. Fundamentally, Camus sees nihilism and transcendence (be it
religious or historical) as equally problematic. Nihilism either obliterates standards
altogether or it leads to the exaltation of power. In novels like The Possessed,
Dostoevsky illustrates this problem with astonishing clarity. Alternatively, because they
are often rooted in abstractions, transcendentals divorce judgment (theory) from
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experience (praxis) such that any action is in principle justifiable. This is more or less
the problem of idealism as defined by Nietzsche – although Nietzsche was concerned
with the life-denying implications of idealist thought. For Camus, transcendent
foundations are beyond the realm of human understanding. More importantly, because
they are divorced from experience, they often fail to impose limits on action.
In the final analysis, Camus’ philosophy of revolt seeks to accomplish two things.
First, it establishes a ground for human judgment beyond metaphysics or transcendentals.
By doing so, Camus avoids the epistemological traps of nihilism and transcendence.
Second, revolt identifies ethical boundary conditions on the basis of which certain actions
(murder, for example) can be deemed illegitimate. Camus’ success on these two fronts is
a matter of legitimate debate, but that debate must begin by acknowledging the impetus
and intent of Camus’ political project. Here I have defined this project in terms of
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. In addition to crystallizing the
problems against which Camus was reacting, this approach has also clarified the novelty
of Camus’ efforts. Whereas many political thinkers have sought to establish what human
beings can and cannot know, Camus rejects this epistemological method. Instead he
accepts the impossibility of certainty and tries to reconnect knowledge and meaning to its
proper ground in experience. In this sense, Camus posits something akin to virtue ethics,
according to which the question is not what shall I do, but who shall I be?
That there are limitations to Camus’ approach is undeniable; however, this is not
surprising given the scale of his ambitions. Ultimately Camus wants to modify our
expectations of politics and truth. This process begins in The Myth of Sisyphus, where
the limits of human knowledge are marked by absurdity. In The Rebel, Camus builds a
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political philosophy on the basis of these absurd revelations. Untruth and doubt are
affirmed, but meaning is preserved (and nihilism is rejected) on account of human
volition. In his fiction, Camus aims to evoke a sense of solidarity and limits. His efforts
may not achieve the sense of awe that can be inspired by foundationalist pleas, but this is
a necessary concession Camus makes to absurdity. A witness to the political horrors of
the twentieth century, Camus believed that rejecting doctrinaire thinking required that we
also reject the consolations of transcendent meaning. To compensate for this loss and to
resist nihilism, Camus engaged various experience-symbolizations in order to recover a
sense of value and community in the modern world. While this effort does not achieve
the explanatory depth or prescriptive power of historical ideologies or transcendent
religions, it does address the alienation and excesses of modern life. For Camus, this was
a necessary first step in the pursuit of an authentic politics of revolt.
Camus’ Legacy
Camus’ controversial position on Algeria reflects his lasting concern with
suffering and limits. The choice between competing certainties was anathema to his
thinking, mostly because it neglected the complexities of political life and discouraged
productive discourse. This is no less true today. Further, while Camus’ moderation was
condemned by many of his contemporaries, his obstinacy now seems remarkably
prescient. In the case of Algerian War of Independence, for example, Camus was widely
criticized for his inability to side either with France or the Algerian rebels. Yet Camus’
silence was not the result of paralysis. Indeed he worked feverishly behind the scenes on
behalf of many political prisoners. Camus refused to choose sides because he believed
that neither faction had a monopoly on justice. “I want Arab militants to preserve the
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justice of their cause by condemning the massacre of civilians,” he wrote, “just as I want
the French to protect their rights and their future by openly condemning he massacres of
the repression.”13
Fundamentally, Camus was not interested in a meaningless victory for France or
the Algerian independence movement; that is, one that failed to break the cycle of
violence and retaliation plaguing Algeria. Hence, as a recent article concludes, Camus
continued to hold that “a third way between colonial oppression and Algerian
independence was possible.”14 This third way involved a commitment to dialogue and
non-violent resolution. In “Letter to an Algerian Militant,” Camus explains his reasoning
quite well:
But I know from experience that to say these things today is to venture
into a no-man’s-land between hostile armies. It is to preach the folly of
war as bullets fly. Bloodshed may sometimes lead to progress, but more
often it brings only greater barbarity and misery. He who pours his heart
into such a plea can expect only laughter and the din of the battlefield in
reply. And yet someone must say these things, and since you propose to
try, I cannot let you take such an insane and necessary step without
standing with you in fraternal solidarity . . . The crucial thing is to leave
room for whatever dialogue may still be possible, no matter how limited.
It is to defuse tensions, no matter how tenuous and fleeting the respite may
be. To that end, each of us must preach peace to his own side. The
inexcusable massacres of French civilians will lead to other equally stupid
attacks on Arabs and Arab property.15
Camus thus foresaw that a victory – for either side – won through terror would result not
in freedom but in further destruction.16 Such was the cyclical nature of violence without
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limits.17 Instead Camus pushed for a more pragmatic and peaceful resolution, one that
secured political and economic justice for Algerians and respected the rights of the
French settlers. In another letter on the crisis, Camus issues a final plea:
I therefore propose that both camps commit themselves publicly and
simultaneously to a policy of not harming civilian populations, no mater
what the circumstances. For the time being, such a commitment would not
change the situation. Its purpose would simply be to make the conflict less
implacable and to save innocent lives.18
These are not the words of a disconnected moralist. Camus was never blind to the
political realities in Algeria; on the contrary, he accepted the necessity of violence and
struggle. He merely enjoined each side to recognize certain limits, and to do so not for
moral reasons but because the alternative was interminable conflict. “How can one
condemn the excesses of the repression,” he argued, “if one ignores or says nothing about
the extremes of the rebellion?”19 Camus’ moderation was thus a response to the poverty
and hopelessness of either-or approaches to political conflicts. In his writings on Algeria,
it is clear that Camus’ intent was to end the escalation and to establish the basis for a third
way. Unlike so many of his contemporaries, Camus’ fidelity to a measured justice
prevented him from adopting the totalizing attitudes that defined his historical moment.
This is evident in his comments on Algeria just as it is in his critique of historical revolt
in The Rebel. While this position alienated Camus from many of his intellectual peers,
president Ahmed Ben Bella began violently purging the FLN of elements he believed
were willing to negotiate with the French during the war.
17
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his moral clarity continues to resonate in our own time, particularly with those seeking
justice in a world without apparent meaning.
Camus’ enduring significance can also be attributed to his understanding of the
incompatibility of violence and dialogue and, more generally, to his critique of ideology.
In a controversial speech in Algeria, Camus explains his view of the former in the
clearest terms:
The struggle has taken on an implacable character that arouses on both
sides irrepressible rage and passions that can be slaked only by escalation.
‘No further discussion is possible.’ This is the attitude that kills any
chance of a future and makes life impossible. What follows is blind
struggle, in which the French decide to ignore the Arabs, even if they
know deep down that the Arab demand for dignity is justified, and the
Arabs decide to ignore the French, even though they deep down that the
French of Algeria also have a right to security and dignity on the land we
all share. Steeped in bitterness and hatred, each side finds it impossible to
listen to the other. Every proposal, no matter what is nature, is greeted
with suspicion and immediately twisted into a form that renders it useless.
Little by little we become caught in a web of old and new accusations, acts
of vengeance, and endless bitterness, as in an ancient family quarrel in
which grievances accumulate generation after generation to the point
where not even the most upright and humane judge can sort it out. It
becomes difficult to imagine how such an affair can end.20
Certainly Camus is not the first to draw this connection. As an artist, however, Camus
was able to articulate these ideas using traditional symbols and pathos in a far more
powerful way. Indeed that Camus resisted injustice via art is itself an important part of
his legacy. In his fiction, Camus describes in existential and symbolic terms what is
often inexplicable in historical or empirical terms. In “The Growing Stone,” for example,
he shows how language conceals important commonalities between individuals and
cultures. While reason often fails to bridge these divisions, Camus uses various
symbolisms to emphasize their origins in a common experience. Thus in “The Growing
20
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Stone” and other works, authentic dialogue begins paradoxically with a silent recognition
of a shared fate and condition. This dialogic communion is impossible, Camus suggests,
when men seek either to submit or persuade each other. Perhaps there is a naïveté to this
aspect of Camus’ thought, but it points to a deeper truth, namely that solidarity must be
grounded in experience, not in ideas or a misguided belief that differences are to be
reconciled rather than affirmed.
Camus understood intuitively that human beings are often divided not by reality
itself but by their ideas concerning reality. He does not deny that there are just material
reasons for conflict, however. Camus is quite clear about this in The Rebel. Instead he
points to the uncertainty of our knowledge to emphasize the need for limits. It is the
fusion of unchallengeable principles and legitimate material grievances that typically
produces the most bloodshed. “For what strikes me amid all the polemics, threats, and
eruptions of violence,” he writes, “is everyone’s good intentions. Everyone . . . believes
that his truth is likely to make men happy. And yet the conjunction of all these good
intentions leads to this infernal world, in which men are still being killed.”21 For Camus,
extremism takes hold when people cease to doubt their “own certitudes and
knowledge.”22 This is tied to the larger problem of ideology. Ideologies are destructive
not because of their content but because of their justificatory power. Absolutely certain
of his convictions, the ideologue sacrifices present life and experience in service to some
future end. This is a peculiar form of nihilism, which Camus often referred to as political
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realism. “The errors of both the Right and the Left,” he lamented, “define the nihilism of
our times.”23
Despite its utility, Camus did not think critical reason a reliable check against
such ideological distortions. As conceptual tools, Camus believed that reason and logic
were too often handmaidens to ideology. Owing to Nietzsche’s early influence, Camus
viewed reason as a prop used to rationalize a particular perspective or narrative. Hence
Camus sought to close the gap between theory and action. Human action had to be
justified in terms of values rooted in experience and awareness, not in ideas concerning
history or the future. Whatever his theoretical shortcomings, this is a valuable
contribution. That Camus was able to formulate these concerns in such universal terms
only adds to his continued importance.
Camus’ aversion to ideological abstractions is related to his broader concern with
the monologic quality of political disputes. As explanatory narratives, ideologies are
quite useful; they order the world; they situate an individual or a group within a larger
historical context; and they justify interpretations of reality. For Camus, however,
ideologies also undermine authentic communication. To bind one’s political identity to a
particular ideology is to be invested in the truth of that ideology. This determines how
individuals interpret the world and, more importantly, how they interact with one another.
In the political realm, this carries enormous implications.

23

Ibid, p. 32.
234

Most obviously, it reduces political discourse to a struggle amongst competing
and irreconcilable worldviews. Camus spoke directly to this in an article for Combat:
We have witnessed lying, humiliation, killing, deportation, and torture,
and in each instance it was impossible to persuade the people who were
doing these things not to do them, because they were sure of themselves
and because there is no way of persuading an abstraction, or, to put it
another way, the representative of an ideology.24
For Camus, then, ideologues are not engaged in honest conversation about reality; they
are defending fixed doctrines. In The Rebel, Camus describes this as the vain attempt “to
fit the world into a theoretic frame.”25 Facts matter only insofar as they correspond to a
pre-determined narrative. As a result, political exchanges are monologic rather than
dialogic, and reality itself is an ancillary concern. Camus felt that the consequences of
this were truly calamitous. Besides diminishing the role of experience, it obscured the
origins of political disputes and denied the fundamental commonalities among human
beings. To the extent that Camus was able to identify this aspect of ideology, his writings
remain vitally important.
Taken together, Camus’ thought and art offers a nascent picture of our political
natures, the origins of which recent scholarship has begun to illuminate.26 To begin, as a
philosopher of the absurd, Camus develops a psychology of revolutionary politics,
according to which ideologies are reactions against meaninglessness. Like the religions
they replaced, ideologies impose order onto the world. But this is precisely why
absurdity is essential to Camus’ political thought. One has to accept the absence of given
24
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meaning in order to appreciate the responsibility of human beings to act and judge on
their own terms. This responsibility includes the imperative to create and affirm ethical
values. By undermining the metaphysical origins of ideology, Camus also reorients
human beings to experience. While Camus does not suppose that inherent political
differences can be reconciled, he argues persuasively that sustained awareness of their
common roots is a critical first step. Dr. Rieux’s cry that “there are more things to
admire in men than to despise” is an expression of this theme; it implies that there is a
nobility to human life that transcends our deepest divisions. But only an extraordinary
mindfulness is capable of grounding the sort of virtue ethics advocated by Camus.
Finally, Camus points to the need for an experiential politics of revolt. Far from
advocating a Utopian scheme in which human solidarity trumps concrete differences,
Camus demands only that we think differently about the world and others. His choice to
articulate this via the symbolism of revolt may indeed limit him as a political scientist.
As an artist, however, he remains among the most important moral voices of his and our
time. And although Camus does not ground any fixed or transcendent values, he does, as
Lev Braun notes, provide “an incentive to those who have preserved the integrity of the
rebel’s initial experience.”27
Camus’ thought is best seen as a reaction against the extremism of ideological
politics. This is most powerfully expressed in his essay, Helen’s Exile. In a passionate
defense of moderation, Camus praises the Greek sense of beauty and measure:
“Admission of ignorance, rejection of fanaticism, the limits of the world and of man, the
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beloved face, and finally beauty – this is where we shall be on the side of the Greeks.”28
Camus admires this attitude for two essential and related reasons. First, he thinks it more
humane. Only a fidelity to limits (epistemological and otherwise) can resist the totalizing
temptations of nihilism and foundationalism. Second, as an artist, Camus finds the Greek
conception of limits and balance more beautiful. Acknowledging the antimonies of
nature and life, Camus argues, the Greeks “could understand nothing of our idea of
justice,” which is necessarily total.29 For Camus, the modern historical spirit stands in
opposition to the Greek spirit, which was fundamentally artistic. Modernity, on the other
hand, preferring history to beauty, “steels itself to attain the absolute and authority; it
wants to transfigure the world before having exhausted it.”30 This view is consistent with
Camus’ early embrace of Nietzsche as well as his appreciation for Plotinus, which is
expressed in his dissertation and reaffirmed in Helen’s Exile. In the end, Camus’ moral
vision was inseparable from his aestheticism. To see the world from the perspective of
the artist was, in some sense, to see it as both impermanent and as an invitation to create
within the limits of the human condition. Hence he writes in the final passage of Helen’s
Exile that the future of humanity “lies in the struggle between creation and inquisition.”31
Ultimately, Camus’ honesty and eloquence have established him as an important
figure in the rich tradition of French moralism. His popularity beyond France is no less
surprising. Camus’ works confront humanity’s most enduring questions and concerns.
However problematic his solutions may be, Camus offers critical guidance to those who

28
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want to live and act justly in an absurd world. Camus also matters because he appeals to
our noblest impulses. He enjoins us to share our struggles insofar as we can, and to
reduce the suffering of others at all costs. Undoubtedly these are lofty aims, but for
Camus they are the preconditions for a humane politics.
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